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ABSTRACT 
 
                                                       
The aim of this thesis is to assess the role of the state in economic development in the 
GCC countries. Three aspects of this subject are investigated. An Indirect role of the 
state is analyzed through the effect of financial development on the economic growth. 
And direct roles of the state are examined through the impact of defence spending and 
that of public infrastructure on the development process. 
 
First the role of financial development is analyzed by using three alterative causality 
tests. The results suggest that the existence of long-run relationship between economic 
development and the state of financial development in most GCC countries. The 
results further suggest that financial sector can be a l eading sector for some of the 
GCC countries. Second, the impact of defence spending on economic development is 
examined by e mploying VAR/ECM models. The emerging results suggest that 
defence expenditure appears to retard economic development for countries with 
relatively heavy defence expenditure (Saudi Arabia and UAE), whilst positive effect 
is suggested for GCC member with relatively low defence spending (Bahrain and 
Oman). Third, for one member of GCC (Saudi Arabia) the role of public 
infrastructure in economic development is analyzed also using VAR/ECM. The 
results indicate that the high public capital expenditure in Saudi Arabia has 
insignificant effect in the economic development in the long – run.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION          
                                                       
The Arab Gulf Countries that constitute the “Gulf Cooperation Council” (GCC) are 
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates (UAE). The 
GCC was found in 1981 as result of the political instability of that time in the region, 
such as Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the First Gulf war between Iraq and Iran 
started in 1980, and further to strength the security and economic interests of those 
countries (Momani, 2008). Most of these countries were formed and found after 
World War II. Kuwait gained a sovereign status from United Kingdom (UK) in 1961, 
while Bahrain, Qatar, and UAE granted theirs in 1971. Oman, on the other hand, has 
been independent since the departure of Portuguese colonists in 1650, and Saudi 
Arabia granted its independence from UK in 1934 ( Abdel-Hadi, 2005). These 
countries, to large extent, share common cultural, political, and economic features; 
royal monarchy, high dependency on oi l, and relatively low population density- 
around 35 m illion at present- are the most obvious characters of those countries 
(Azaam, 1988; Al-Muharrami et al, 2006; Beblawi 2008; among others).  
 
After World War II, the level of socio-economic development in GCC countries and 
most countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region was below that of 
most newly independent developing regions; adult illiteracy rate were well over 85 
percent and only about 23 percent of children ages 9-19 enrolled in school (Yousef, 
2004). GCC states, with exception of Saudi Arabia, are quite small in terms of land 
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area and size of population; they are small coastal states located on the Persian Gulf 
as in Figure 1.1. Saudi Arabia amounts for about 80 percent of the land area of GCC 
region, 70 percent of the population, and about half of the collective GDP. Oman is 
the second in land area but the third in population after UAE, while Qatar and then 
Bahrain are the smallest after Kuwait in both land area and population size. 
Furthermore, GCC region is one of the driest places in the world with huge desert 
landscapes, possibly the most fragile on t he earth, and has no rivers or lakes with 
sporadic and infrequent rainfall. During the summer the temperatures can go well 
over 50 centigrade. The economic activity in most GCC countries was revolved 
around a small agricultural sector and some small finishing industry in some of the 
small coastal states, in addition to livestock of the nomadic population “the herding 
population” and some commercial activities that usually take place in a bazaar or suq-
type in few small scattered urban towns around the region.  
Figure 1.1: The Gulf States and the surrounding region 
 
Source: Ulrichsen (2009). 
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The discovery of oil, nonetheless, with massive quantity has undoubtedly changed the 
destiny of these countries. A destiny of traditional agricultural pastoral economies has 
been replaced, with oil wealth, to a more modern one with relatively advanced-service 
economies that can be capable of producing consumer and industrial goods. The 
region sits on the world’s largest proven oil and natural gas reserves, a round 45% and 
17% respectively of the world’s total (Fasano and Iqbal, 2003); with four of the six 
countries are members of OPEC, the industrial cartel of oil producing countries.1 
However, the pronounce role of the oil wealth in the development process in the 
region did not take effect until the 1970s where the rest of the small states granted 
their independence from United Kingdom, and the political instability in the MENA 
region derived the oil prices to  standard  levels by that time.2  
 
These countries have been receiving large amount of windfalls from oil exports since 
early 1970s. The development process in the region, therefore, has relied heavily on 
the rents derived from oil and natural resources exportations. Beblawi (2008) argues 
that the recurrent flow of rents from oil and natural gas have made those countries the 
most conspicuous rentier economies in the world. In essence, the windfalls from 
natural resources have major impact on the general pattern of economic behaviour and 
the potential comparative advantage of other economic sectors. This could be 
attributed to the fact that the discovery of oil in the region, with massive quantity, was 
coincided with the finding of those countries. As a r esult, oil rent has become the 
                                                 
1 Oman, although oil producer, is not member of OPEC. Bahrain, on the other hand, has not been a big 
oil producer.  
2 The state formation and the economic development process in some of the GCC countries (Bahrain, 
Qatar, UAE, and to lesser extent other countries in the region) perhaps did not start effectively until the 
British announcement, in 1968, of their desire to withdraw from the Persian Gulf by 1971. For 
example, up to the 1960s the Gulf rupee, issued by the central bank of India, was the region’s only 
universally accepted legal tender (Sursock, 1988).  
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major source of building both the state and the economy. 3 Furthermore, such heavy 
external windfall with small economic capacity have given the GCC region an 
international position as a significant supplier of financial funds to the international 
market, and to some world organizations – the World Bank (WB) and International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) – , as well as a generous donor to developing countries. For 
example, in 1981, one member of GCC, Saudi Arabia, claimed the sixth place among 
the 141 member of the IMF in voting strength as well as a constant seat on the 22 
member board of directors after a $10bn loan from the kingdom to the Fund (El 
Mallakh, 1982). 
 
A rentier economy is the case w here the national resources sector, with substantial 
external rent, dominates the economy. A rentier state as Beblawi (1987) suggests is a 
special case of rentier economy where the rent accrues do not go t o individuals or 
private corporations, but rather go directly to the state. In addition, only small portion 
of the labour force involved in the process of generating this rent whilst the rest of the 
society is only engaged in the distribution and in the utilization of the wealth. The oil 
exporting developing countries whose large portion of their income is derived from 
oil rent – such as GCC members (see Table 1.1) – are  typical example of a rentier 
state (Okruhlik, 1999).  
 
The most pronounced economic features of GCC countries are the dominant role of 
natural resource sector in the economy, as well as the high dependency on expatriate 
labour where over 50% of labour force in those countries is expatriate workers – in  
some cases as m uch as 90% (UAE) (Jbili et al,1997) –. Together with some 
                                                 
3 Beblawi argues that this coincidence distinguishes them from other rentier, semi-rentier economies 
such as those of Norway, Canada, and Netherlands in the 1960s, where the natural resource activity in 
latter countries added to existing developed economy with productive sectors.   
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neighbouring countries GCC members form the most hydrocarbon-centred in the 
world (Sturm et al, 2008). Oil rents remain the major determinant of economic growth 
where the governments’ ownership of the Petroleum companies has allowed the state 
to play the major role in all economic activity (Beblawi, 1987; Mazarei, 1997; among 
others). Devaux (2006) also argues that GCC countries remain rentier states where oil 
and natural gas, in case of Qatar, revenues account for over 70% of the governments’ 
revenue in most of the GCC countries since the 1970s when oil companies 
nationalised and the ownership passed to the governments in the region.  
 
The region, nonetheless, has made a relatively noticeable economic development in 
the last few decades, with relatively large projects of infrastructure. GDP per capita, 
for example, has jumped from around $1080 in 1970 to $17000 by 1980 due notably 
to the huge windfall from oil exports as in Table 1.1. H owever, GDP has declined 
remarkably since the mid of 1980s, as in Table 1.1, a s result of relatively low oil 
prices in most of the 1980s and the 1990s. Reflecting the dominate role of natural 
resources sector in those economies. Other development indicators reflect the stage of 
development in some areas, with life expectancy increases from around 58 year in 
1970 up t o 70 year in the late 1980 and around 75 a t present. 4 Table 1.1 pr esents 
some macroeconomic and development indicators in the region.  
 
 
                                                 
4 Haq (1992), however, argues that the dilemma of development concept in most developing countries 
can be detected through some development indicators. Saudi Arabia GDP per capita, for instance, is 15 
times that of Sir Lanka but much lower literacy rate. Costa Rica GDP per capita also is one third of that 
of Oman but its life expectancy is 10 years longer and its literacy rate is 3 times higher. These 
comparisons reveal the critical disparity between economic and social progress among countries.   
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Table 1.1: Consolidated GCC Macroeconomic and Development Indicators 
Variable unit 1970 1975 1980 1985 1991 1995 2000 2005 
Nominal GDP US$ bn 8.4 73.1 239.4 172.2 199.1 240.2 342.3 615.4 
Exports % GDP 0.61 73.9 81.3 58.8 50.2 54.8 64.9 70.9 
Fuel exports % merch exports Na na 71.1 na 59.1 79.4 88.1 87.5 
Imports US$ bn 1.9 11.6 52.1 43.6 56.5 68.2 82 187.6 
Imports % GDP 0.22 0.16 0.21 0.25 0.28 0.28 0.24 0.3 
Population mn 7.7 10.1 13.8 18.3 23.7 25.7 29.9 34 
GDP Per capita US$  1084 7201.9 17404.3 9410.1 8400.8 9354.5 11430.3 17866 
Life expectancy year 58 na 65.9 69 72.3 73.2 74.7 75.8 
Illiteracy rate % population over 15 Na na Na 0.25 0.23 0.21 na 0.24 
Oil reserve bn barrels Na na 272.4 305.5 463 464.9 476.1 484.3 
Natural Gas 
reserve ton cubic meters Na na 9.5 12.5 19.4 22.1 29.2 41.1 
Sources: IMF, IFS, World Bank (WDI), (Database, 2007), and Annual statistical Bulletin, OPEC (2007) 
 
Recently those countries have devoted more attention toward economic integration 
among them moving from free trade area in 1981 to full customs union in 2005. The 
gulf common market among those countries has been declared by the beginning of 
year 2008, and a monetary union with a common currency is the next expected step, 
although Oman has already withdrawn from the ongoing procedures of establishing a 
common currency and monetary union among the GCC members.5 GCC countries do 
understand the challenges that facing their economies with economic globalization, 
where they are all now members of WTO. Hence, economic integration among them 
may help to mitigate the challenges of economic globalization. 
 
                                                 
5 UAE also has expressed its desire of not joining the monetary union unless Abu Dhabi, the capital 
city of UAE, is the host city of the GCC central bank’ headquarter.    
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The recent continuous surge of oil and natural gas prices, nevertheless, has drawn 
some attention worldwide to the region.  Abdel-Hadi (2005), and Devaux (2006), 
among others, argue that the surge of oil prices since the beginning of this century has 
ranked those countries to that of Asian countries in its impact on t he international 
investment flow. The impact of high oil prices has been reflected in the GDP figures 
where the GCC region ranks the 16th largest economy in the world with collective 
GDP of about $ 750bn in 2006. 
 
Those countries have made over $ 2 trillion from oil revenue in the last decade.6 Gray 
and Blejer (2007, p41) argues that “it is totally unfair to neglect the fact that those 
countries are rentier economies with no significant diversification or scope of 
economic development out side that supported by t he petroleum sector” such as 
petrochemical and energy intensive industries such as aluminium. Devaux (2006) 
points out that the distribution of oil income still is the key factor of growth process as 
whole and the development of financial sector activity in particular in the GCC 
region.7 Strurm et al (2008) also argue that the key transmission mechanism in 
translating the oil wealth into both higher investment and consumption in the GCC 
countries has always been government expenditure. 
 
The governments of GCC countries, therefore, are in a position to influence 
profoundly the rate and the quality of economic development in their economy. The 
directions in which the government allocates its expenditure dictate the distribution of 
                                                 
6 Abdel-Hadi (2005) argues that the higher oil prices since the beginning of this century is largely 
attributed to supply demand imbalances, which makes it different from that of 1970s where the latter 
was due mainly to political instability in the region.  
7 An interesting question that would rise up with this regard is whether the financial institutions in 
those countries are capable of deploying such massive flow of capital?, Al-Muharrami et al (2006), 
among others, doubts it as we shell see in the next chapter.  
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income and the allocations of resources; where spending flows, incomes are received 
and resources are utilised. It is, therefore, an important and interesting issue to assess 
the impact of government role on the development process in region.  
 
1.2 Research Questions and Hypothesis 
 
 
The traditional view of the role of the state in economic development rests on t he 
triple issues of resource mobilisation, resource re-allocation and externalities 
associated with public capital formation. Typically, a developing country resides 
within its production possibility frontier, so growth spurts are possible if the 
government can mobilise additional resources which the private sector has failed to 
do.  O nce on the production possibility frontier itself, allocate efficiency becomes 
important and resource transfer from the private sector to the government may have a 
positive effect (crowding-in) or a negative effect (crowding out). Finally, if there 
exists increasing returns to capital and public capital adds to the productivity of 
private capital through spillovers, then these externalities are predominantly growth 
enhancing. 
 
Easterly (2009) utilises a production function of the following type: 
                                    
βα KAky ii =  
 
Where i is the ith firm and K  is the public capital provided by the state which, as a 
pure public good, would be available to all firms.  y a nd k a re output and capital 
stock. In long run equilibrium, assuming all k = ki , and summing over all firms, the 
aggregate production function takes on the form: 
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βα+
= KAY    
It is possible that the provision of K  and the possibility that α + β > 1 (increasing 
returns to scale) creates externalities purely due to the existence of the government. 
Government capital formation both human and physical (education, infrastructure, 
security) create externalities (given by the parameter ‘β’) which in turn increases the 
productivity of private capital and thereby increases economic growth. 
 
All of these models whether in public finance or in growth theory, requires costly 
capital formation by the state whether it is trying to increase the supply of resources, 
or is allocating resources from the private to the public sector or creating government 
capital with positive externalities. Thus, optimum government spending on enhancing 
productivity requires an evaluation of the costs (via resource transfer away from the 
productive private sector) with the benefits (productivity growth from public 
infrastructure) for economic development of having an activist state and a major role 
for public investment. Normally, development literature is awash with such case 
studies where individual countries are evaluated depending on w hich side of the 
spectrum they lie on this issue. 
 
The problem is somewhat different for the GCC countries. They are resource rich and 
the transaction costs of earning resource revenue are low. Thus, the economic costs of 
obtaining government capital are relatively modest. Hence, we should see a high 
productivity of government capital in these countries. In the three separate case 
studies we consider in this thesis we therefore attempt to evaluate the net benefit (if 
any) of government intervention. The three ‘essays’ reflect three different aspects of 
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the role of the State in the unique framework of the resource rich, population poor, 
gulf countries.  
 
The study therefore investigates the role of the state in economic development in the 
GCC countries. The three core research questions are as follow: 
  
1. Is there a significant contribution from the financial institutions in the 
development process in the GCC countries? 
 
It is argued in the literature that the development of financial sector in the GCC did 
not start effectively until the mid of the 1970s when oil price jumped up and massive 
external windfall flowed to the region thereafter (e.g. Abdeen and Shook, 1984; 
Azzam 1988a). The massive wealth that flows into those countries has created some 
pressures on the governments to facilitate the development of financial intermediaries 
in order to channel the oil wealth to the other sectors in the economy. Hence, the role 
of financial development in the economic growth may be viewed as indirect role of 
the state in promoting economic development. Moreover, small countries with such 
massive wealth accompanied with limited domestic investment opportunities may 
have a comparative advantage in banking industry. Thus, the first hypothesis is that 
the financial development may have promoted the development of other sectors in the 
economy and may also contribute significantly to economic growth in the GCC 
countries.  
 
2. What is the effect of defence expenditure on the economic growth in the 
GCC countries? 
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The large recurrent flow of capital from oil exports to small developing GCC 
countries raises the importance of security to those countries. GCC region apparently 
and according to several sources, remains one, if not the first, of the highly defence 
spending regions in the developing world, and correspondingly has higher level of 
arms imports. Deger and Sen (1995) argue that the problem of security in developing 
countries can not be impartial from the development failures or success according to 
most analysts. Allocating too much to security may hinder development, while giving 
too little to security may allow threats to grow. Military expenditure would carry both 
positive and negative effects on the economic development. Spin-offs from military 
expenditure may have positive effects on the other sectors in the economy. However, 
military expenditure has opportunity costs and may crowd out other forms of 
expenditure such as investment, which may carry adverse effects on economic 
development. Therefore, the second hypothesis is that the heavy defence expenditure 
that characterise most of the GCC may have come at the expense of the development 
of other sectors in the economy. 
 
3. What is impact of public infrastructure on the development process in 
GCC? 
 
This question, as the second question, represents a direct role for the government in 
economic development. Due to the small size of the economy, the state can dominate 
the economy and, thereby, the total capital formation in theses countries. 
Infrastructure has widely been thought of as an essential base for productive economic 
activities. Investments in public infrastructures will carry positive externalities to the 
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other sectors in the economy and allow business activities to flourish. With a 
relatively low level of public infrastructure prior to the 1970s, translating the oil 
wealth that these countries have been enjoying into higher investment in public 
infrastructure may contribute significantly in economic development. However, 
higher level of public investment with low level of human capital formation as well as 
the misuse and misallocation of public investment, as it is the case in most developing 
countries, may imply a very low of return on public investment and perhaps a 
negative impact on e conomic growth. The focus here is on one member of GCC 
“Saudi Arabia” who has engaged in unprecedented form of public capital 
expenditures since early 1970s. The hypothesis is that the large amount of public 
investments with low level of human capital to construct and to operate as well as the 
problem of misallocation of public investment may have lower the rate of return on 
public investment in the country. 
 
1.3 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follow: 
Chapter 2 investigates the role of financial development in economic growth in the 
GCC countries. the propose is to assess whether the development that financial 
institutions in the region have witnessed since the 1970s contributes significantly to 
the economic growth, or is it merely a consequence of the whole development process 
that is fuelled by rent derived from oil exports. The chapter reviews the development 
of financial institutions in the GCC region and assess the financial deepening in the 
region as well as the development of capital market and the monetary policy in these 
countries. Number of financial indicators is selected to represent the level of financial 
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development, and three alternative causality tests – Granger–causality tests, Sims–
causality and G-M-D causality tests –are considered to assess the causal relationship 
and the direction of causation between financial development and economic growth in 
each country in the GCC in the last few decades. The results, however, are country 
specific and vary, to some extent, with kind of proxies employ to measure financial 
development.  
 
Chapter 3 explores the effect of defence expenditure in the economic development in 
the GCC countries. It provides an overview over the security of GCC region and the 
historical events that have challenged the security of the region. The chapter also 
survey a large body of  literature that have considered different approaches (e.g. 
simultaneous – equations models (SEMs), Feder – Ram model, Augmented Solow 
growth model, and traditional demand side) to asses the casual relationship between 
defence expenditure and economic growth.  The impact of defence expenditure on the 
development process is carried out in the context of the production function approach 
of Cubb- Douglas and time series analysis for each country during different periods in 
the last four decades. Positive and negative effects of defence expenditure emerge for 
two groups in the sample (negative for those with heavy defence expenditure such as 
Saudi Arabia and UAE, and positive for those members with relatively low defence 
expenditure, Bahrain and Oman). 
 
Chapter 4   investigates the role of public infrastructure in the development process in 
one member of the GCC, Saudi Arabia. The chapter discuss the infrastructure 
development in Saudi Arabia during the second half of the last century and up to now. 
Saudi Arabia may represent an interesting study case to assess the impact of heavy 
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public investment in infrastructure on t he economic development (Loony and 
Frederiksen, 1985). Different theoretical approaches that have been employed in the 
literature (e.g. the production function approach”, cost-function approach, endogenous 
growth model, and simultaneity equations models SEM) to assess the effect of public 
capital in economic development are reviewed.  The chapter examine the long – run 
and the short – run impact of public capital on the level of economic development 
over the period 1970-2008 in the context of VAR/ECM model. The results, however, 
suggests that public capital has positive but insignificant impact on the level of 
economic development in Saudi Arabia. Despite the low level of public capital that 
Saudi Arabia had, the rate of return on t he heavy public investment, which the 
government launches since the 1970s, may have been well below the expectations. 
 
Chapter 5 concludes the study and provides some policy implications. 
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CHAPTER 2  
THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE ECONOMIC 
GROWTH IN THE GCC COUNTRIES 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter investigates the role of financial development in the economic growth in 
the GCC countries as i t may represent an indirect role of the state in the process of 
economic development. The role of financial development in economic growth has 
attracted a wide attention among economists and policy makers worldwide. Countless 
arguments and evidences have been provided to verify the role of financial 
development in elucidating economic growth differentials (e.g. Goldsmith, 1969; 
McKinnon, 1973; Shaw 1973; and King and Levine, 1993, to name just few). In fact, 
Robert Lucas (1988) has argued that economists “badly over-stress” the role of 
financial development in economic growth. The pronounced role of financial sector 
comes in the endorsement of collecting additional savings, re-allocating resources, 
and redistributing the benefits of larges returns on capital investment (Tun Wai, 
1972).  In addition, they mobilize savings, facilitate the exchange of goods and 
services (Levine, 1997), and contribute to the credit market by l owering cost of 
borrowing (Bahita and Khatkhate, 1975). 
 
According to Goldsmith (1969), financial development is the change in financial 
structure over time; the presence, nature, and relative size of financial instruments and 
financial institutions of various types that characterize the financial structure of a 
country. Finding credible measures that approximate financial development is 
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intrinsically a point of disagreement among economists.  From the point of view of 
what is suitable for country A is not necessarily suitable for country B, one could 
argue that measures of financial development should be chosen based on t he 
characteristics of the country’s financial, economic, social, geographical and political 
structure. In essence, the measures should be chosen so that they include all possible 
factors that affect the evolution of a country’s financial structure. 
 
Since the financial intermediaries are considered the backbone of financial sectors in 
the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), this study aims at testing for a 
casual relationship between financial intermediaries and economic development in the 
GCC.8 Testing for such relationship may be crucial for rentier economies where rent 
from natural resources – oil and natural gas - is the primary source of development in 
the region.  In such economies there is a potential that the financial development is 
not more than a consequence of development process that is fuelled by rents derived 
from natural resources.9 The direction of causality between financial development 
indicator and economic growth, therefore, may have an important implication for the 
policy makers. Unnecessary emphasize on the importance of financial development in 
economic growth my just divert attention away from other, perhaps more, important 
policy options that may promotes growth (Darrat, 1999).  
 
On the other hand, although these countries have spent over $50 billion to set up an 
industrial base in order to lessen dependence on oil revenues, they are still highly 
                                                 
8  The focus here is in the banking sector since the crash of Al-Manakh equity and real- estate market in 
Kuwait in 1982, where over US $90bn was wiped out (Abdel-Hadi, 2005),  have to some extent slowed 
the development of financial markets in those countries in the last century, see Azzam (1988a) for 
further details.  
9 An interesting feature of the development process in this region is the fact that the finding of those 
states was coincided with oil discovery in the region. As a result, oil rents have become the major 
source of building both the state and the economy (Beblawi, 2008)                                                                                                    
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dependent on oil. 10 Looney (1997) argues that despite the industrial diversification 
efforts that has been carried out by GCC countries, the achievements, with exception 
of that of Saudi Arabian Basic Industry Corporation (SABIC), have been 
disappointing where a steady infusion of government expenditures is essential to 
maintain an adequate demand. In fact, some characters of those countries’ economies 
such as, high dependency on oi l, shortage of labour, small market size due to small 
size of the population, as well as unpleasant weather condition make it hard, to some 
extent, to launch an ambitious big industry. The region is blessed with 45 percent of 
the world's recoverable oil and 17 percent of natural gas reserves. The overall 
population of GCC is about 35 million, and expected to grow to 57.4 million by 2020. 
From the above brief statistics, it is readily perceived that there has been flow of 
massive wealth to this region, mostly resulting from their exports of oil and natural 
gas. Disciplined financial sectors then in needed for facilitating the channelling of this 
wealth and promoting economic development.  
 
Moreover, financial sector may happen to be an alternative major sector for those 
economies, besides oil sector, that may account for a considerable block of their GDP 
if it is well managed.11  Beblawi (2008) argues that oil revenue should be treated as a 
capital asset rather than an income. According to this view, the countries of the GCC 
possess a finite quantity of proven reserves of oil and natural gas, and they are neither 
recurrent nor renewable flows. Therefore, it is wise to think of oil as capital asset. To 
                                                 
10 Most of the investment in the region has been in the petrochemical industry and energy intensive 
industry –aluminium- where those countries hold comparative advantage in such industries, since oil is 
the primary raw material in these industries.  
11 Financial services industry approximates 8% of United State GDP, which is greater than the 
contribution of both agriculture and mining together in the USA economy, and half as big as 
manufacturing. This industry consists of depository institutions or banks-, which account alone for two 
fifths of the industry total-, non-depository institutions, brokers, insurance carriers and agents 
(Wachtel, 2001).  
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Beblawi the process of producing and selling oil is no more than monetization of oil 
to monetary capital. Based on s uch view one could argue that the countries of the 
GCC may have comparative advantage in banking industry since they have abundant 
of capital that derived from natural resources exploitation12  
 
To that end, this study aims to examine the causal relationship between financial 
development and economic growth process in the GCC countries in context of time 
series analysis and three alternative causality tests – Granger causality tests, Sims 
causality test, and a new version of Sims causality tests introduced by Geweke et al 
(1983). The following section discusses the development of the financial system in 
the GCC region. Section 3 r eviews the literature on f inancial development and 
economic growth. Section 4 discusses the financial development indicators considered 
in the study, and section 5 pr esents the empirical methodology. Finally, section 6 
reports the empirical finding and the conclusion.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 Author’s own calculations have shown that those countries have made over US $ 2.5 “trillions” in 
the last 10 years from oil exports (see for example, OPEC website, www.opec.org).  Considering, the 
limited capacity of those economies to absorb such a massive windfall.  
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2.2 FINANCIAL SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT IN THE GCC 
 
It has been argued, in literature, that there has not been a significant development in 
the financial system in the GCC region prior to mid 1970s, when oil prices climbed up 
as result of political instability in the region (Abdeen and Shook, 1984; Azzam 1988a; 
Jbili et al, 1997; and Devaux, 2006).13 The massive windfalls, thereafter, flowed into 
those countries have created some pressures to facilitate the development of financial 
intermediaries in order to channel the oil wealth to the other sectors in the economy. 
Abdeen and Shook (1984, p15) argue that most of the financial institutions in the 
region, namely banks, were originally branches of international banks. Those 
institutions were mostly colonial- based institutions that were oriented to exports-
imports trade that was not related to development goals.14  By the mid of 1970s, all 
foreign banks were required to transfer ownership to residents of the region. 
 
As result of massive windfall from oil rents in the 1970s and early 1980s, 
governments in the region, which are the recipients of oil rents, established some 
commercial banks with private partners. Moreover, governments established other 
specialized development institutions such as industrial funds, real estate funds, 
Agricultural funds, etc. These specialized financial institutions target to distribute the 
oil wealth, as well as to facilitate the channelling of oil rents to promote the 
development of other potential sectors.  They are mostly government owned, and they 
are not depository institutions rather they usually take the form of single branch banks 
                                                 
13 The Egyptian Israeli war in 1973 accompanied with oil embargo by Arab oil-producer countries 
derived up oil prices to standards levels by that time.     
14 For instance, one of the oldest banks in Saudi Arabia, “Nederlandsche Handelmaatschappeij”, later 
known as Saudi Holland Bank, was originally placed in the western part of Saudi to cater to the 
Muslim pilgrims from Far East, “Indonesia”, which used to be one of the Netherland Colonies 
(Sursock, 1987).  
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that finance long- term projects with relatively low interest rates (Al-Muharrami et al, 
2006; Gray and Blejer 2007). The development of those institutions is not considered 
here due to the lack of data in most cases, and to those reasons mentioned by Al-
Muharrami such as different technology, structures, and goals of those institutions as 
well as a relatively small market share of them. 
 
Azzam (1988), Jbili et al (1997), Devaux (2006), Al-Muharrami et al (2006), among 
others, point out some important features of financial sector in the GCC region such 
as a w idespread government share in financial institutions, including commercial 
banks. The public sector, therefore, fully controls large number of commercial banks 
and specialized financial institutions. Notwithstanding, the private ownership in 
commercial banks is concentrated in the hands of few shareholders. Moreover, the 
countries of GCC do have moratoria on license new banks along with constraints on 
foreign ownership in financial institutions.15 All of these factors have, to some extent, 
led to a relatively high degree of concentration in the banking sector in most countries 
in the region led-by Kuwait with the three largest banks account for 80% of banking 
sector assets in 1995, a nd over 50% in Oman and Saudi Arabia in 1994 and 1996 
respectively Jbili et al (1997).16 Fry (1995, p. 304)  argues that high degree of 
concentration in banking sector is a common feature in most developing countries and 
in some cases, however, could be an obstacle to financial development.17   
 
                                                 
15 Money laundering has been an issue of concern in the region (Stone and Corbett, 2007). UAE, for 
example stopped licensing foreign banks since 1982 (Pock et al, 2007).  
16 A recent study by Al-Muharrami et al (2006) on banking concentration in the GCC covering the 
period 1992 – 2002, using both bank Concentration Ratio (CRk) and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI), to measure the degree of concentration, suggests that Oman, Qatar, and Bahrain have highly 
concentrate market while Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and UAE have moderately concentrated market and 
move toward less concentrated markets in the future.  
17 According to Fry, Morocco is a typical example of lack of competition in banking industry in 
developing countries due partly to higher degree of concentration within the Moroccan financial sector.  
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The Banking sectors in the countries of GCC, nonetheless, are relatively very well 
capitalized, with large number of banks that run a comprehensive networks of 
branches (Azzam, 1988a,b; Jbili et al, 1997). Compared with international standards 
the ratio of commercial bank assets to GDP is relatively high in the region ranging 
between 50 percent in Oman to 100 percent in Bahrain in 2000 as in Table 1.2. The 
commercial banks assets have increased dramatically in most countries in the region 
in the last three decades rising from 25 $bn in1985 up to 46 $bn by 1995 in UAE, and 
from 40 $bn to 81 $bn in Saudi Arabia as in Table 1.2. A recent study by IMF, Creane 
et al (2004), investigates the financial development in the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) region, by constructing comprehensive financial indices to major the 
financial development in the region,  ha s classified the banking sector in GCC 
countries as well developed, profitable, and efficient sector.18 Furthermore, the share 
of financial services in non-oil GDP is around 10 percent in the late 1990s in most 
countries in the region as Jbili et al (1997) argue.19  
 
However, despite the massive wealth generated from natural resources exportation, 
the consolidated capital of the top 50 banks in the region at 31.5 $bn is globally low 
amounting for 1.7% of the capital of  the world’s top 1000 banks (Al-Muharrami et al, 
2006). Generally, commercial banks in the GCC are relatively small in keeping up 
even with the size of their countries’ economies (Devaux, 2006). The small size of 
those banks have prevented them from taking a part in financing energy related 
projects and local infrastructure projects since they do n ot have the resources to 
                                                 
18 Based on qualitative and quantitative data the study developed six comprehensive indices that built 
upon six themes each of which reflects different aspect of financial development such as banking sector 
development, Institutional environment, financial sector openness, etc. See Creane et al (2004) for 
further details.  
 19 Data on non-oil GDP for GCC countries is available at IMF; however, it is strictly confidential.  
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finance such projects.20 As results, most of those banks, as Devaux (2006) argues, 
concentrate their services on a  purely domestic activity. According to the Banker 
(2002, as cited in Al-Muharrami et al, 2006, p. 3489), unless GCC banks’ consolidate 
together, they will be unable to survive the competition – with such small fragmented 
banking sector – with well established international banks when markets do 
eventually open up.  
 
Table 2.1:  Some Commercial Banks Statistics from the GCC countries 
    1980 1985 1991 1995 2000 2005 
Bahrain Banks Assets (US$ bn) 2.18 3.54 2.24 5.84 8.32 14.11 
 Banks Assets/GDP 0.7 0.96 0.91 0.99 1.04 1.05 
 No. of Banks’ Branches na na na na na 366 
  Bank Density Per 100000 Of Pop na   na na   na  na 50  
Kuwait Banks Assets (US$ bn) 17.45 27.22 30.83 34.11 38 65.12 
 Banks Assets/GDP 0.61 1.21 2.79 1.25 1 0.77 
 No. of Banks’ Branches na na na 124 163 231 
 Bank Density Per 100000 Of Pop na na na 7.2 7.3 8.5 
Oman Banks Assets (US$ bn) 1.08 2.79 2.58 3.34 7.49 9.78 
 Banks Assets/GDP 0.23 0.29 0.32 0.35 0.49 0.45 
 No. of Banks’ Branches na na na 320 378 380 
  Bank Density Per 100000 Of Pop na  na  na  14.7  15.7  14.5  
Qatar Banks Assets (US$ bn) 1.83 3.74 6,38 8.97 13.23 34.01 
 Banks Assets/GDP 0.23 0.6 0.92 1.1 0.74 0.8 
 No. of Banks’ Branches na na na na 98 125 
  Bank Density Per 100000 Of Pop na  na   na na   16 15.5  
Saudi  Banks Assets (US$ bn) 23.38 40.19 65.6 81.89 111.19 191.84 
Arabia Banks Assets/GDP 0.14 0.38 0.5 0.57 0.59 0.61 
 No. of Banks’ Branches na na na 1192 1184 1224 
 Bank Density Per 100000 Of Pop na na na 6.5 5.7 5.1 
UAE Banks Assets (US$ bn) 13.8 25.75 38 46.04 70.08 162.18 
 Banks Assets/GDP 0.46 0.95 1.12 1.14 0.99 NA 
 No. of Banks’ Branches na na na na 420 564 
 Bank Density Per 100000 Of Pop na na na na 13 13.8 
Note: Pop is population 
Source: IMF, IFS statistics, annual report (2007). And GCC database of Saudi Arabian Monetary 
Agency (SAMA). 
 
 
With regard to financial deepening, traditional measures of financial development 
reveal a relatively well-monetized region. The ratio of liquid liabilities (M3) to GDP 
                                                 
20 The largest bank in GCC “National Commercial bank” ranks the 109th worldwide (Devaux, 2006).  
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is relatively high ranging from 45% in Oman to 82% in Kuwait in 2002 as in Figure 
2.1. However, although this ratio has been relatively higher than those of other 
developing regions such as Latin America and South Asia, it ranks far below that of 
East Asia as in Figure 2.2, indicating more needs to be done towards financial 
development in the region. The increase of banking awareness as well as the 
expansion of financial institutions services, the complexity of the financial sector, 
could be captured through the ratio of Currency in circulation to narrow money M1. 
The ratio has slowly declined over time in the region in the last three decades ranging 
from 21% - Kuwait- to 41% in Oman in 2002. There has been, however, a decreasing 
trend in this ratio in most of these countries in the last few years as in Figure 2.3. This 
probably due to the introduction of some new financial services such as Islamic 
financial products Devaux (2006), mutual funds, and advanced consumer-banking 
technology such as ATM, Sale points, telephone and internet banking. The low 
banking habit, however, could be also stemming from the relatively low bank density 
in some countries in the region as in Table 2.1.  
 
Moreover, the ratios of credit to private sector as sh are of GDP -  albeit growing 
(Figure 2.4) – have been noticeably disappointing compared with the international 
standards averaging less than 40% of GDP most of the time as in Figure 2.5. Azzam 
(1988b), Jbili et al (1997), and Devaux (2006), among other, related the limited role 
of commercial banks in the development process in the region to some common 
structural features of those institutions. The widespread of government ownership in 
commercial banks in the region have, to some extent, made those institutions an 
active lender to governments. Commercial Banks have been contributing in financing 
the large fiscal deficits some countries in the region run into as result of relatively low 
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oil prices since the mid of the 1980s and through the 1990s as well as the costs of 
Second Gulf War.21 They all argue that the commercial banks lending also continues 
to take the form of short- term and  generally revolved around the traditional niches 
such as t rade22, constructions related activities, refinancing, letters of Credit, real 
estate activities.  
 
 
Figure 2.1:23 M3 as a share of GDP 
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21 For example, Saudi government’s debit, mostly domestic, has reached up to 100% of the country’s 
GDP in the late 1990s.  
22 GCC region has been rather a big importer due to the nature of those countries economies “rentier 
economies”. For example, the region imports surged from US$ 11.6bn in 1975 up to US$ 52.1bn in 
1980, and accounts for 30% in 2005 of those countries GDP as in Table 1.1. Abdel-Fadil (1987) sees it 
natural for societies that have been living in stagnation and poverty for centuries to have a relatively 
high marginal propensity to import in such coincidence “massive external windfall”.  
23 Source of data for all charts is IFS, IMF (2007).  
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Figure 2.2: M3/GDP Compare to other regions 
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Figure 2.3: Currency in circulation as a share of M1 
Currency/ M1
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
Year
%
 M
1
Bahrain
Kuwait
Oman
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
UAE
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 26 
Figure 2.4: Credit to private sector as a share of GDP 
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Figure 2.5: Credit to private sector/GDP compare to other regions 
Credit to Private sector %  GDP
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
Year
%
 G
D
P
GCC
East Asia & Pacific
Latin America & Caribbean
South Asia
 
 
The problem of negligible engagement of commercial banks in financing the 
productive sectors is more general in fact, where the commercial banks deposits are 
dominated by s hort-term nature (Azzam, 1988b). With this nature of deposits, the 
commercial banks have been reluctant to finance the development of productive 
sectors, which usually require medium to long-term form of credit. Notwithstanding, 
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many banks in the region are not capable to assess the viability of industrial projects. 
Moreover, Devaux (2006) argues that in rentier economies such as those of GCC the 
general role of financial institutions is simply to handle the financial transactions for 
governments and the public enterprises.  
 
Abdeen and Shook (1984), on the other hand, claim that the concept of interest has 
been a major obstacle to the financial development in the Middle East region as a 
whole, where interest is strictly prohibited in Islam.24 According to Abdeen and 
Shook, this has hindered a full cooperation and integration of financial system in most 
countries in the region with the most developed financial system in the world, the 
Western, which based upon interest, to large extent. That in return has precluded the 
financial institutions in the region to fully benefits from the financial development 
experiences in the industrial countries. Devaux (2006) among other, nonetheless, 
argues that the introduction of some Islamic banking products since the late 1990s has 
undoubtedly played a major role in mobilizing more saving in the region.25 Recently, 
there has been rapid development in Islamic finance where there are over 267 Islamic 
financial institutions, banks, and insurance and reinsurance companies operating in 
different countries mainly in the GCC countries. Moreover, the Islamic market 
approximates US$100bn growing at 17% per capita (Boustany, 2003). Such 
development may provide another viable way to increase monetization and probably 
facilitates the financial development process as a whole in the region. 
 
The development of other components of financial systems such as the capital market 
has been rather slow in the whole region. It was just until recently the development of 
                                                 
24 Not to mentioned, the GCC societies are quite traditional ones.  
25 Islamic Bank is rather young one, introduced in the 1980s in Pakistan, where they were allowed to 
operate at national level, followed by Iran and Sudan (Boustany, 2003). 
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capital markets has become an issue of concern in most of these countries. In fact, 
they are at different stages of development with Dubai and Abu Dhabi – UAE - stock 
markets established just in the beginning of this century, while Kuwaiti stock market, 
in contrast, is over 30 years old (Abdel-Hadi, 2005). Azzam (1988a), among others, 
points out number of causes for the slow development of capital markets in the 
region. The crash of Al-Manakh equity and real estate market in Kuwait in 1982, 
where over US$ 90bn reportedly wiped out, has caused a psychological damage in the 
other GCC countries and therefore has limited the development of capital markets in 
the region. Not to mentioned, as Azzam argues, since those countries have abundant 
of capital derived from natural resources exportation accompanied with limited 
domestic investment opportunities, there was not need to develop capital markets. The 
structure ownership of most firms in the region, where they are mostly either family 
owned or predominant by government ownership, has been another obstacle.26 Those 
families have been reluctant to relinquish control of their firms by going public, and 
therefore continue to use traditional bank finance rather than open their firms’ capital 
to new investors. Weak regulatory is another hurdle halted the development of capital 
markets in those countries. Jbili et al (1997) argue that there are a general weakness in 
transparency requirements and provision of information in most countries in the 
region.27  
 
The countries of the region, however, have devoted considerable attention toward the 
development of their Capital markets in the last decade. Saudi Arabia, for example, 
                                                 
26 Family firms’ activities amount for over 90% of the whole commercial activities’ in the region. 
There are over 5000 firms with collective assets over US$ 500bn; those firms employ around 70% of 
labour force too (Ithmar Capital, 2007).  
27 Boustany (2003) argues that flourishing capital market requires an independent and scientific 
measurement of risk and return, which an application of transparency concept. Yet, emerging markets 
have not devoted much attention due particularly to the role of transparency in uncovering corruption.  
 29 
established the capital market authority in 2003 and opened its financial market lately 
to foreign investors. Financial markets in all other GCC countries are opened to 
foreign investors. UAE launched Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC). Qatar 
too launched its own version of International Financial Centre. While Bahrain, on the 
other hand, is developing its financial market to become a regional financial centre. 
Oman is following suit.  
 
Development of other components of capital market such as bonds market has been 
shallow and just recently developed in most countries. In addition, the trade of 
government bonds is limited to financial institutions. The shallowness/ lack of 
secondary market for government securities, therefore, has slowed the financial 
development and tied up the use of open market operations as an effective tool of the 
monetary policy in those countries.28  
 
2.2.1 MONETARY POLICY IN THE REGION 
 
In most developing countries, the role of monetary policy instruments is limited due 
mainly to the absence or the shallowness of capital market as well as to the lack of 
diversified productive base whose output could be enhanced by l iquidity provision 
(Al-Hamar, 1988). Furthermore, a country with small-undiversified economy that 
relies heavily on the exports of one commodity, oil and natural gas in our case, and 
imports most of other goods is obviously more vulnerable to external disturbances.29 
In such case - as Al- Hamar argues - both fiscal and monetary policy have limited role 
                                                 
28 For further details about capital markets in the region (see for example, Azzam 1988a; Jbili et al, 
1997; and “MENA-OECD investment programme”, 2005).                                                                                                  
 29 Beblawi (2008) argues that GCC countries export oil and natural gas and nearly import everything 
else even labour.  
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in controlling monetary development and influencing other economics variables 
compared to countries with relatively independent economies.  
 
Azzam (1988c), among other, argues that the fixed exchange rate to a major currency, 
therefore, has been the refuge for such countries to mitigate the external shocks – as  
exchange rate may have great effects on price levels and balance of payment stability 
(Al-Jasser and Banafe, 1999) – . In fact, the monetary policy in the GCC countries has 
been always geared to maintain a stabile exchange rate with US$ where all currencies 
in the region - with exception of Kuwait which pegged to basket of currencies - are 
pegged to US$.  As results, the monetary authority in the region set their interest rates 
with accordance to that set by US Federal Reserve since all countries have free capital 
movements. Furthermore, in open economies where the government plays the 
dominant role in all economic activity accompanied with fixed exchange rate regime 
has other implications for the role of monetary policy in the region (Jbili et al, 1997). 
In such case the fiscal policy is the main determinant of money supply30 and the 
demand pressure of fiscal deficit is tend to be absorbed through balance of payments. 
Thus, the primary role of monetary policy is left to regulate the short- term liquidity 
and to mitigating the impact of external disturbance while the burden of adjustment 
falls on fiscal policy. 
 
Fixed exchange rate with respect to US$, as argued in the literature, has been a wise 
decision taken by the central banks and monetary agencies in the region, Since those 
countries rely heavily in the rents generated from oil exports which are priced in US$. 
                                                 
30 Albatel (1993) argues that government expenditure in Saudi Arabia has been the main determinant of 
the change in monetary aggregate, due particularly to the nature of Saudi economy “rentier Economy”. 
As thus, the monetary authority finds it difficult to apply monetary policy when needed. Al-Jasser and 
Banafe (1999) argue that the monetary policy in Saudi Arabia is often used to fine-tune the effect of 
fiscal policy.  
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Hence, these rates reflect neither the strength nor the weakness of those economies; 
exchange rates of those countries are no m ore than a conversion formula for 
petrodollar revenues through which the governments finance their domestic 
expenditures (Azzam, 1988c). 31 
 
Addition to guarding a stable exchange rates the monetary authorities in the region 
apply monetary policy instruments with growing tendency lately to the use of some 
forms of open market operations (Jbili et al, 1997).  The monetary agency of Saudi 
Arabia, for instance, uses the repos operations in government bonds, while the central 
bank of UAE relies heavily on purchases of foreign exchange, Kuwait and Bahrain 
monetary authorities use purchase and sale of government bonds, repos of 
government securities, and some central bank-lending operations such as o verdraft 
window and overnight lending. As mentioned earlier, however, the effectiveness of 
open market operations in the region is limited due mainly to the lack of well-
structured secondary markets for government securities in those countries.  
 
Regulation and supervision of financial institutions is another task shouldered by the 
monetary authorities in the region. Jbili et al (1997) argue that regulations and 
monetary authorities supervision in these countries has strengthened the banks 
soundness in most countries in the region. Provision and capital adequacy 
requirements in those countries are generally stricter than those of Basle rules. 
Furthermore, monetary authorities in the region run an on-side inspection and offside 
                                                 
31 A huge surplus in the balance of payments of those countries does not mean the exchange rates of 
those currencies will appreciate.  
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analysis of banks in addition to some prudential regulations such as foreign currency 
exposure limits, liquid asset ratios, limits on consumer lending, etc.32  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32 See Jbili et al (1997) for further details.  
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2.3 LTERAURE REVIEW 
 
The role of financial development in economic growth has received a considerable 
attention among economists and policy makers worldwide. Schumpeter (1912) was 
one of the first economists who established the theoretical foundations of the 
relationship between development in the financial sector and economic growth. He 
relates banking system to economic development through its role in maintaining 
credit, which enhance entrepreneurship and productivity.  He argued that the role of 
money market and capital market is acute for financing development, and in terms of 
causality, he believes that economic growth promotes financial sector. Sir John Hicks 
(1969, pp.143-145, as cited in Levine 1997) argues that the primary cause of 
industrial revolution in England in 18th century was the capital market development. 
According to Hicks industrial revolution required big commitments of capital for long 
period of time, but savers usually do not like to engage in such investments, because 
they do no t want to relinquish control of their savings for long periods. Hence, the 
financial market improvements in England mitigate the liquidity risk, which makes it 
possible to transform the capital to long run and high-return investments.33    
 
Broadly speaking, there are at least two opposite hypotheses in the literature regarding 
the causal relationship between financial development and economic growth (Darrat, 
1999). There are those who argue that financial development is pre-condition for 
economic growth. According to this view (supply- leading hypothesis) more 
developed financial system promotes  ec onomic growth through mobilizing saving, 
allocating resources to better investment projects, exerting corporate control and 
                                                 
33 “Industrial revolution, therefore, had to wait for financial revolution”, (Starr etal.1966, p. 243, as 
cited in Levine 1997).   
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monitoring managers, facilitating the exchange of good a nd services, and allowing 
investors to diversify risk.34  Presenting such views, among other, are McKinnon 
(1973), Shaw (1973), Goldsmith (1969), Levine (1993), Fry (1995), and Khan and 
Senhadji (2000, 2003). Shaw and McKinnon argue that liberating interest rates to 
reach their market-determined levels is necessary for financial development.35 
According to this view, liberated interest rates would increase saving in financial 
forms and the allocation of funds to the most efficient investors, which will enhance 
economic growth and development (Al-Jasser, 1986). 
 
On the other hand, some economists reject such views arguing that financial 
development grows in respond to the economic growth process. According to this 
view (demand- following hypothesis), as an economy grows it creates demand for 
more financial services and financial system responds positively to this demand 
(Robinson 1952, as cited in Levine 1997). Patrick (1966) has lent support to this view 
by introducing the demand-following role of financial development. He argues that as 
the real side of the economy grows the demand by enterprises for funds will increase, 
and hence the demand for financial intermediaries services. Moreover, Cameron 
(1972) points out that banking system should not be impartial with respect to 
economic development since they exist as a result of demand for their services and 
such demand usually comes from growing economy.36    
                                                 
34  Levine (1997) provides an interesting and extensive discussion about these functions.  
35 McKinnon and Shaw school attributes the financial repression, in most developing world, to 
government restrictions on the banking system such as interest rate ceiling and high reserve 
requirements. Further details in liberalization; see for instance Fry (1995) and Gelb (1989).  
36 Khan and Senhadji (2003, pp 6-7) argue, among other,  that  “although demand-following hypothesis 
argument carries some weight, the findings from empirical work, however, cannot be disregarded on 
the basis of such premise. Since it would amount to assuming not only that growth affects financial 
development, which is realistic, but also that financial development has no effect on growth, which is 
certainly counterintuitive. Thus, the real issue in the empirical literature is not of spurious correlation 
but one of simultaneity bias”.  
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The obvious role of financial intermediaries in the economic development has been 
widely tested through many empirical studies. Some of these studies are based on 
regression analysis for large cross-section countries, while there are some country-
case studies. Their outcomes differ based on the types of measures they use to 
represent the level of financial development. 
 
Most of cross-country studies reviewed here lend support to the supply-leading 
hypothesis.37 According to Khan and Senhadji (2000), one of the most influential 
studies on t his subject is King and Levine (1993). King and Levine’s study covers 
cross-section of 80 countries during the period 1960-1989.  They used four measures 
as proxies for the level of financial development.  The first measure is liquid liabilities 
of banks and non-bank institutions as a sh are of GDP, which measures the size of 
financial intermediaries. The second is the ratio of bank credit to the sum of bank and 
central bank credit, which measures the degree to which banks versus central bank 
allocate credit.  The third is the ratio of private credit to domestic credit.  The fourth 
measure is the ratio of private credit to GDP. Their findings show a strong positive 
relationship between financial development and growth.  They argue that financial 
development has predictive power for future growth, which is evident for casual 
relationship that runs from financial development to economic growth.        
 
Johnston and Pararbasioglu (1995) use panel data for 40 countries to investigate the 
impact of financial development on growth. 38  Their results suggest that the interest 
cost of capital, the volume of intermediation, and the efficiency of intermediation can 
                                                 
37 See Levine (1997), Khan and Senhadji (2000) for comprehensive survey about the studies that have 
investigated the causal relationship between economic growth and financial development.  
38They use a combination of three variables to reflect the different aspect of financial development, 
they are interest rate, credit to private sector/GDP, and a measure of financial sector efficiency (gross 
spread between the average lending and deposit rates and the ratio of base money to deposits).  
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be separately identified as explaining economic growth.   They also find that the 
impact of financial development on e conomic growth is very different in repressed 
and reformed financial systems, and in countries that have experienced financial 
crises.  P ill and Pradhan (1995) examine the role of financial development in 
promoting economic development using four indicators of the level of financial 
development: broad money, base money, bank credit to the private sector, and real 
interest rates.  T hey find that credit to private sector is the main factor that can be 
expected to influence financial development.   G elbard and Leite (1999), in their 
study of measuring financial development in sub-Saharan Africa, use cross-sectional 
data of 38 c ountries over the period 1987-97. They suggest that the initial level of 
financial development is an important predictor of future economic growth.39  In 
addition, they find that financial liberalization, changes in the institutional 
environment, and changes in the array of financial products are the most important 
variables, which have stronger impact on growth.   
 
Country-case studies have, to some extent, yield similar results. McKinnon (1973) 
studies the role of financial system in economic growth in the case of Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Germany, Indonesia, Korea, and Taiwan in the post-World War II 
period.  He finds that well-developed financial system support faster growth.  He uses 
the ratio of financial institutions assets to GDP as an  indicator of financial 
development.  
 
Albatel (1993) demonstrates the role of financial evolution in enhancing economic 
development in Saudi Arabia.  Specifically, he explores the impact of financial sector 
                                                 
39 Others too, have found evidences support this argument; see for example Levine (1993b), and Sen 
(2000).  
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on saving, investment, and income.  He uses data covers the period 1965-1989. He 
applies different proxies for the financial development: nominal and real money 
balances, the ratio of total assets of the financial system to GDP, the number of bank 
branches per 100,000 of population, and credit to private sector.  He concludes that 
financial development has a positive impact on s aving, investment, and economic 
growth in Saudi Arabia. Alhmeed (1999) observes positive contributions of financial 
development (represented by t he evolution in the financial markets) to economic 
growth in Saudi Arabia in both macro- and micro level. Using time-series for the 
period 1969-1997 and utilizing error correction model-based analysis, he finds highly 
significant positive relationship between the financial development variables used in 
the model (M1 and M2) and economic growth.   
 
The empirical work on the issue causality, nevertheless, is still largely disputed in the 
literature. Does financial development causes economic growth or does it simply 
follow the economic development, is a point of disagreement among economists (Fry 
1995). Some of the influential works on the issue of causality such as those by Jung 
(1986) and Demetriades and Hussein (1996) have generally shown that the pattern of 
causality differs among countries. 
Jung (1986) tests for the causality between financial development and economic 
growth using data for 56 countries including developing and developed countries, the 
findings of his study was country specific.  He found that causality runs from 
financial indicator to economic growth in less developed countries where the reverse 
causality occurs in developed countries.40 Based on reasonably representative data set 
for 16 developing countries, as they argued, Demetriades and Hussein (1996) conduct 
                                                 
40 Jung’s work, however, has been criticized because of the short span of time series, where in some 
case as low as 15 observations.  
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a variety of causality tests between the two variables using both the Vector Auto 
regression (VAR) and Error Correction Model (ECM) frameworks.41 Findings, 
however, favour neither supply -leading hypothesis nor demand-following hypothesis. 
It is rather bidirectional hypothesis - where both financial development and economic 
growth are mutually casual (bidirectional causality) – what seems to be the form of 
relationship hold between the two variables in most countries considered in the study. 
 
Other studies by D arrat(1999),  Al-Yosif (2002), Ghirmay (2004), and Abu-Qarn 
(2006) found evidences that support supply- leading hypothesis, demand- following 
hypothesis and bidirectional hypothesis, and those findings tend to vary with kind of 
indicators considered to measure financial development.  In fact, Darrat (1999) argues 
that it is the direction of causality not the correlation between the two variables what 
researchers should focus on when it comes to study the relationship between financial 
development and the economic growth process.42Thus, proponents of time series 
approach-such as those mentioned above- argue that the causal relationship between 
the financial development and economic growth is more likely to be country specific 
and tend to vary with kind of proxies employ to measure financial development. They 
related that to the fact that countries differ in their level of financial development due 
to differences in economic policies and institutions implemented them. A final word 
about the issue of causality could be that stated by L evine (1997, p 710) “any 
                                                 
41 They argue that their study overcomes the shortages of previous time-series studies, addressed the 
causality issue between the two Variables, by a) using a relatively long span of data, a minimum of 28 
observations, b) considering Financial indicators that fit the theory requirements – such as claims on 
private sector-, and c) applying appropriate econometrics techniques to examine the integration 
properties of the data when the variables are non-stationary.            
42  According to Darrat (1999) serious doubts are casted on m ost works in the area, if the causal 
relationship between financial indicators and economic growth in a giving country appears to follow 
demand-following hypothesis, or bidirectional hypothesis.  
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statements about the causality are – and will remain – largely impressionistic and 
specific to particular countries and specific periods”. 
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2.4 FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT MEASUREMENTS AND DATA SOURCES 
 
Finding credible measures that approximate financial development is intrinsically a 
point of disagreement among economists, since countries have different financial 
structures as well as different institutional environment (Jung, 1986). Wide variety of 
financial indicators have been proposed and employed in the literature to measure the 
development of financial system. In fact, Von Furstenber and Fratianni (1996), and 
Beck et al (1999), provide and discuss a comprehensive list of financial development 
indicators.  
 
Following the common practice, the first proxy of financial development considered 
is the traditional measure of financial depth that is the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP 
- M3/GDP-. This proxy, which measures the size of financial intermediaries, is one of 
the most common proxies used in literature. Numerous numbers of studies in the area 
have employed this proxy (see, for example, McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973; Jung, 
1986; Levine, 1993b; Fry, 1995). Fry (1995), among other, argues that this measure is 
an appropriate proxy of financial development in the majority of developing countries 
where direct financial claims such as stocks and bonds are unimportant compared 
with indirect claims such as demand and time deposits. Therefore, the real growth of 
financial aggregates, M2 and M3, reflect the extent to which financial intermediaries 
are able to supply more credit on relation to the level of economic activity.  Ghirmay 
(2004), however, rejects the use of this measure arguing that it does not reflect some 
important functions of financial system such as sav ing mobilization and efficient 
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allocation of investment, where it is more likely to measure the extent to which 
transactions are monetized.43  
 
An alternative measure of M3/GDP, albeit similar, is Bank assets as a share of GDP. 
According to IMF, banks assets can be calculated as f ollow: claims on monetary 
authorities, securities, foreign assets, claims on central government, claims on states 
and local governments, claims on nonf inancial public enterprises, claims on pr ivate 
sector, and claims on nonbank financial institutions. This indicator reflects, to large 
extent, the ability of commercial banks to provide credits to different sectors in the 
economy including government. Therefore, considering this measure may be crucial 
in such case where the public sector dominates overall economic activities in most 
GCC countries.    
 
The third measure considered is credit to private sector as a share of GDP. Most 
studies reviewed here argue that this measure is an accurate proxy of the functioning 
of financial system. It reflects the role of financial institutions in channeling funds to 
private sector (Khan and Senhadji, 2003), as well as it measures the quantity and 
quality of investment (Ghirmay, 2004; Demetriades and Hussein, 1996, among 
others).44 
 
The fourth measure considered here is the ratio of currency to the narrow money 
(M1). Jung (1986), and Al-Yousf (2002), among others, argue that this variable is an 
                                                 
43 Demetriades and Hussein (1996) argues that excluding the currency in circulation from the broad 
money stock is crucial when using this variable as measure of financial development, since a large 
component of broad money stock in developing countries is currency outside banking system.   
44 Former Soviet Union has been a typical example for misallocation of capital; Soviet Union always 
have high rates of saving and investment (abundance of machinery and equipment), but relatively low 
growth simply because investment was not allocated to effective use (Wachtel, 2001). 
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adequate variable to capture the qualitative development in the financial system, 
where a decline in this ratio reflects the complexity of financial system and a g reat 
availability and use of non-currency transaction methods. 
 
The economic development indicator considered, as following the common practice 
in the literature, is the real GDP per capita. It has been argued that, the figures of GDP 
per capita are prone to fewer errors than those of total GDP Figures. Heston (1994, p. 
40, as cited in Demetriades and Hussein, 1996, p 396)  argues, “This is because some 
of the errors which affect estimates of the level of GDP also affect population 
estimates and, as such, they tend to be offsetting”. For the purpose of this study, both 
the level and the growth rate of real GDP per capita will be used interchangeably as 
economic development indicator. Considering both the level and the growth rate of 
real GDP per capita may provide further information to assess whether the state of 
financial development is correlated with the level or with the growth rate of GDP per 
capita or with both.45  
 
The data for all variables considered in this study are obtained from the International 
Monetary Fund publication international Financial Statistic (Database, 2007), World 
Bank Publication World Development Indicator (Database, 2007). The different 
sample periods are as follow: Bahrain (1975 – 2005), Kuwait (1973 – 2006), Oman 
(1976 – 2006), Qatar (1980 – 2006), Saudi Arabia (1964 – 2007), and United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) (1973 – 2004). 
 
 
                                                 
45 Further implication is regarding the long – run relationship as we demonstrate in the empirical 
discussion.  
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2.5 EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
 
Testing for the direction of causality between the economic development and the state 
of financial development is carried out in different forms. The study employs three 
alternative causality tests to assess the form of relationship between the two variables. 
The first causality test is the well known Granger – causality test proposed by Granger 
(1969), the second one is Sims – causality test introduced by Sims (1972). The third 
one is a new version of Sims causality tests proposed by Geweke et al (1983) and it is 
quoted as G-M-D causality test. 
 
Granger – causality tests are conducted in the form of the Vector Auto regression 
(VAR) framework. The VAR model developed to account for the possibility that both 
time series variables are random and jointly determined (Griffiths et al, 1993). Testing 
for Granger – causality is rather easy test in the context of VAR models. A time series 
Y is said to be Granger – caused by another time series X if the currant value of Y can 
be better  predicted from the past values of both Y and X rather than from the past 
values of Y alone (Granger, 1969). The conventional Granger causality tests in the 
form of VAR model between the two variables are as follow:  
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Where G is economic development indicator, where both the level and the growth rate 
of GDP per capita are used interchangeably as economic development proxy. FD is 
the financial development indicator, which is either the ratio of M3 to nominal GDP, 
bank assets as a share of GDP, credit to private sector as share of GDP, or the ratio of 
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currency to narrow money (M1). And ∑
=
k
i 1
are polynomials of appropriate orders. 
Finally, μ and ν are mutually uncorrelated white noise series. It is said that FD 
Granger causes G if the coefficient α2, in equation (1), is statistically significant, 
whilst the significance of 1β , in equation (2), refers to reverse direction of causality. In 
return, Granger Causality does not exist if both coefficients  2α  and 1β  are not 
significant and therefore bi- directional causality is the form of Granger causality 
when both coefficients 2α  and 1β  are statically significant.
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Nevertheless, results based on the estimates from equation (1) and (2) are valid only if 
the variables considered in the system are level stationary. The means and the 
variances of Non –stationary variables change over time, and therefore all computed 
statistics in which these means and variances are used, are time dependent and fail to 
converge to their true value as the sample increases (Roa, 1994). 47 The well-known 
Augmented Dickey – Fuller unit root test as well as Philips-Perron (PP) unit root test 
are carried out here to determine the order of integration for each variable in the 
sample. Taking the difference of non- stationary time series is the common practice in 
the literature to covert non - stationary time series to achieve stationarity. 48 Yet, a 
model of the first difference variables does not have long – run solution, since the 
                                                 
46 A word about the concept of causality, “it is worth mentioned that Granger’s concept of causality 
does not imply a cause – effect relationship, but rather is based only on “predictability” of the time 
series (Griffiths et al, 1993, p.696). Granger causality tests are essentially tests of the predictive content 
of economic time series. Therefore, it may be preferable to attach “Granger” to “cause” since a 
controversy still surrounds the Granger concept of causality which differs somewhat from the causality 
definition in the strict philosophical sense (Darrat, 1999, p. 23).  
47 “Spurious regression” is the term used to describe the estimates obtained by regressing two or more 
time series where at least one of them is non-stationary. In such case usual properties of least squares 
estimates do n ot hold, and therefore tests such as (t, F, DW, and R2) are not reliable (Granger and 
Newbold, 1974).  
 48 If a variable is found to be non-stationary in its level form, but stationary in its first differenced 
form, then the variable is integrated of order one or I(1) , and I(2) in case it is stationary in its  second 
differenced.    
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economic theory suggests that economic variables take same values from period to 
another in long – run steady – state, thus yt = yt-1 = yt-2 =…= y* until the system is 
disturbed (Griffiths et al, 1993). Thus, in case the first difference model is considered 
the difference terms in the model will be zero and there is no long – run solution. The 
first difference model, therefore, may only provides short – run inferences rather than 
long – run. 
 
An appropriate way to investigate the existence of stable long – run equilibrium with 
unit root variables is to consider cointegration technique. Two or more variables are 
said to be cointegrated if they possess the same order of integration (same I(p)), and 
the linear combination of them εt, ( εt = yt – α – β xt ), is level stationary, integrated of 
order zero I(0).  Engel and Granger (1987) argue that if two or more variables are 
cointegrated then, this may reveal inherited long run relationship among them. A 
stationary linear combination, error term, represents how far the variables in a 
regression were away from equilibrium and therefore it could be regarded as 
equilibrium error. To detect the presence of cointergration between the two variables 
considered, the study conducts the Johansen (1988) Maximum Likelihood approach 
which relied on Engel and Granger (1987) representation theorem. Engel and Granger 
(1987) representation theorem states that if a set of variables are cointegrated then this 
equilibrium long – run relationship among the variables can be modelled in the form 
of Error Correction Model (ECM). In other word, the previous VAR model can be re-
parameterise in the form of ECM, which allows testing for long – run in addition to 
short – run Granger Causality among the unit root variables. 
 
The Error Correction Model (ECM) conventional framework is as follow:                         
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Equations (1) and (2) are in the first difference form Δ augmented with error term 
(EC) to form the framework of Error Correction Model (ECM) as in Equation (3) and 
(4). The EC terms which is stationary series I(0) refer to the lag residuals obtain from 
the underlying cointegration regression of the two variables. As thus, the significance 
of Φ1 and/or Φ2 in equations (3) and (4) indicates long- run Granger causality 
between the two variables, whilst the significance of α2 and/or β1 refers to short run 
Granger causality. 
 
An alternative causality test employed to assess the direction of causality between the 
two variables is that proposed by Sims (1972). Sims makes use of future values of the 
variables as an indicator of the direction of causality. The test based on the 
assumption that, only if causality runs from one variable, say, X to another variable Y, 
the coefficients of future values of X in the regression of Y on X should be 
insignificantly different from zero. He suggests one – sided distributed lagged model 
of Y on X and vice versa where future values of independent variable are included. 
Sims causality test between the economic development and the state of financial 
development will take the following form:  
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The direction of causality in this test depends upon the significance of the coefficients 
of future values 2α  and 2β  in both equations (1) and (2). If both coefficients 2α  
and 2β  are insignificantly different from Zero then the variables are independent, 
while the significance of both coefficients, 2α  and 2β , refers to bidirectional 
causality. In case that 2α  is significant, but  2β  is not, then causation runs from G to 
FD, and reveres direction of causality from FD to G, in case 2β  is significant whilst 
2α  is not.
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To achieve stationarity and to mitigate the problem of autocorrelation in the estimated 
models Sims suggests the variables to be measured as natural logs and to be 
“whitened” or prefiltered using the filter {FiltX(t) = X(t)– 1.5X(t-1) + 0.5625X(t-2).50 
Moreover, Sims emphasizes the importance of the Size of those coefficients in the 
interpretation of his test. He argues that it is  a common practice in the empirical 
literature to ignore insignificant coefficients even if they are large from economic 
point of view and that should not happen, large coefficients should be considered no 
matter how insignificant they are. To what extent a coefficient can be considered large 
enough in the notion of Sims tests, Sims suggests comparing the size of the 
coefficients of future values with those of current and past values. If they are 
comparable or larger than those of current and past values, then the coefficients of 
future values may be considered regardless of their significances. Small coefficients 
                                                 
49 Rowley and Jain (1986), however, stress that those tests of Sims should not be considered as 
indication of exogeneity of the independent variable in the previous equations. Sims test is not more 
than extension of existing practice where the theatrical one-sided distributed lagged model is 
augmented with future values, and that cannot resolve the issue of exogeneity. Sims work may just 
have been exaggerated by monetarists view.                                                                                                                            
50 Sims argues that prefiltered “whitened” time series will help in reach white noise residuals of the 
regression, by flattening the spectral density of economic time series. In fact, prefiltered time series 
will be stationary even if the original series is not. Sims among others argues against differencing time 
series to reach stationarity since differencing as they claim will through information away from the 
series and gives no inferences about the long – run relationship.  
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of future values relative to those of current and past values may, also, be ignored 
sometimes even if they are statistically significant.         
 
Geweke et al., (1983), nonetheless, construct several tests of causality in both forms 
“Granger causality tests” and “Sims causality tests” in a series of Monte Carlo 
experiments, where the properties of these tests investigated and compared.  T he 
results of their experiments indicate that the problem of serially correlated residuals is 
a common feature in most of those tests. They point out, however, that the 
performance of causality tests that includes lagged dependent variable in both forms 
of causality tests “granger causality test” and “Sims causality test” is “excellent” in 
comparison to other forms. Thus, a n ew version of Sims causality tests was 
introduced in their work by using two-sided distributed lagged model. In other word, 
each equation of the previous equations (5) and (6) is augmented with lags of the 
dependent variable as follow:  
                         ∑∑∑
=
+
=
−
=
− ++++=
k
i
tit
k
i
it
k
i
itt XXYY
1
3
0
2
1
10 µαααα          (7) 
                         ∑∑∑
=
+
=
−
=
− ++++=
k
i
tit
k
i
it
k
i
itt YYXX
1
3
0
2
1
10 νββββ          (8) 
The direction of causality in this test, as that of Sims, depends on significance of the 
coefficients of future values 3α and 3β  in equations (7) and (8) with the same 
interpretation of those of Sims, as mentioned above.51   The latter causality tests are 
usually quoted as G-M-D causality tests in the literature, which refers to the names of 
the authors, introduced this version of Sims – causality tests.             
 
                                                 
51 Lags of the right hand side variables in the previous equations (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), and (8) 
will be dictated due to the limited number of observations for most countries in our sample.   
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2.6 EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 
   
The empirical analysis of this study is built upon six economic variables to investigate 
the causal relationship between the economic development and the state of financial 
development in each country in the sample. Both the level of real GDP per capita and 
its growth rate are used interchangeably as economic development indicator. 
Considering both the level and the growth rate of real GDP per capita may provide 
further information to assess whether the state of financial development is correlated 
with the level or with the growth rate of GDP per capita or with both. Moreover, the 
growth rate of GDP per capita is more likely to be level stationary I (0), since it is the 
growth rate of the first differences of the GDP per capita, and that may preclude the 
study from applying the cointegration tests to investigate the existence of stationary 
long – run relationship between the two variables. On the other hand, the study 
considers four alternative measures to reflect the state of financial development. They 
are money supply M3 as a share of GDP (M3), banks assets as a share of GDP (BS), 
credit to private sector as a share of GDP (CPS), and currency in circulation as a share 
of narrow money M1 (C).  
 
2.6.1 UNIT ROOT TEST 
 
Unite root test, as mentioned earlier, is a prerequisite step before proceeding in such 
analysis. Two alternative unit root tests, the Augmented Ducky-Fuller (ADF) test and 
Philips-Perron (PP) test, are considered here to assess the degree of integration 
(stationarity) of each variable considered. The null hypothesis in each test is that the 
concerned variable has a unit root and the alternative hypothesis is that the variable is 
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stationary. The results of both tests for the level and the first difference of each 
variable for all countries are reported in Table 2.2.52  The various ADF and PP 
statistics show that the null hypothesis of a unit root in the level of GDP per capita 
(LG) cannot be rejected at 5% level for all GCC countries. Meanwhile, the null 
hypothesis of unit root in its first difference is rejected for all countries at 5% level or 
better. On the other hand, the growth rate of GDP per capita variable (G) is level 
stationary I (0), where the null hypothesis of unit root in G was strongly rejected at 
5% level or better for all countries. For financial development indicators considered  
the statistics of both unit root tests, ADF and PP, suggest that most of the financial 
indicators are first difference stationary I (1) in most countries with few exceptions. 
 
In case of Bahrain, only the ratio of M3 to GDP variable (M3) is level stationary I (0) 
with constant and trend at 5% level of significance. The null hypothesis of unit root in 
the other three variables – BS, CPS, and C -, cannot be rejected for any variable at 5% 
level. On the other hand, the null was strongly rejected at 1% level for the first 
difference of all three variables (BS, CPS and C) indicating that the variables are first 
difference stationary I (1). For Kuwait, the first two financial indicators considered 
M3 and BS are level stationary I(0) where the null hypothesis of unit root in each 
variable was rejected at 1% level by both unit root tests. For The other two financial 
indicators, CPS and C, the statistics of both unit root tests, ADF and PP, seem to 
disagree in the order of integration of each variable, even though both tests cannot 
reject the null of unit root in the level of both variables. The ADF test suggests that 
both variables are second difference stationary I (2), the null hypothesis of unit root in 
each variable cannot be rejected neither in its level form nor in its first difference 
                                                 
52 Only the level of GDP per capita was in the natural logarithm form since all other variables (financial 
indicators) are in ratios form.    
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form, whilst it is rejected for the second differences of both variables at 1% level. 
Philips-Perron PP t est, on the other hand, suggest that both variable are first 
difference stationary I (1), where the null hypothesis of unit root in the first difference 
of both variable was strongly rejected at 1% level.  The latter two variables, CPS and 
C, are excluded from empirical analysis since the possibility that both variables are 
second difference stationary I (2) cannot be ruled out.53      
 
In case of Oman, only one financial indicator - the ratio of currency to M1 (C ) - the 
null hypothesis of unit root was reject at 1% level by both unit root tests.54 The other 
three financial indicators - M3, BS, and CPS– are first difference stationary I (1). The 
null hypothesis of unit root in the first difference of the three variables was strongly 
rejected at 1% level according to both unit root tests ADF and PP. For the remaining 
three countries Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE the null hypothesis of unit root cannot 
be rejected at 5% level by a ny one of the unit root tests for the level form of all 
financial indicators considered. On the other hand, the statistics of the unit root tests, 
ADF and PP, support the rejection of the null hypothesis at 1% level in the first 
difference form of all four financial indicators in the three countries.  
 
Based on the results of the unit root tests the cointegration investigation can be carried 
out between the level of GDP per capita LG and each unit root I (1) variables of 
financial development indicators in five out of the six GCC countries. Cointegration 
                                                 
53 We considered a third unit root test, Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test (KPSS), to determine 
the order of integration of these two variables. However, the result of the test, in contrast to the finding 
of ADF and PP, suggest the variable is I (0). On the other hand, Perron (1997) unit root test with 
structural break, Second Gulf War (1990), in the three alternative forms of  the test suggests the two 
variables (CPS and C) are not level stationary I (0).   
54 The variable is level stationary I (0) according to both tests with constant and trend. The coefficient 
of the trend in the regression comes with negative sign, as expected, implying the ratio of currency in 
circulation to M1 declines with time reflecting a g radual increase of non-currency transactions and, 
perhaps, the role of financial institutions in the economic development, see Figure 2.3. 
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tests cannot be conducted for Kuwait since both financial indicators, M3 and BS, and 
the level of GDP per capita LG have different order of integration. 
 
T able 2.2: Unit Root Tests: 
H0: the variable has a unit root         
Country Variable  
Order of 
 integration ADF  k P-P  L 
Bahrain LG I (0) 1.007 0 0.942 2 
 G I (0) -4.066** 0 -4.097** 5 
 M3 I (0) -3.898* 0 -3.937* 2 
 BS I (0) -1.678 0 -1.687 2 
  CPS I (0) -1.595 0 -1.663 1 
 C I (0) -0.669 0 -0.700 2 
  ΔLG I (1) -4.082** 0 -4.105** 3 
 ΔG I (1) -7.859** 1 -10.267** 5 
 ΔM3 I (1) -8.770** 0 -8.770** 0 
 ΔBS I (1) -5.126** 0 -5.127** 1 
 ΔCPS I (1) -5.761** 0 -5.767** 0 
  ΔC I (1) -5.570** 0 -5.567** 1 
Kuwait LG I (0) -1.980 0 -1.980 0 
 G I (0) -5.860** 0 -5.907** 5 
 M3 I (0) -5.095** 0 -4.621** 3 
 BS I (0) -4.892** 0 -4.393** 3 
 CPS I (0) -1.424 0 -1.403 5 
 C I (0) -2.023 0 -2.023 0 
  ΔLG I (1) -6.094** 0 -6.240** 4 
 ΔG I (1) -6.828** 1 -17.038** 31 
 ΔM3 I (1) -8.322** 0 -8.322** 0 
 ΔBS I (1) -7.400** 0 -8.031** 4 
 ΔCPS I (1) -1.451 4 -5.209** 11 
  ΔC I (1) -0.938 6 -6.084** 4 
Oman LG I (0) -0.266 0 -0.276 6 
 G I (0) -4.466** 0 -4.363** 11 
 M3 I (0) -1.538 0 -1.399 11 
 BS I (0) -1.026 0 -0.987 6 
 CPS I (0) -1.333 0 -1.422 2 
 C I (0) -4.736** 1 -4.656** 19 
  ΔLG I (1) -4.485** 0 -4.424** 7 
 ΔG I (1) -6.465** 3 -11.498** 13 
 ΔM3 I (1) 5.641** 1 6.318** 22 
 ΔBS I (1) -4.270** 0 -4.467** 16 
 ΔCPS I (1) -4.783** 1 -3.834** 7 
  ΔC I (1) -4.561** 1 -4.395** 23 
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Table 2.2 continues: Unit Root Tests 
H0: the variable has a unit root         
Country Variable  
Order of 
 integration ADF  k P-P  L 
Qatar LG I (0) -1.698 0 -1.887 2 
 G I (0) -3.158* 2 -3.054* 2 
 M3 I (0) -2.622 0 -2.622 0 
 BS I (0) -2.585 0 -2.731 4 
 CPS I (0) -2.682 0 -2.621 4 
 C I (0) -0.454 0 -0.516 1 
  ΔLG I (1) -3.438* 0  -3.380* 3   
 ΔGR I (1) -5.057** 3 -16.455** 9 
 ΔM3 I (1) -4.246** 0   -4.246** 0   
 ΔBS I (1) -4.308** 0  -4.265** 0   
 ΔCPS I (1) -4.715** 1   -5.108** 9    
  ΔC I (1) -4.663** 0   -4.663** 0   
Saudi Arabia LG I (0) -2.274 0 -2.270 1 
 G I (0) -6.399** 0 -6.401** 2 
 M3 I (0) -0.173 0 -0.257 2 
 BS I (0) -0.222 0 -0.314 2 
 CPS I (0) 1.094 0 1.419 2 
 C I (0) -0.341 0 -0.311 1 
  ΔLG I (1) -5.943** 0   -5.950** 2   
 ΔG I (1) -5.88** 4 -28.166** 19 
 ΔM3 I (1) -5.150** 0   -5.018** 4 
 ΔBS I (1) -4.777** 0   -4.570** 5  
 ΔCPS I (1) -5.393** 1   -5.727** 1   
  ΔC I (1) -6.700** 0  -6.700** 0    
UAE LG I (0) -1.027 0 -1.028 2 
 G I (0) -4.648** 0 -4.583** 0 
 M3 I (0) -1.434 0 -1.466 3 
 BS I (0) -1.789 0 -1.792 1 
 CPS I (0) -1.556 0 -1.644 8 
 C I (0) -1.039 0 -0.990 2 
  ΔLG I (1) -7.155** 0 -6.912** 1  
 ΔG I (1) -6.567** 1 -9.467** 1 
 ΔM3 I (1) -5.870** 0   -5.856** 3 
 ΔBS I (1) -5.411** 0   -5.411** 2  
 ΔCPS I (1) -5.546** 0   -5.836** 5   
  ΔC I (1) -5.575** 0   -5.581** 4   
Note: k is the degree of augmentation in ADF tests determined automatically based on (SIC). L is the 
bandwidth determined automatically based on (Newly-West Bandwidth). 
One asterisk * indicates the significance at 5%, whilst two asterisks ** indicate the significance at 1% 
level.  
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2.6.2 COINTEGRATION TEST 
 
The cointegration analysis, as mentioned earlier, is associated with the existence of 
long – run relationship among the concerned variables. The Johansen maximum 
likelihood method is carried out here to detect the presence of cointegration between 
LG and each of the unit root financial indicators. The maximum likelihood method of 
Johansen consists of two alternative likelihood ratio tests, the Trace statistic test and 
Maximum eigenvalue test. The results of these tests are based on the maximum 
likelihood estimates of VARs of order 1 a nd 2, us ing model 3 (no trend in the 
cointegration relationship) and model 4 (with trend in the cointegration relationship) 
of Johansen (1995), to assess the sensitivity of cointegration tests outcome to lag 
length in VAR and to the inclusion of a trend in the relationship as Demetriades and 
Hussein (1996) suggested.55  The null hypothesis in each test is that there is no 
cointegration vector “r = 0 ” between the two variables, against the alternative 
hypothesis of the existence of one cointegration vector, “r = 1”.56 The statistics of the 
tests, Maximum eigenvalue test and Trace statistic test are reported in Table 2.3.           
                                                                                                  
The reported results show that the Johansen cointegration tests detect few cases of 
possible long – run relationship between the level of economic development LG and 
the alternative “unit root” measures of financial development considered in the study. 
The cointegration tests of both models, model 3 a nd model 4 of  Johansen (1995), 
reveal similar results for most countries in the sample. Only in two cases the 
cointegration was detected with the inclusion of trend; one is between LG and CPS in 
case of Bahrain and one is between LG and C in case of Qatar. However, only in 7 
                                                 
55 It is to be mentioned, that we test for the optimal lag length in VAR in the cointegration tests and it is 
suggested to be 2 and 3 in most cases, according to Akaike Information Criteria (AIC). 
56 Since there are just two variables in the system the maximum cointegration vector in this case is one. 
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cases out of the 18 c onsidered the cointegration relationship between the two 
variables is detected by the tests. Generally, the tests seem to be less sensitive to the 
lag length of the VAR except in four cases. The cointegration relation was detected 
only with higher lags, lag 2, in three cases, between LG and BS in case of Bahrain, 
LG and M3 in cases of Qatar, and between LG and CPS in case of Saudi Arabia.  In 
contrast, the cointegration relationship in the fourth case is suggested with lag 1, but 
not with lag 2, between LG and CPS in case of UAE.57        
                                                                                                                             
Table 2.3:  Johansen cointegration tests  
Country 
Variables in  
cointegration 
vector 
Null hypothesis: r = 0 ; alternative hypothesis: r = 1 
 
Maximal eigenvalue 
statistic   Trace statistic 
  k = 1 k = 2   k = 1 k = 2 
Bahrain LY, BS 8.694 16.319*  10.933 17.993* 
 LY, CPS 26.484* 27.258*  31.209* 32.336* 
 LY, C 13.954 9.40  21.082 15.970 
Oman LY, M3 6.863 3.876  7.106 4.845 
 LY, BS 7.775 6.834  7.802 7.014 
 LY, CPS 7.6749 4.833  7.876 5.173 
Qatar LY, M3 15.411 26.588*   24.038 41.649* 
 LY, BS 14.604 17.018  24.734 27.162* 
 LY, CPS 15.289 19.487  21.544 23.929 
 LY, C 21.362* 25.841*  29.582* 35.325* 
Saudi Arabia LY, M3 7.206 8.525  9.569 10.526 
 LY, BS 6.698 7.921  8.706 10.042 
 LY, CPS 8.994 15.685*  9.488 17.199* 
 LY, C 8.024 8.007  8.595 8.241 
UAE LY, M3 9.395 6.105  11.793 10.049 
 LY, BS 8.775 8.166  12.150 10.987 
 LY, CPS 17.667* 11.853  19.456* 13.945 
  LY, C 9.982 9.584  11.153 10.846 
Note: r is the number of cointegration vector, K is number of lags in the cointegration tests. 
One asterisk * indicates the significance at 5%,  
 
 
 
                                                 
57 Some studies such as Ghirmay(2004), and Darrat (1999), among others, report results for relatively 
higher lags, up to 4 lags in the cointegration tests, despite the limited number of observations. Yet, even 
though we relax the lags up to 3 (and to 4 in case of Saudi Arabia) no cointegration relationship was 
detected except for lag 3 in the cointegration test between LG and CPS for UAE. However, lag 2 in the 
latter cointegration test (LG and CPS for UAE) is significant at 10% level.   
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The results of both cointegration tests in case of Bahrain reject the null hypothesis of 
zero cointegration vector between the level of GDP per capita LG and two financial 
development indicators, BS, and CPS at 5% level. On the other hand, the null 
hypothesis of zero cointegration vectors between the level of economic development 
LG and the ratio of currency to narrow money (C) cannot be rejected by either test. 
 
For Oman, however, the Johansen tests, Trace statistic test and Maximum eigenvalue 
test, fail to reject the null hypothesis between the real GDP per capita LG and any one 
of the three unit root financial indicators, M3, BS, and CPS. This finding, nonetheless, 
needs to be interpreted with some caution and may not be considered as a sign of the 
lack of stable long – run relationship between the economic development process and 
the level of financial development in the Omani  economy. It may be rather due to the 
limited number of observations, 31 observations in case of Oman, considering that the 
Johansen cointegration technique requires long series for better performance. 
Moreover, others such as D emetriades and Hussein (1996), Al-Yousf (2002) and 
Boulila and Trabelsi (2004) related such finding to a possible non – linear relationship 
between the two variables rather than a linear relationship. Or perhaps to the failure of 
the financial development proxies considered to reflect extensively the financial 
activities in Omani economy. Interestingly, Oman has the highest ratio of currency in 
circulation to narrow money (C) – Figure 2.3 – in our sample, which may indicate 
that, a considerable number of financial transactions occur outside the banking 
sector.58          
         
                                                 
58 Moreover, for the other three financial indicators considered, Oman has the lowest ratios in two 
indicators in the sample; BS (Table 2.1) and M3 (Figure 2.1).  
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For Qatar, on the other hand, three cointegration relationships are detected between 
the level of GDP per capita and three out of the four financial indicators M3, BS, and 
C. The null hypothesis of no cointegration was rejected by both tests in all cases at 
5% level.  For Saudi Arabia and UAE the credit to private sector as a share of GDP 
(CPS) is the only financial development indicator suggested to have a long – run 
relationship with real GDP per capita LG, according to both cointegration tests. The 
null hypothesis of zero cointegration vectors between LG and CPS is rejected by 
cointegration tests at 5% level for the two countries. The null hypothesis, however, 
cannot be rejected by those tests between the real GDP per capita LG and each one of 
the remaining unit root financial indicators considered – M3, BS, and C – in both 
countries. In sum, there is at least one financial indicator has a stationary long – run 
relationship with level of real GDP per capita LG in four countries out of the five 
countries considered in the cointegration analysis. 
 
The existence of stationary long – run relationship between the two variables, the real 
GDP per capita LG and the level of financial development, provide evidence to 
support the underlying theoretical argument of causal long – run relationship between 
the two variables. This long – run relationship between the two variables can be 
modelled according to Granger representation theorem, as mentioned earlier. The 
Granger causality tests therefore can be expressed in a d ynamic Error Correction 
Model (ECM), if the level of real GDP per capita LG and the concerned financial 
indicator are cointegrated.  For most case where no long – run relationship is detected 
between the alternative financial proxies and the real GDP per capita LG, the Granger 
– causality tests are conducted in the form of first difference model, where both 
variables are taken in their first difference form. The first difference model, as 
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mentioned earlier, may only provide inferences about a possible form of short – run 
Granger – causality between the two variables. However, Sims causality tests may 
provide an alternative way to determine the form of long – run causality between the 
two variables. Variables involved in Sims causality tests are prefiltered or whitened 
rather than differenced to achieve stationarty. Therefore, the inferences of Sims 
causality tests may refer to the long – run Sims – causality between the concerned 
variables.    
 
2.6.3 CAUSALITY TESTS  
 
Following the preceding discussion the study conducts three causality tests, Granger – 
causality test, Sims – causality test, and G-M-D causality test, to determine whether 
the economic development process – measured interchangeably by t he level of real 
GDP per capita and its growth rate – and the state of financial development are 
related. The Granger – causality tests are based on the estimates of first-difference 
VARs in case the concerned variables have different order of integration or if they are 
not cointegrated. If, however, the two variables are level stationary I (0) the results of 
the tests are based on the estimates of level VARs. Finally, in case the two variables 
are cointegrated the Granger – causality tests are based on the form of ECM.59 The 
null hypothesis of Granger – causality tests is always of no causality between the 
concerned variables. The tests are based on F-tests and t-tests of the relevant 
coefficients in each equation. Sims – causality tests and G-M-D causality tests, on the 
other hand, are based on the estimates of single equations of the two variables. For 
Sims tests, the variables are transformed, pre-filtered, using Sims filter {FiltX(t) = 
                                                 
59 To conserve the degrees of freedom the lag length in the ECM are based on the shortest lag for which 
the cointegration is reported. However, different lag, lag 2, do to not alter the finding.  
 59 
X(t)– 1.5X(t-1) + 0.5625X(t-2) to ensure both variables are level stationary I(0). For 
G-M-D causality test, we followed the unit root tests results to apply the test. In other 
words, the test is carried out using the level form of the two variables if both variables 
are level stationary I (0). Alternatively, the test is conducted using the first differences 
of the time series of both variables in case one of them or both variables are first 
difference stationary I(1).  The null hypothesis in both tests (Sims – causality tests and 
G-M-D causality tests) is that the coefficients of future values are insignificantly 
different from zero (no causation between the two variables). Same as Granger tests 
both tests based on F-tests and t-tests of the relevant parameters in each equation.60   
 
The Granger – causality tests between the level of real GDP per capita LG and each of 
the alternative measures of financial development (FD) are report in Table 2.4. The 
results of the alternative causality tests (Sims – causality tests and G-M-D causality 
tests) between the two variables are presented in Table 2.5 for all countries in the 
sample. Results of these tests for Kingdom of Bahrain are based on a sample of data 
from 1975 to 2005. T he Granger – causality tests detect two possible forms of 
causation between LG and three financial indicators, BS, CPS, and C. The null 
hypothesis of no causality running from BS to LG is rejected at %5 level for long – 
run (error term in the ECM), but not for short – run (dynamic lagged terms of BS in 
the ECM). Therefore, there seems to be evidence to suggest that financial system 
development leads the level of real output in long- run in Bahraini economy. 
However, the results for the other two indicators CPS and C suggest that the causation 
is the other way around; LG does impart the demand for credit CPS in the long- run, 
                                                 
60 For all tests considered, F-tests statistics are reported if the independent variables have dynamic 
terms (lagged \ forwarded more than once) in the relevant equation, and t-tests statistics considered if 
the independent variable is lagged\forwarded once.  
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Whilst LG appears to alter the demand for financial services C in the short-run. 61 In 
both cases the null hypothesis of no causality was rejected at 5% level of significance. 
 
Table 2.4: Granger –causality tests between LG and financial indicators based on VARs and ECMs  
Country Model Null hypothesis K 
F-Statistics 
for 
short-run Coeff 
t-Statistics 
for 
Long-run Coeff 
Bahrain 
VAR 
M3 Does not cause LG 1 -0.0406 -0.0062   
 LG Does not cause M3 1 -1.29927 -0.3262   
 
ECM 
BS Does not cause LG 2 1.231 0.212 2.2170* 0.1807 
 LG Does not cause BS 2 -1.309 -0.6312 -0.1164 -0.0159 
 
ECM 
CPS Does not cause LG 1 -   - 0.3607 0.0248 
 LG Does not cause CPS 1 - - 2.9375* 0.1004 
 
VAR 
C  Does not cause LG 1 -0.1982 -0.0887   
  LG Does not cause  C 1 -2.1666* -0.1704   
Kuwait 
VAR 
M3 Does not cause LG 1 -0.8130 -0.2424   
 LG Does not cause M3 1 0.1621 0.0232   
 
VAR 
BS Does not cause LG 1 0.9318 -0.1825   
 LG Does not cause BS 1 0.4532 0.1041   
Oman 
VAR 
M3 Does not cause LG 1 -1.6098 -1.7342   
 LG Does not cause M3 1 2.5010* 0.1256   
 
VAR 
BS Does not cause LG 1 -0.7838 -0.4853   
 LG Does not cause BS 1 1.9589 0.1752   
 
VAR 
CPS Does not cause LG 1 -0.9685 -0.7541   
 LG Does not cause CPS 1 1.5377 0.1231   
 
VAR 
C  Does not cause LG 1 1.5534 1.0030   
  LG Does not cause  C 1 -1.7976 -0.1030   
Note: diagnostic tests of the residuals of VARs and ECMs where causality is reported indicate the 
absence of autocorrelation and Heterosckedasticity, as well as normally distributed residuals; except for 
ECM of LG and CPS in case of Saudi Arabia where the residuals are not normally distributed. For the 
remaining VARs in Table 2.4 where no causality is detected, some of these problems were reported in 
few cases. 
 k is the number of lags in VAR and ECM. 
One asterisk * indicates the significance at 5%, whilst two asterisks ** indicate the significance at 1% 
level.   
 
 
Moreover, Sims – causality tests support the finding of supply - leading hypothesis in 
Bahrain, albeit with different financial indicator (CPS). The test rejects the null 
hypothesis of no causality run from CPS to LG at 5%.  In contrast, G-M-D causality 
tests confirmed the demand following hypothesis of short – run causality, suggested 
by Granger-causality test, between the level of output LG and the financial 
                                                 
61 Note that there is no coefficient for the dynamic short-run between LG and CPS, since the lag is 
already included in the cointegration vector in the ECM estimates.  
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development C (reverse causality).  The null hypothesis of no causality from LG to C 
is rejected at 5% level as in Table 2.5.  However, the cointegration tests showed that 
these two variables (LG and C) are not cointegrated, and therefore such finding may 
need to be viewed with considerable scepticism, Since the two variables seems to be 
wandering apart from each other and do not show a sign of cointegration. The three 
causality tests fail to report any further form of causality between LG and the 
alternative financial indicators considered for Bahrain.  
 
Table 2.4 continues: Granger –causality tests between LG and financial indicators based on VARs and ECMs  
Country Model Null hypothesis K 
F-Statistics 
for 
short-run Coeff 
t-Statistics 
for 
Long-run Coeff 
Qatar 
ECM 
M3 Does not cause LG 2 0.5178 0.4292 1.4394  0.2937 
 LG Does not cause M3 2 0.1684 0.0264 -2.9309* -0.262 
 
ECM 
BS Does not cause LG 2 -0.8842 -0.3229 3.8034* 0.1916 
 LG Does not cause BS 2 2.7603* 0.8282 -3.767* -0.174 
 
VAR 
CPS Does not cause LG 1 0.1891 0.073   
 LG Does not cause CPS 1 0.1668  0.0205   
 
ECM 
C  Does not cause LG 1 - - -5.937** -0.1215 
  LG Does not cause  C 1 - - 0.9907 0.0077 
Saudi  
VAR 
M3 Does not cause LG 1 -1.1482 -1.3961   
Arabia LG Does not cause M3 1 0.0785 0.0030   
 
VAR 
BS Does not cause LG 1 -1.1915 -1.0148   
 LG Does not cause BS 1 0.2162 0.0113   
 
ECM 
CPS Does not cause LG 2 0.2115 0.2937  -2.2869* -0.1274 
 LG Does not cause CPS 2 -0.452 -0.0098 2.6386* 0.0187 
 
VAR 
C  Does not cause LG 1 -0.7807 -0.77439   
 LG Does not cause  C 1 -2.6184* -0.0633   
UAE 
VAR 
M3 Does not cause LG 1 0.0057 0.0024   
 LG Does not cause M3 1 0.1228 0.0096   
 
VAR 
BS Does not cause LG 1 -0.6401 -0.1938   
 LG Does not cause BS 1 0.2868 0.0464   
 
ECM 
CPS Does not cause LG 2 -0.6439 -0.37196 -1.0798 -0.1932 
 LG Does not cause CPS 2 0.0121 0.00085 -1.1916 -0.0582 
 
VAR 
C  Does not cause LG 1 -0.0866 -0.0745   
  LG Does not cause  C 1 -2.3152* -0.0660   
 
 
The form of causality between the level of economic development LG and the 
development of financial sector in Bahrain seems to be sensitive to both the causality 
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tests considered and the proxies of financial development. Finance leads economic 
development in the long - run according to Granger – causality tests (from Bs to LG) 
and Sims – causality tests (from CPS to LG). And economic development leads 
finance in short – run (from LG to C) and in the long- run (from LG to CPS) 
according to Granger – causality tests as well as a short-run causality (from LG to C) 
suggested by G-M-D causality tests. Therefore, Considering the causality tests 
between the growth rate of GDP per capita G and the alternative measures of financial 
development, as we proceed, may help to determine the dominate form of causality 
between economic development and financial system activity in Bahrain in the last 
three decades.     
 
The findings of these tests, nonetheless, are discouraging for two countries in the 
sample, Kuwait (1973 – 2006) and Oman (1976 – 2006). The null hypothesis of no 
causality between LG and each of the alternative financial indicators considered for 
Kuwait (M3 and BS) cannot be rejected at 5% level according to the three alternative 
causality tests.  For Oman also the three causality tests suggest no form of causality 
between LG and the alternative measures of financial development – M3, BS, CPS, 
and C-.  However, Granger – causality tests detect one reverse short – run causality 
from LG to M3, at 5% level for Oman. Yet, again, the cointegration tests suggest that 
the two variables (LG and M3) do not carry a stationary long – run relationship (not 
cointegrated). Therefore, the lack of cointegration between the two variables may cast 
some doubt in the reliability of this evidence of short – run causality.  
 
Although our finding for Kuwait based only on two financial indicators (M3 and BS), 
other studies also, such as Al-Yousf (2002) and Boulila and Trabelsi (2004), report no 
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evidences of causality between the economic development and financial development 
for Kuwait. 
 
Table 2.5: Sims-causality tests and G-M-D Causality test between LG and Financial Indicators 
Country Null Hypothesis 
  Sims   G-M-D 
lag F/T- Test Coeff F/T- Test Coeff 
Bahrain LG Does not cause M3 1 -0.284 -1.636 -1.626 -0.232 
 M3 Does not cause LG 1 0.035 0.012 0.045 0.0097 
 LG Does not cause BS 2 0.231 
-0.057 
0.028 1.634 
-0.172 
-0.038 
 BS Does not cause LG 2 2.423 
0.522 
-0.0053 2.539 
0.459 
0.053 
 LG Does not cause CPS 1 0.566 0.176 0.882 0.269 
 CPS Does not cause LG  1 2.135* 0.178 1.600 0.143 
 LG Does not cause C 1 -1.507 -0.695 -2.089* -0.921 
 C Does not cause LG  1 0.682 0.062 -0.429 -0.038 
Kuwait LG Does not cause M3 1 -1.623 -0.252 -1.6131 -0.275 
 M3 Does not cause LG 1 1.073 0.097 1.892 0.123 
 LG Does not cause BS 1 -0.902 -0.096 -1.789 -0.139 
  BS Does not cause LG  1 0.972 0.107 1.357 0.151 
Oman LG Does not cause M3 1 1.047 0.840 1.724 1.277 
 M3 Does not cause LG 1 -1.415 -0.050 -1.190 -0.040 
 LG Does not cause BS 1 1.409 0.542 1.721 0.691 
 BS Does not cause LG  1 -0.075 -0.0045 -0.427 -0.027 
 LG Does not cause CPS 1 1.518 0.824 1.650 0.823 
 CPS Does not cause LG  1 -0.829 -0.041 -1.014 -0.051 
 LG Does not cause C 1 -0.806 -0.573 -1.231 -0.880 
  C Does not cause LG  1 0.706 0.043 0.966 0.056 
Note: for each equation the usual residuals tests (autocorrelation, Heteroskedasticity, normality) are conducted to 
ensure that they are white noise. In case, however, there are evidences of serial correlation, Heteroskedasticity, or 
both we make sure we correct for it. Normality, on the other hand, where it was detected in few cases, may require 
longer span of data.   
 Lag in Sims tests refers to the number of for ward periods and the number of lagged periods of i ndependent 
variable. Whilst, it refers to the number of  for ward periods and the number of lagged periods of i ndependent 
variable as well as the number of lagged periods for the dependent variable in case of G-M-D tests. 
One asterisk * indicates the significance at 5%, whilst two asterisks ** indicate the significance at 1% level.   
 
 
 
This finding for Kuwait may take us back to Azam’s (1988a) argument about the 
psychological and financial damage caused by the collapse of Al-Manakh equity and 
real estate market in Kuwait in 1982, w here over US$ 90bn reportedly wiped out. 
Damage of such magnitude, in a relatively small economy such as that of Kuwait, 
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may have hindered the role of financial institutions in the economic activity for 
sometimes in the last three decades.  
 
T able 2.5: continues: Sims-causality tests and G-M-D Causality test between LG and Financial Indicators (FI) 
Country Null Hypothesis 
  Sims   G-M-D 
k F/T- Test Coefficient F/T- Test Coefficient 
Qatar LG Does not cause M3 1 -0.8105 -0.3027 -0.7271 -0.2729 
 M3 Does not cause LG 1 -0.1268 -0.0230 -0.0183 -0.0029 
 LG Does not cause BS 1 0.8283 0.1174 0.8495 0.1263 
 BS Does not cause LG  1 0.5456 0.0660 0.1370 0.0180 
 LG Does not cause CPS 1 0.3290 0.1228 0.1507 0.0569 
 CPS Does not cause LG  1 0.1501 0.0251 0.0303 0.0042 
 LG Does not cause C 1 -1.4865 -1.1266 -1.5292 -1.1793 
 C Does not cause LG  1 0.3365 0.0257 0.5854 0.0395 
Saudi Arabia LG Does not cause M3 1 1.0686 0.73291 -0.04041 -0.02805 
 M3 Does not cause LG 1 -1.1072 -0.030325 -1.05638 -0.022418 
 LG Does not cause BS 1 1.2707 0.639224 0.096594 0.050862 
 BS Does not cause LG  1 -1.1446 -0.041814 -1.13590 -0.034012 
 LG Does not cause CPS 2 0.3326 
0.9974 
0.2018 0.0921 
0.2505 
-0.5718 
 CPS Does not cause LG  2 0.3038 
0.0095 
0.0189 0.2462 
-0.0122 
-0.0037 
 LG Does not cause C 2 3.6236* 
-2.1376 
-2.0989 2.5099 
-2.8497 
-2.2349 
  C Does not cause LG  2 1.1010 
-0.0018 
0.0459 0.5537 
-0.0183 
-0.0147 
UAE LG Does not cause M3 2 3.9581* 
0.0835 
0.4753 3.4526* 
-0.3558 
0.42909 
 M3 Does not cause LG 2 6.006** 
0.1079 
-0.1808 3.6426* 
0.1600 
-0.1878 
 LG Does not cause BS 1 -0.7210 -0.0616 -0.5496 -0.0549 
 BS Does not cause LG  1 0.9310 0.0719 0.6900 0.0536 
 LG Does not cause CPS 1 0.1434 0.0298 -0.5757 -0.1358 
 CPS Does not cause LG  1 0.1331 0.0049 1.2628 0.0437 
 LG Does not cause C 1 -1.0208 -0.8907 -1.8694 -1.6064 
  C Does not cause LG  1 0.0049 0.00028 -0.3205 -0.0138 
Note: see the previous note of the same table.  
 
A possible channel of such impact is through the rise of government controls and 
intervention in the allocation of financial resources. Further explanations of such 
finding perhaps related to some characters of the resource rich economy, such as the 
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role of public sector, and the negligible role of private sector as it w ill be 
demonstrated as we proceed in our discussion.   
 
For Qatar, only Granger – causality tests, out of the three causality tests, suggests a 
casual relationship between the level of output LG and three financial indicators M3, 
BS, and C. However, different forms of causation is reported for each relationship; the 
level of output LG imparts financial development M3 in the long-run, whilst bi-
directional causality is the form of causation between LG and BS in the long – run 
and demand following hypothesis in the short – run. On the other hand, the third 
relationship reported (LG and C) suggests that financial development appears to 
stimulate the level of economic development in the long – run. In all cases the null 
hypothesis was rejected at 5% level or better. However, the short span of data for 
Qatar 26 may cast doubt on such different outcome for each relationship. 
 
For Saudi Arabia (1964 – 2007), few evidences of causality are recorded between the 
level of output LG and the development of financial system. Two forms of causality 
between LG and two financial indicators (CPS and C) are reported by Granger – 
causality tests; a b i-directional long-run relationship between LG and CPS, and a 
short – run demand following hypothesis between LG and C. The null hypothesis of 
no causality was rejected at 5% level in both cases. 62  However, as mentioned above, 
the latter finding of short – run reverse causality may be less reliable since LG and C 
are not cointegrated. Sims – causality tests support the finding of reverse causality; a 
long-rung causation runs from LG to C is reported with 5% level of significance. The 
G-M-D causality tests, on the other hand, detect no form of causality between the LG 
                                                 
62 However, The lack of short – run causality between LG and CPS in the ECM contradicts the 
suggestion of Granger representation theorem of the existence of short – run causality between the two 
cointegrated variables at least in one direction, thereby, casting some doubt on this finding  
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and any financial proxy considered for Saudi Arabia. As thus, there seems to be 
evidences, albeit weak, suggest that the development of real sector LG seems to 
impart the financial system activities in Saudi Arabia in the last four decades. This 
finding of Saudi Arabia is probably due to the fact that the public sector plays the 
dominant role in all economic activity, which in return may have enhanced the 
activities of other sectors and hence the demand on f inancial services by other 
sectors.63 
 
For the UAE (1973 – 2004), the evidences from Granger-causality test are weak, only 
a short-run reverse causality between LG and one financial indicator C is detected 
with 5% level of significance.64 Sims-causality test and G-M-D causality, on the other 
hand, demonstrate evidences of bi-directional causality between the level of economic 
output LG and the development of financial system with the same financial proxy M3. 
The null hypotheses of no c ausality from M3 to LG and vice versa are rejected 
according to both causality tests at 5% level or better. No other form of causation is 
reported by any causality tests between LG and any financial proxy considered for 
UAE.  
 
The finding of bi-directional causality, where the level of income LG and the financial 
system development seems to impart the activities of each other may be related to 
some features of the UAE economy.  In the case where the economic activity enhance 
the financial sector activities, demand – following hypothesis, such form of causation 
may be attributed to the flourishing private sector in Dubai Emirate (real estates, 
constructions, re-export industry, tourism, …etc), . In addition, as mentioned earlier 
                                                 
63 Saudi Arabia is the largest oil producer in the world, and it has the largest economy in the region.  
64  Similar to that reported earlier for Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, the two variables LG and C are not 
cointegrated which may doubt the reliability of this finding.  
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for Saudi Arabia, the role of Public expenditures, in rich oil producer country, to fuel 
the other sectors activities and in returns the demand for financial services.65 The 
supply – leading hypothesis, where the financial sector development stimulates the 
economic development in UAE,  could be related to the fact that UAE is among the 
countries with the highest rate of bank density relative to its population and its level 
of GDP. There are over 45 l ocal and foreign banks, and around 50 representative 
offices of other international banks.66 Thus, the expected higher level of competition 
among this large number of banks may have fostered the quality and the quantity of 
the financial services in the country and ultimately the level of economic activities. 
Moreover, it might be related, to some extent, to the rapid development of financial 
sector of Dubai Emirate since early 1990s. Dubai has paid a considerable attention to 
develop its financial sector as it aims to lesson its dependency on oil and the hope to 
become a financial centre in the Middle East region.  
 
The second set of causality tests considered here is regarding the forms of causality 
between the growth rate of GDP per capita (G) and the development of financial 
sector. ADF and PP unit root tests suggests that G is level stationary I(0), therefore, 
Granger – causality tests and G-M-D causality tests will be carried out using the first 
differences of the two variables ( short – run causality)  if the concerned financial 
indicator is first difference stationary I(1). Table 2.6 reports the results of the three 
alternative causality tests between the two variables for all countries in the sample.  
 
The results of the three tests for Bahrain suggest strong evidences in favour of the 
view that the expansion of financial services fuels the growth of real sector activities. 
                                                 
65 UAE has two industrial zones, Jabal Ali free zone in Dubai as well as Zannah –ArRuways industrial 
Zone in Abu Dhabi, both zones host most of manufacturing industry in the country.  
66 Country profile (UAE), Federal research division, (Library of Congress, 2007).  
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Granger – causality tests reports this form of causality, supply – leading hypothesis, in 
the long - run (between (G) and M3, both variables are I(0) and in the short – run 
(between G and two other financial proxies BS and CPS). The null hypothesis of no 
Granger – causality running from the alternative financial indicator (M3, BS, and 
CPS) to (G) is rejected in the three cases at 5% level or better as in Table 2.6.  
Interestingly, Sims causality tests also, seem to support this finding of Granger tests 
of supply – leading hypothesis is the form of causation between the financial 
development and growth of real output. The null hypothesis that financial 
development does not cause economic growth (G) is rejected for both financial 
indicators, BS and CPS, at 5% level. Moreover, G-M-D causality tests give support 
for supply – leading hypothesis, but only from one financial indicator (BS) to (G), 
where the null hypothesis of no causation is rejected at 5% level.  These substantial 
evidences of supply – leading hypothesis, along with the previous finding of causality 
between LG and the development of financial sector, may conclude that the supply – 
leading hypothesis may have been the dominant form of causation in Bahrain in this 
period. This finding for Bahrain may, in fact, carry some weight. Bahrain has served 
as financial centre for the GCC region, where Bahrain was initially developed 
strongly, to deploy and to recycle the petro-dollars of the GCC region in 1970s; since 
then Bahrain has been seeking to make a niche of its financial sector (Gray and Blejer, 
2007).  
 
Moreover, Bahrain has always been relatively opened to the international financial 
institutions (e.g. offshore banks, insurance companies,) compare to some other 
countries such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Hence, Bahrain has provided the right 
place for some international financial institutions interested in operating in the GCC 
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region and in targeting the huge energy and petrochemical industries as well as some 
big construction activities in the region.67   
 
Table 2.6:  Causality tests between (G) and Financial indicators (FI) 
Country Null Hypothesis 
  Granger   Sims   G-M-D 
lag F/T- Test Coeff F/T- Test Coeff F/T- Test Coeff 
Bahrain G Does not cause M3 1 -0.7768 -0.1702 -0.841 -0.2306 -1.8503 -0.2422 
 M3 Does not cause G 1 2.389* 0.2426 1.2073 0.3216 0.1560 0.0382 
 G Does not cause BS 1 -1.2669 -0.2938 -0.6225 -0.0949 -0.2820 -0.0330 
 BS Does not cause G  1 3.5203** 0.4732 3.2515* 0.6119 2.7199* 0.5725 
 G Does not cause CPS 1 -0.2934 -0.0283 -0.5478 -0.2305 -0.3781 -0.1281 
 CPS Does not cause G  1 2.3103* 1.0381 2.5131* 0.1905 1.3163 0.1149 
 G Does not cause C 2 1.0321 
- 0.0962 
- 0.0821 0.3492 
-0.6260 
-0.5581 1.1186 
- 0.558 
- 0.454 
 C Does not cause G  2 1.1713 
0.2737 
- 0.7195 0.640541 0.05611 1.0089 
- 0.035 
- 0.123 
Kuwait G Does not cause M3 2 1.0866 
-0.1619 
0.1852 1.0928 
-0.585 
-0.2162 2.9866 
-0.4475 
-0.0988 
 M3 Does not cause G 2 0.4993 
0.1052 
0.0461 8.6392** 
0.2571 
0.0188 4.4004* 
0.1645 
-0.1005 
 G Does not cause BS 1 -0.7383 -0.0974 -0.4433 -0.1129 -1.6448 -0.1908 
  BS Does not cause G  1 1.3505 0.1549 4.5211** 0.3279 -0.3142 -0.0333 
Oman G Does not cause M3 1 -0.4281 -0.0185 0.3861 0.4915 0.9324 0.8554 
 M3 Does not cause G 1 0.6544 1.0203 -0.67008 -0.0168 -0.8862 -0.0249 
 G Does not cause BS 1 0.1198 0.0082 0.3844 0.2315 1.0294 0.5305 
 BS Does not cause G  1 1.1570 0.9038 0.9854 0.0446 0.1582 0.0082 
 G Does not cause CPS 1 -0.19171 -0.0103 1.4083 1.1425 1.5093 0.9575 
 CPS Does not cause G  1 1.4623 1.2872 0.4365 0.0167 -0.2548 -0.0115 
 G Does not cause C 1 -2.0451* - 0.1059 0.1905 0.2154 -1.9253 -1.3178 
 C Does not cause G  1 0.2192 0.0850 1.5516 0.0686 0.7610 0.0437 
Qatar G Does not cause M3 1 -0.7537 -0.0817 -0.7676 -0.4665 -0.8360 -0.3421 
 M3 Does not cause G 1 -0.2219 -0.0736 -0.4115 -0.0927 -0.8338 -0.134 
 G Does not cause BS 1 0.0965 0.0182 0.9131 0.17607 1.6285 0.2354 
 BS Does not cause G  1 1.6548 0.6229 1.6013 0.18046 0.1484 0.0223 
 G Does not cause CPS 1 -0.2651 -0.029 -0.1074 -0.0693 0.7446 0.3167 
 CPS Does not cause G  1 0.4848 0.2100 -0.2592 -0.0372 -0.0744 -0.0110 
 G Does not cause C 1 -1.071 -0.0548 -0.7001 -0.8538 -1.234 -1.0010 
 C Does not cause G  1 1.1320 0.9974 1.0391 0.06855 1.3737 0.0928 
Note: lag is the number of lagged periods for each variable in Granger tests. For Sims and G-M-D tests see the 
note of Table 1.6.  
For each equation the usual residuals tests (autocorrelation, Heteroskedasticity, normality) are conducted to ensure 
that they are white noise. In case, however, there are evidences of serial correlation, Heteroskedasticity, or both we 
make sure we correct for it. Normality, on the other hand, where it was detected in few cases, may require longer 
span of data.   
One asterisk * indicates the significance at 5%, whilst two asterisks ** indicate the significance at 1% 
level  
                                                 
 67 Considering, the fact that the small size of the local banks has prevented them from participating, as 
mentioned earlier, in the energy related projects in their economies.  
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Table 2.6 Continues: Causality tests between (G) and Financial indicators (FI) 
Country Null Hypothesis 
  Granger   Sims   G-M-D 
lag F/T- Test Coeff F/T- Test Coeff F/T- Test Coeff 
Saudi G Does not cause M3 2 0.4435 
0.0038 
-0.0028 0.0051 
0.1988 
0.1323 0.0252 
-0.1167 
-0.2343 
Arabia M3 Does not cause G 2 1.28095 
-0.3709 
2.477 0.3416 
0.0144 
0.0147 0.3306 
0.0049 
0.0134 
 G Does not cause BS 2 0.3036 
0.0219 
0.0059 0.1474 
0.8488 
0.0084 0.2311 
0.6169 
-0.4674 
 BS Does not cause G  2 0.9273 
-0.3221 
1.5295 0.2287 
- 0.037 
-0.008 0.2632 
0.0094 
0.0181 
 G Does not cause CPS 2 0.06116 
0.0046 
0.0035 0.3322 
2.3623 
-1.0339 0.2528 
0.8530 
-1.4286 
 CPS Does not cause G  2 0.2096 
0.4058 
1.219 0.14897 
0.0118 
0.0081 0.1601 
0.0078 
0.0079 
 G Does not cause C 2 1.6366 
-0.0279 
0.1068 0.7011 
-2.6099 
-2.6189 2.2684 
-2.3845 
-2.2333 
 C Does not cause G  2 1.3932 
0.0169 
2.6784 1.5053 
0.0287 
0.0326 1.3132 
0.0209 
0.0307 
UAE G Does not cause M3 2 4.1786* 
-0.0272 
0.1149 7.8828**  
-0.3149 
0.6222  5.8012*  
-0.4156 
0.5001 
 M3 Does not cause G 2 5.1869*  
0.9894 
-0.5327  4.7814* 
0.0760 
-0.0920 3.7340* 
0.0138 
-0.1634 
 G Does not cause BS 2 0.6284 
-0.0785 
0.0574 1.3217 
- 0.1236 
0.1240 0.8433 
-0.1283 
0.0881 
 BS Does not cause G  2 5.2552* 
0.8495 
0.1977 4.5809* 
-0.1611 
0.0401 2.0410 
0.1888 
0.0132 
 G Does not cause CPS 1 -1.1231 -0.0434 0.2168 0.1168 -0.9563 -0.5892 
 CPS Does not cause G  1 3.4473** 2.0562 2.5648* 0.0906 3.4269** 0.1557 
 G Does not cause C 1 -0.7405 -0.0156 0.0247 0.02728 -0.8522 -1.2228 
 C Does not cause G  1 0.8307 1.2243 -0.0676 -0.0032 0.5886 0.0228 
 
 
The findings of these tests for Kuwait, nonetheless, contradict our earlier finding of 
no form of causality between the level of economic development LG and financial 
sector activity in Kuwait. Two causality tests, Sims – causality tests and G-M-D 
causality tests, suggest that the financial system activities encourage the economic 
growth process in Kuwait in the long-run. Sims – causality tests reject the null 
hypothesis that development of financial system does not cause the economic growth 
(G) at 1% level for both financial indicators M3 and BS. G-M-D causality tests, 
however, support this finding for just one financial indicator M3. The null hypothesis 
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that M3 does not cause (G) is rejected at 5% level. Granger – causality tests, on the 
other hand, report no form of causation between (G) and the two proxies of financial 
development, M3 and BS. 
 
This finding for Kuwait, even though disagrees with our previous finding, perhaps 
related to some facts about the economic development of Kuwait in the last three 
decades. Kuwait has witnessed dramatic financial development since mid 1970s 
where Kuwait has the oldest financial market in the region. Thus, it seems that this 
dramatic financial development has encouraged the growth of other sectors in the 
economy. Moreover, the role of financial institutions may have played a noticeable 
role in rebuilding the country after the invasion of the country in the Second Gulf War 
in 1990. 
 
For Oman, the results of the causality tests report very week sign of causation, similar 
to the earlier finding between LG and financial development indicators. Only Granger 
– causality tests detect one possible long – run causality from growth indicator (G) to 
one financial measures C at 5% level of significance.  
 
For Qatar and Saudi Arabia, the causality tests suggest that the growth rate of output 
per capita (G) and the level of financial system activity are not related. No form of 
causality is reported by any tests between the economic growth (G) and the alternative 
measures of financial development. In case of Qatar, this probably due to the short 
span of data, just 26 observations (1980 – 2006).  However, even though that Saudi 
Arabia has the longest span of data in our sample, over 40 obs ervations (1964 – 
2007), no form of causation was detected between the two variables.   
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The lack/weak causality between the economic growth and the development of 
financial sector in those countries may be related to some characters of the financial 
sector of those countries, as well as the negative impact of Almanakh collapse in 1982 
in the whole region. Some features of the financial structure are well discussed in 
section 2 of this chapter. Those features include the widespread of government 
ownership in commercial banks in the region, the small size of the commercial banks 
relative to the size of the economy, short terms nature of most deposits of the financial 
institutions, religious factor and Abdeen and Shook’s (1984) argument about the 
impact of interest concept in the financial development in the region.68 In addition, 
this finding for those countries may favour Devaux’s (2006) argument that the general 
role of financial institutions in the rentier economies such as those of GCC is simply 
to handle the financial transactions for governments and the public enterprises. 
Needless to mention that the public sector dominates most economic activities and the 
private sector plays negligible role in most countries in the region. 
 
For UAE, the causality tests report similar results, to some extent, to that found 
between LG and the financial development indicators. The three causality tests find 
evidences in the form of bi-directional causality between the economic growth (G) 
and one financial development measures M3. The null hypotheses that economic 
growth does not cause M3 and vice versa are rejected at 5% level or better by all 
causality tests. However, there are some substantial evidence suggest that the 
financial deepening imparts the economic growth process in the UAE in the last 30 
                                                 
 68 For some, and perhaps most, banks in the region the remittances of expatriate labour, over half of 
the labour force of the region, provide a high margin of profits. According to Migration and 
Remittances  Fact book of World Bank (2008) Saudi Arabia ranks the second biggest country, after 
Unite State, in the source of the migrant labour remittances (over 15$bn in 2006). 
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years. Granger – causality tests reject the null hypothesis of no short – run causality 
running from finance to economic growth (G) at 5% level or better for two financial 
indicators (BS and CPS). Sims – causality tests also report long – run causality 
running from the same two variables, BS and CPS, to economic growth (G), where 
the null hypothesis is rejected at 5% level for both variables.  M oreover, G-M-D 
causality tests support this finding of supply – leading hypothesis, but only from one 
financial indicator CPS to (G). the null hypothesis that CPS does not cause (G) in the 
short – run is rejected at 5% level. No further form of causality is reported by any 
causality tests between the alternative measure of financial development and 
economic growth (G) in the UAE. The latter finding of supply – leading hypothesis 
has overwhelmed the form of relationship between the growth rate of the economy 
and the development of financial services and might be related to some features of the 
UAE economy, as we discussed earlier, such as high bank density, rapid development 
of the financial sector of Dubai Emirate… etc.         
 
Overall, the cointegration results suggest that the level of economic output LG and the 
development of financial system may have stable long – run relationship in four 
countries (Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE) out of the five countries 
considered in the cointegration test. On the other hand, our findings of the form casual 
relationship between the economic development and the state of financial system 
activities seems to vary from one country to another and, to some extent, from one 
financial indicator to another according to the alternative causality tests considered. In 
order to summaries our findings, we report the results of the three causality tests 
(Granger – causality tests, Sims – causality tests, and G-M-D causality tests) for all 
countries in two Tables. Table 2.7 pr esents the findings of the cointegration test as 
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well as that of the three causality tests between the level of GDP per capita LG and 
each financial indicator considered for all GCC countries. On the other hand, Table 
2.8 summaries the findings of causality tests between the growth rate of GDP per 
capita (G) and the alternative measures of financial development for all countries. 
 
Table 2.7: Results Summary: summary of cointegration and the alternative causality tests between LG and 
Financial Indicators (FI) 
      Granger- causality Sims- causality G-M-D  causality  
  Cointegration 
Finance 
causes 
development 
Development  
causes  
finance 
Finance 
causes 
development 
Development  
causes  
finance 
Finance 
causes 
development 
Development  
causes 
finance Country FI   
Bahrain M3 No No No No No No No 
 BS Yes Yes No No No No No 
 CPS Yes No Yes Yes No No No 
 C No No Yes No No No Yes 
Kuwait M3 No No No No No No No 
  BS No No No No No No No 
Oman M3 No No Yes No No No No 
 BS No No No No No No No 
 CPS No No No No No No No 
 C No No No No No No No 
Qatar M3 Yes No Yes No No No No 
 BS Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
 CPS No No No No No No No 
  C Yes Yes No No No No No 
Saudi  M3 No No No No No No No 
Arabia BS No No No No No No No 
 CPS Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
 C No Yes No No Yes No No 
UAE M3 No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 BS No No No No No No No 
 CPS Yes No No No No No No 
  C No No Yes No No No No 
 
 
For Bahrain (1975 – 2006), Table 2.7 s hows that the finding of the alternative 
causality tests suggest two forms of causation between the level of real output per 
capita LG and the development of financial system. Granger – causality tests report 
results for supply-leading hypothesis with one financial indictor BS, and demand – 
following hypothesis with two financial indicators (CPS and C). Sims – causality tests 
 75 
suggest supply-leading hypothesis with one financial indicator (CPS), whilst G-M-D 
– causality tests support the view that economic development imparts the level of 
financial system development for one financial indicator C. On the other hand, the 
three causality tests report strong evidences, with the same financial indicators, to the 
view that the expansion of the financial system services imparts the economic growth  
(G) as in Table 2.8.  Therefore, the supply – leading hypothesis perhaps have been the 
dominant form of relationship between the economic development and the level of 
financial development in Bahrain in the last thirty years.  
 
For Kuwait (1973 – 2006), the three alternative causality tests detect no form causal 
relationship between the level of the real output LG and the two alternative measures 
of financial development, M3 and BS. However, similar to Bahrain there are some 
evidences to support the existence of supply – leading hypothesis between the growth 
rate of economic output (G) and the development of financial system as in Table 2.8 
according to both tests, Sims – causality test and G-M-D causality tests. Even though 
the results are weak, the supply – leading hypothesis may have been the form of 
relationship between the economic development process and the development of 
financial system in Kuwait, due to the reasons addressed earlier. 
 
For Oman (1976 – 2006), there are weak evidences of causality between the level of 
real output LG and the alternative measures of financial development as in Table 2.7. 
Only Granger – causality tests suggest a short – run demand – following hypothesis 
form the level of real GDP per capita LG to one financial indicator, M3.  Again only 
Granger causality – tests detect one long – run causality from the growth rate of 
output (G) to just one financial indicator, C as in Table 2.8. This finding for Oman 
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that the development of economic activity leads the development of financial sector is 
probably related to some characters of those economies (e.g. dominant role of public 
sector, small size of the financial institution) as we mentioned in the results discussion 
earlier.  
 
Table 2.8: Results Summary: summary of the alternative causality tests between (G) and Financial 
Indicators (FI): 
    Granger- causality Sims- causality G-M-D  causality  
  
Finance 
causes 
development 
Development  
causes 
finance 
Finance 
causes 
development 
Development  
causes 
finance 
Finance 
causes 
development 
Development  
causes 
finance Country FI 
Bahrain M3 Yes No No No No No 
 BS Yes No Yes No Yes No 
 CPS Yes No Yes No No No 
 C No No No No No No 
Kuwait M3 No No Yes No Yes No 
  BS No No Yes No No No 
Oman M3 No No No No No No 
 BS No No No No No No 
 CPS No No No No No No 
 C No Yes No No No No 
Qatar M3 No No No No No No 
 BS No No No No No No 
 CPS No No No No No No 
  C No No No No No No 
Saudi  M3 No No No No No No 
Arabia BS No No No No No No 
 CPS No No No No No No 
 C No No No No No No 
UAE M3 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 BS Yes No Yes No No No 
 CPS Yes No Yes No Yes No 
  C No No No No No No 
 
 
For Qatar (1980 – 2006), three cointegration relationships between the level of output 
and three financial indicators M3, BS, and C are reported. However, different forms 
of causation are reported for each indicator according to Granger – causality tests, 
supply-leading hypothesis with C, bi-directional with BS, and demand-following 
hypothesis with M3 as in Table 2.7. However, these forms of causality between the 
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two variables are suggested by Granger – causality tests only. On the other hand, the 
economic growth (G) and the level of financial system activities seem to be 
independent according to these causality tests as in Table 2.8. No conclusion of the 
dominant form of relationship between economic development and the state of 
financial development can be drawn from the causality tests considered. 
 
For Saudi Arabia (1964 – 2007), the relationship between level of economic output 
LG and the development of financial system appears to be bi-directional with one 
indicator (CPS) according to Granger – causality tests. Demand-following hypothesis 
is suggested by Sims-causality tests and Granger-causality tests (short-run) with one 
financial proxy (C) as in Table 2.7. However, the growth rate of output (G) and the 
level of financial system activities seem to be independent according to the alternative 
causality tests considered as in Table 2.8.  
 
For UAE (1973 – 2004), the level of real output LG and the financial system 
development exhibit bi-directional causality with the same financial indicators, 
according to Sims-causality and G-M-D causality tests. Granger-causality tests, on the 
other hand, report short-run causation from LG to C as in Table 2.7. However, even 
though there is evidence of bi-directional causality between the growth rate of output 
(G) and the state of financial development according to all three tests with M3 as in 
Table 2.8. There  a re some substantial evidences in support of supply – leading 
hypothesis emerge from the results of the three alternative causality tests between the 
rate of economic growth (G) and two financial indicator BS, and CPS. 
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Finally, it needs to be mentioned that some results of the alternative causality tests 
come with the opposite sign implying a negative correlation between the state of 
financial development and the development of economic activities. Such finding has 
been reported by other studies. Al – Yousif (2002) suggests two explanations for such 
finding: it might be due to the possibility that financial institutions operate under a 
weak regularity environment with the expectation that government will help failing 
banks.69 Thus, banks may have been inefficient in the allocation of their resources. 
Another possible explanation is that the negative correlation may be as a result of 
business cycle rather than a form of long – run relationship between the two variables.   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
69 Weak regulations, as mentioned in section 3 o f this study, are an obstacle to the development of 
financial sector in the GCC region.  
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2.7 CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter we investigate the role of financial sector in the development process 
in the GCC countries. The financial sector may play a key role in the development 
process of GCC countries in channelling the oil wealth to other potential sectors in the 
economy. in addition, financial system may stand as promising sector in these 
countries as those countries may have a comparative advantage in banking industries 
and in financial services in general since they have abundant of capital that derived 
from natural resources exportations. However, the development of financial sector in 
the GCC courtiers perhaps is a merely consequence of the development process as a 
whole. Hence, we investigate the development of the financial system in the region in 
the last few decades, and construct three alterative causality tests - Granger-causality 
tests, Sims-causality and G-M-D causality tests – to assess the form the relationship 
between the economic developments (measured interchangeably by the level and the 
growth of output) and financial development for each country in the region. 
 
The results suggest the existence of cointegration space (long-run relationship) 
between the level of economic development and the state of the financial development 
in four countries out of the six countries in the sample. Moreover, similar to the 
results emerge from other studies in the field our findings vary from country to 
another and with kind of proxies employ to measure financial development. However, 
there are some evidences to suggest that the financial development seem to impart the 
development process especially in case of Bahrain and UAE, and, to lesser extent, in 
Kuwait. Qatar, on the other hand, has mixed results; different forms of causation are 
reported for each indicator according to Granger – causality tests (the low frequency 
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of the data may cast doubt over Qatar’s results). In Oman the economic development 
appears to stimulate the financial development, whilst the bi-directional causality may 
fit the relationship between the economic development and the level of financial 
development in case of Saudi Arabia.  
 
 The financial system in the GCC countries have witnessed unprecedented form of 
development since the mid of 1970s compare to the other financial systems in the 
MENA region and in most developing countries. However, despite such development 
and the fact that GCC region has the financial means to become an international 
financial hub, as G CC countries have witnessed massive flows of windfall from 
natural resources exportations, the financial institutions in the region are still way 
smaller compare to the international standards, and are not even capable to participate 
in financing big projects such as those of energy related projects in their countries and 
in the MENA region. It is clear that financial institutions can play a major role in 
economic development in the GCC region. However, GCC banks first need to 
increase their capital and strengthen their deposit base through merging between them 
or associating with regional or international banks, so they can be able to absorb the 
risks of financing megaprojects Jbili et al (1997).   
 
The GCC countries need to devote much more attention to the development of the 
financial system and to implement reform policies that would strengthen the position 
of financial sector in the economy. Such policies  should aim at increasing the level of 
competition by a llowing new and foreign banks participation, promoting merging 
between banks in the region, reducing government ownership in the financial 
institutions, enhancing prudential regulations  and supervisory framework to meet 
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with international standards, and ensuring that judiciary systems enforce  contracts 
and allow banks to collect debts and  liquidise collaterals. However, there are various 
factors can be blamed for the small size of the financial system in the region. Security 
is an essential factor for financial activities to flourish and Middle East region has not 
been a stable region since the end of World War II. In the next chapter we investigate 
the effect of security in the development process in the region.    
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CHAPTER 3  
THE ROLE OF DEFENCE SPENDING ON THE ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE GCC COUNTRIES 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter investigates the role and the importance of security outlays on the 
development process in GCC countries. The large recurrent flow of capital from oil 
exports to small developing GCC countries raises the importance of security to those 
countries. Beblawi (2008) suggests that it has been historically observed that most 
financial centres in the world are usually backed by pol itical, military, and/or 
economic powers. GCC countries are obviously small rich developing countries that 
lack, to large extent, political, military, and to lesser extent economic powers. The 
security of the fields and the trade of the strategic commodity “oil” is a critical issue 
for oil – rentier GCC countries. Moreover, those countries locate in one of the most 
turbulent regions in the world, Middle East, which has relatively been unstable since 
the end of World War II. Stork (1985), for example, finds it surprising for small GCC 
states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and UAE,) to survive for a decade and half after the 
departure of British navy from Persian Gulf in 1971.70  
 
Internal and external securities, therefore, have been major concerns for the 
governments of those countries, and, as thus, have received a considerable amount of 
the states’ budget allocations. This allocation to security, in rentier states where the 
government is usually the main player in most economic activities, may have some 
                                                 
70 Further details on the threats that have faced GCC countries since Egyptian revolution in1952 will be 
presented in the following section.   
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considerable impact on the development process in the region. Deger and Sen (1995) 
argue that the problem of security in developing countries can not be impartial from 
the development failures or success according to most analysts. Allocating too much 
to security may hinder development, whilst giving too little to security may allow 
threats to grow. The levels of defence expenditures in most GCC countries are 
relatively high, and enjoy a relatively considerable share of budget allocation 
(Frederiksen and Looney, 1983; Lebovic and Ishaq, 1987; Looney, 1991, among 
others). Hasbani (2006), for example, argues that GCC countries are among the 
highest in the world in terms of defence expenditure; about 23% to 45% of the state 
budget is allocated to defence. In defence literature Middle East region in general has 
been noticed with its high intensity to defence burden (military expenditure as a share 
of GDP), see for instance, among other, Lebovic and Ishaq (1987), Looney (1994), 
Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn (2003), and Yildirim et al (2005).71  
 
The impact of defence burden on t he economic development has received a 
considerable attention among economists and policy makers worldwide since the 
seminal works of Benoit (1973, 1978), where a significant positive impact of defence 
expenditure on growth rate of output is found for a sample of 44 developing countries 
in the period of 1950 t o 1965. B enoit suggests some channels through which the 
defence expenditure may carry some positive and/or negative impacts on the 
economic development. Besides its important value to economic progress, the spin-off 
from the military expenditures may carry some positive effects on the growth of the 
economy. The positive effects of defence expenditures on the economic growth 
                                                 
71According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) - a pioneer research institute  
established in 1966 ,dedicated to research into conflict, armaments, disarmaments, and arm control - as 
well as most analysts of defence economics, Middle East region is among the most highly defence 
spending regions in developing world.   
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maybe explained through the Keynesian demand effect. An increase in defence 
expenditures may increases the aggregate demand and that may lead to an increase – 
multiplier effect – in resources utilization and economic growth. 
 
Deger and Sen (1983) suggest that there seems to be a g eneral acceptance among 
researchers in defence literature toward the argument that defence expenditure has a 
substantial spin-off that will carry some positive effects on development process. 
Benoit describes several positive contributions of military expenditure on civilian 
output in developing countries.  Those include the engagement of military programs 
in some public works – roads, airports, dams, communication networks… etc – that 
may in part serve civilian sector, the process of modernisation72, technological and 
scientific progress, and – creation of demand for some industries that may, otherwise, 
suffer capital underdevelopment (Deger and Sen, 1995) –. However, military 
expenditure has opportunity costs73 and may crowd out other forms of expenditure 
such as i nvestment, which may carry adverse effects on economic development. 
Deger (1986a) stresses the negative impacts of military expenditure on saving and 
balance of payment, which may have an ultimate adverse impact on l ong – run 
economic growth, notably from saving.  
 
Supply side view, on the other hand, suggests that the effects of military expenditure 
may operate through the contribution to production factors accumulation (labour, 
capital, and natural resources), as well as to the technological progress, which 
together dictate the economic output (Dunne et al, 2005). Biswas and Ram (1986) 
                                                 
72  Deger and Sen suggest that the help of military programs in modernisation maybe effective in a 
backward society. Looney (1991) argues that the role of military expenditure in modernisation may be 
crucial for Middle East region where it has a relatively low human capital formation. 
73 Allocating some of available resources to less productive defence sector may have a highly 
opportunity cost.  
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suggest that the use of supply side model in the form of Feder two sectors framework 
provides another important mechanism through which defence expenditure may affect 
economic output. The model estimates the factor productivity differences, along with 
ad hoc effect on growth, between the military sector and the civilian sectors, which 
may have significant impact on the growth of output.  
 
Although there is not a well established economic model that reflects the causal 
relationship between defence spending and economic growth (Hartley, 2006), several 
econometrics models have been proposed in the literature to predict the form of such 
relationship between the two variables. Those models include, among others, ad hoc 
traditional growth function, simultaneous equations models (SEMs), Feder – Ram 
model, Augmented Solow growth model, traditional demand side, and Granger – 
causality. However, the findings of the empirical works in the area seem to vary from 
positive, to negative, to no e ffect of defence spending on economic development. 
Ram (1995), Deger and Sen (1995), and Hartley (2006) survey a large body of  the 
empirical works on defence and economic growth nexus, and suggest, among other, 
that the differences in empirical works findings may be related to different 
methodologies, periods of time , samples, and variables proxies used in the empirical 
works.   
 
In this chapter we will investigate the impact of defence expenditure on development 
process for each country in the GCC. We consider the production function approach 
of Cobb- Douglas form in the context of VAR model and coitegration analysis for 
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each country.74 The following section provides an overview on the security in GCC 
region. Section 3 includes a survey of the literature, section 4 presents the empirical 
methodology, and section 5 reports the empirical findings and the conclusion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
74 This approach is widely common one in the public capital literature as we shall see in the next 
chapter.  
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3.2 AN OVERVIEW ON THE SECURITY OF THE GCC REGION 
 
Since their independence from United Kingdom (UK), GCC countries have faced 
several external and internal threats that have formed great challenges to the security 
and the stability of the region. Some neighbouring countries have posed, and some to 
some extent remains, a threat to the security of some GCC countries. Egypt revolution 
in 1952 a nd the Pan-Arabism – Arabic nationalism – movement thereafter have 
formed a major threat to the GCC countries internally and externally, pictured in 
Yemen revolution in 1963 where Egypt enters to support the revolutionists by sending 
troops to Yemen, Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, along with some other countries in 
the region support the king of Yemen by t hat time. Interventions by neighbouring 
countries, mostly Egypt and Iraq, in the political affairs in other Arabic countries 
including GCC countries were usually justified by the pan-Arabism ideology (Yousef, 
2004). For example, Iraqi communist government claims that Kuwait is part of Iraqi 
soil and intends to take over Kuwait Immediately after Kuwait granted its 
independence in 1961. The crisis was resolved in1963 at Arab league where Kuwait is 
recognised as a member of the Arab league and that was forced by s ending troops 
from some members of Arab league countries to Kuwait to replace the British troops 
and to halt the Iraqi communist government aggression.75 
 
Disputes over borders with other neighbouring countries of the region are there; Saudi 
Arabia has long had disputes over the borders with Republic of Yemen as well as with 
former People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen PDRY which also had borders 
                                                 
75 The International Security council failed to reach an agreement to resolve the crisis since Iraq was 
backed by Soviet Union. 
 88 
disputes with Oman another member of GCC. 76 UAE also has dispute with Iran over 
three Islands – Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb – where Iran immediately 
takes control of the Islands after the departure of the British troops and claims 
sovereignty over them, whilst UAE sees those islands as Arabic islands and claims 
legal ownership of them (Mobley, 2003). GCC also have disputes along the borders 
between them such as those between Saudi Arabia and Oman, Saudi Arabia and UAE, 
Bahrain and Qatar, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. However, most of these disputes among 
the GCC members have been soft and have not led to serious border clashes.  
 
Internally perhaps Oman and Saudi Arabia are the ones that have faced serious 
political tremors. In 1964 a rebellion broke out in Dhofar province of Oman against 
the Sultan of Oman, with the support of the PDRY the  aim was to overthrow the 
Sultan in Muscat. Oman later ended the leftist revolt in Dhofar by the mid of 1970s 
with the help of Iran, UK, and US after 10 years of war (Katzman, 2005).  T he 
takeover of Mecca’s Grand Mosque in Saudi Arabia by Islamic extremist rebels in 
1979 has caused a major disturbance to the whole region. The Grand Mosque was 
freed from the extremist rebels after several weeks with the help of Jordanian army 
(Stork, 1985).77 The small states of the Gulf were not also spared from this turmoil 
with sabotages and demonstrations in Bahrain and Kuwait as well as the ruling circle 
paralysis in UAE.   
                                                 
76 Former PDRY has always formed a r eal threat to Oman even though Oman and PDRY relations 
were normalized in 1983; borders clashes between them were occasional events ( Katzman, 2010). 
77 According to Stork Jordanian and Pakistani troops play key advisory and mercenary roles in the 
armed forces of the GCC countries. For example, over 30 percent of UAE arm forces are expatriates 
mostly from Pakistan (Foley, 1999).   
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The departure of the British navy from Persian Gulf in 1971, nevertheless, has been a 
major disturbance to the security of the whole region.78 The three largest states on the 
Gulf – Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia – have competed to fill the gap left by the British 
troops’ withdrawal, as the idea of Gulf collective has been haphazardly advanced by 
the three countries since the British announcement of the withdrawal (Stork, 1985).  
To secure their monarchies most of GCC countries have resort to security treaties 
with some of the World major powers namely United States (US), which also 
increases its presence in the region to fill the gap left by the British forces. Moreover, 
the Arab- Israeli war in 1973 a nd the subsequent regional instability accompanied 
with oil price shock and the massive windfall of oil revenue have allowed the GCC 
region to take over the first place in global arms imports; as those states start to build 
up their national armies from scratch, especially small states, from building army 
bases, airports and communications centres, to the acquisition of military equipments 
(Hasbani, 2006).   
 
The fall of Reza Pahlavi, the king of Iran, under the rise of Islamic revolution in 1979 
has further eroded the stability of the region. The fear that the revolution would 
spread throughout Middle East and the subsequent war between Iran and Iraq, started 
in 1980, has shaken the GCC monarchies. GCC countries lined up with Iraq in its 8 
years war with Iran, where they diverted billions of dollars to Iraqi war treasury. 
Kuwait became the main port for war material shipments to Iraq whilst Bahrain and 
                                                 
78 In 1968 as part of Budget cut plan the United Kingdom declared that the British Navy to depart 
Persian Gulf by 1971, although UAE had offered to pay the financial cost of keeping the British Navy 
in the Gulf (Mobley, 2003).  
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Oman rashly offered their territories to Iraqi air force as staging points (Stork, 
1985).79  
 
Furthermore, the invasion of Kuwait by I raqi army in 1990 and the subsequent 
Second Gulf war, where an international coalition led by US was formed to drive 
Iraqi troops out of Kuwait, has crumbled the stability of the region and has further 
given the GCC countries more appetite to import more arms equipments – around 40 
percent of the world’s arms sales during the 1990s has been form GCC region 
(Hasbani, 2006) - .  Early this century the terrorist attack of September 2001 on New 
York Wold Trade Centre and the following invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq by 
American forces as well as the dispute between the West – led by US – and Iran over 
the Iranian nuclear programme, have also disturbed the security of the GCC region. 
Not to mention the rise of Islamic extremists in the region and the number of terrorist 
attacks that some countries have witnessed especially Saudi Arabia. 
 
Thus, GCC region apparently and according to several sources, remains one, if not the 
first, of the highly defence spending regions in the developing world, and 
correspondingly has higher level of arms imports. Figure 3.1 below compares the 
share of the defence expenditures to GDP of the GCC region with those of some other 
developing regions in the world. It clearly shows that the share of defence to GDP for 
GCC region is far greater than those of the other regions; it is almost double the size 
of that of the rest of Middle East region and is over three times that of Latin America 
and South Asia regions throughout the time in the last three decades. This high 
                                                 
79 Transparency in arms transfers in the Middle East region is poor, most Arab countries boycott the 
United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) (Perlo-Freeman, 2009); there are large 
unreported exports of arms and arms transfers to the region and among the countries of the region 
which challenge the credibility of military data published by those countries (Lebovic and Ashfaq, 
1987).  
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defence expenditure that characterises the GGC region has motivated some 
researchers to investigate the impact of such heavy spending on t he economic 
performance in the region as we review some in the following section. 
 
Figure 3.1: Defence Expenditure as a Share GDP                                                                                                                                
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   Source: SIPRI Year Book various issues, and the database of SIPRI available on www.SIPRI.org.                                                                                                                                     
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3.3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Since the seminal works of Benoit (1973, 1978), the role of defence spending in 
economic development has attracted a co nsiderable interest among economists and 
policy makers worldwide. Benoit (1973) notes that defence programmes in 
developing countries have been growing faster than their economies. He estimates the 
relationship between the defence burden (military expenditure as a share of GDP) and 
economic growth for a sample of 44 developing countries in the period of 1950 t o 
1965. The results obtained based on a single ad hoc growth equation where the 
growth rate of civilian output is regressed in the defence burden and other control 
variables. Contrary to his expectation and to the general belief, the results suggest 
strong positive effect of defence spending on economic growth; countries with high 
defence expenditure had the most rapid rate of growth.80 Furthermore, Benoit’s 
analysis suggests that the direct interaction between defence burden and economic 
growth in the sample countries appears to run from defence burden to economic 
growth rather than vice versa.  
 
Benoit argues that these results may suggest that the defence spending carries 
substantial positive effects on economic growth, at least to the extent of offsetting any 
adverse effects that defence spending may have had on gr owth. 81 This may be 
possible, as Benoit claims, since most part of any income that is not spent on defence, 
in developing countries, is usually put into consumption  a nd much less into social 
                                                 
80 The general belief for many economists prior to Benoit’s findings is that defence spending is a major 
component of government expenditures which exceeds that of health and education in some cases, and 
May crowds out other forms of productive spending and civilian investments which will have adverse 
impact on the economic growth (Hou, 2009).  
81 Benoit (1973, 1978) provides a comprehensive discussion regarding the channels through which 
defence spending may carry some positive and negative effect on economic development. Deger and 
Sen (1995) summarize those effects in nine channels. 
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investment such as housing, which has little contribution to future production. Even 
that put into productive investment may have little effects on real economic growth, 
where productive investment in most developing countries are badly conceived or 
managed that they operate at uneconomically high cost which undermines their 
contributions to real economic growth. Thus, a heavy defence burden may increase 
resources utilization and economic growth with low opportunity cost. 
 
Following Beniot’s argument, Frederiksen and Looney (1983) suggest that the 
resource constraints faced by i ndividual developing countries is probably what 
determines whether the impact of added defence spending is positive or negative on 
the economic growth. They hypothesize that in most developing countries the 
tendency is to maintain defence programs even if that could reduce other high growth 
development expenditures.  They expect that an increase in defence expenditure is 
more likely to carry a negative impact on economic growth for developing countries 
with resource constraints, whilst developing countries with resource abundant may 
experience a positive impact, since they can afford to keep high growth development 
expenditures along with maintaining or even increasing defence spending. A sample 
of 74 developing countries was divided into two groups: resource - poor countries and 
resource – rich countries. Similar to that of Benoit they use a single ad hoc growth 
equation to estimate the relationship between defence spending and economic growth 
for each sub-sample over the period 1960-1978.  As they expected, the results report a 
positive significant impact of defence spending on e conomic growth for resource – 
rich countries, and a negative impact, albeit not significant, for the group of resource 
– poor developing countries. 
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Biswas and Ram (1986) test Benoit’s hypothesis for a sample of 58 countries over the 
period 1960-1977. They group the sample countries with accordance to World Bank’s 
classification into two subgroups, law-income developing countries and middle-
income developing countries. As to avoid the possibility of structural changes during 
the 1970s, they report estimates for two sub- periods 1960-1970 and 1970-1977 for 
both two subgroups samples (law-income and middle-income developing countries) 
as well as the estimated results for the whole sample. The results, however, are mixed, 
whilst results from the full sample and from middle-income group over the period 
1960-1970 convey Benoit’s findings; it is not the case for low-income sample where 
defence burden has negative and insignificant effect on growth. Moreover, the 
defence burden coefficient was not significant, and even with negative sign for low-
income group, the full sample, and for the two sub-samples over the period 1970-
1977. The study concludes that Benoit’s findings have been special case, if Benoit has 
considered more developing countries and had separately treated both low-income 
and middle income developing countries his conclusion may have been more mixed 
and qualified.  
 
Benoit’s works have been criticised on s everal grounds including the proxies’ 
variables used and the sample sensitivity, the misspecification of the relationships, as 
well as the used of a simple equation model that may neglect the complexity of such 
relationship (Deger, 1986; Biswas and Ram, 1986; Ram, 1995). Robert and Alexander 
(1990), on the other hand, suggest that there are always plausible justifications for 
expecting both positive and negative impact from defence spending on e conomic 
growth, and that makes the question of whether the defence expenditure has positive 
or negative effects an empirical one rather than a theoretical. Generally the empirical 
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works in the literature may be divided into: demand-side models, Supply-side models, 
demand and supply side models, and forms of Barro and Solow models in addition to 
Granger-causality test and different ad hoc specifications (Hou, 2009). Our review of 
the empirical works will try to group them according to the above classifications 
where a summary table of the empirical works for each classification is provided.       
 
Concern with negative impact of defence expenditure from crowding out other forms 
of investments and its opportunity cost, some studies use the demand side model 
based in the initial work of Smith (1980) to capture such impact.82 Defence 
expenditure is a component of aggregate demand, and therefore it competes with 
other forms of demand for resources. Smith investigates the opportunity cost of 
defence spending on investment in 14 OECD countries over the period 1954-1973. He 
estimates the relationship between investment and defence burden by us ing 
alternatives data treatment: time-series, pooled data, and cross-section sets. The 
results for all alternative sets suggest a negative effect of defence spending on 
investment. 
 
Deger (1986b) employs a sample of 50 developing countries over the period 1965 – 
1973 to assess the impact of defence spending on investment. She considers 
                                                 
82  The demand side models can be derived from the Keynesian representation of aggregate demand , 
and may be expressed as: Y= P – W = C + I + M +B 
Where Y is actual output, P is potential output, w is P – Y, C total consumption, I total investment, M 
is defence expenditure, and B is balance of trade.  
Rearrange terms one can get : i = 1 – w – c – m – b  
Smith (1980) suggests that consumption can be presented as: C = α0 + α1 u + α2 g ,  
then i= (1 - α0 ) + α1 u + α2 g – m – (w + b )  
Where u is unemployment rate and g is the growth rate of output.  Rearrange terms and assuming (w + 
b ) is function of  u, thus (w + b ) = β u,  one can get : 
 i= (1 - α0 ) – (β – α1 ) u + α2 g – m   
The possibility of crowding out of defence spending can be capture through the sign of m term in the 
last equation; if negative then defence spending has an adverse impact on investments and therefore on 
economic growth, see Hou (2009). 
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alternative forms of investment equation where the share of investment in GDP is 
regressed in defence burden and other control variables such as exports and balance of 
payment, all as share of total output. Based on cross – section estimates the results 
reports a significant negative impact on investment from defence expenditure for all 
alternative forms of investment equation used. Deger suggests that these empirical 
results imply the crowding out impact of defence spending on ot her form of 
investment has been operating in the study sample. Moreover, Knight et al (1996) use 
panel data for 79 de veloping countries over the period 1971-1985, to estimate the 
form of the relationship between defence burden and investment. The share of 
investment in fixed capital is regressed in the defence burden and other controlled 
variables such as o penness of trade, the rate of investment in human capital, and a 
proxy for war incidence. Their findings suggest that defence burden has a significant 
negative impact on investment and the crowding out effects proved to exist.83 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
83 This association with negative impact of defence expenditure as well as the neglect of the supply side 
have drawn some criticisms to the demand side studies (Hou, 2009). 
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Table 3.1: literature Survey ( Some ad hoc and Demand-Side Empirical Studies  on The Impact of Defence Expenditure on Economic 
Development) 
Author(s) Sample Remarks Main Conclusion 
Ad hoc Studies 
Benoit (1973, 
1978) 
44 DCs, 
1950-1965 
Correlation and cross-sectional 
estimations.  
Defence expenditures have a significant positive effect  
(spin-offs) on economic growth. 
Frederiksen and  
Looney (1983) 
74 DCs 
1960-1978 
Sub-samples (resources-rich 
countries, and resources poor 
countries) cross-sectional 
estimations. 
Positive and significant impact of defence expenditure on 
economic growth for resources-rich countries, and negative  
but insignificant impact from defence expenditure to economic 
 growth for resources-poor countries. 
Biswas and  
Ram (1986) 
58 DCs 
1960-1970 and 
 1970-1978 Cross-section estimations 
Although the results for middle-income sub-sample as well as that of the 
whole sample covey Benoit’s finding, the result for low-income countries 
reflects a negative but insignificant impact of defence expenditure on 
economic growth.    
Demand Side Studies 
Smith (1980) 
14 OECD 
Countries 
1954-1973 
Time-series, pooled panel, and 
cross-sectional estimates 
Three sets of results estimates (time series, pooled panel,  
and cross-section) all suggest negative impact of defence  
expenditure on investment.   
Deger (1986b) 
50 DCs 
1965-1973 Cross-section estimations 
Defence spending has a significant negative effect on  
investment. 
Knight et al 
(1996) 
79 Countries  
1971-1985 
Panel Data estimation (fixed effect  
technique) Defence expenditure has a significant negative effect on investment. 
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Supply side view, on the other hand, suggests that the complexity of the relationship 
between defence expenditure and economic performance can be better off represented 
through the supply side model. Biswas and Ram (1986) argue that there are two main 
channels through which defence spending effects economic growth, one is through the 
positive and negative externalities of defence spending to the rest of the economy and 
the other one is through the possible factor productivity differences between the 
civilian sector and the defence sector. They suggest that the type of Feder model that 
based on a simple neoclassical function, where labour, capital, and defence spending 
enter as inputs, can decompose the effects of defence expenditure on economic 
growth through these two channels.84 Biswas and Ram employ the two sectors Feder 
model to assess the relationship between defence expenditure and economic growth 
for a sample of 58 c ountries that consists of two subsamples (17 low-income 
developing countries and 41 M iddle-income developing countries) over the periods 
1960-1970, and 1970-1977. The results of cross-section estimates for both subsamples 
over the two periods suggest the absence of any significant externalities effect from 
defence expenditure to civilian output. The results also show the lack of any 
                                                 
84 They used a two sectors model developed initially by Feder (1983) to capture the effects of exports 
sector on economic growth, Biswas and Ram used Feder model to analyse the effect of military 
expenditure on economic growth where the economy is divided to two sectors, military sector (M) and 
civilian sector (C ). Assuming labour (L) and capital (K) are the only inputs in each sector, and that the 
military sector (M) output has externalities effects on the civilian output (C ). Thus, the production 
functions of two sector can be written as:    
                                             C = C (LC , KC , M) ,  M = M (LM ,K M ) 
The total usage of inputs can be expressed as: 
                                              LC  + LM  = L ,  KC  +  K M  = K 
Assume Y is the total output of the two sectors (Y = C +  M), the model allows the marginal 
productivities of labour L and that of capita K to differ across the two sectors. Thus, ML/CL = MK /CK = 
1+ δ, and CM  (ә C/ә M) captures the externalities effects of military sector on the civilian sector. δ is 
the factor productivity difference between the two sectors. With few assumptions and some 
manipulations Feder shows that one can derive the following econometric specification: 
            =y   α (I/Y) + β (l) + [ (δ/1+δ) – θ] m (M/Y) +  θ m 
Where (y) is the growth rate of output, (I/Y) is the ratio of investment (I), and (M/Y) is the ratio of 
military spending (M) to total output (Y), (l)  is the growth rate of labour (L), θ = CM [M/(Y- M)], and 
(m) is the growth rate of military spending (M). This model allows to estimate separately the 
externality effects through the term (θ m) and the factor productivity effect through the term [(δ/1+δ) – 
θ] m (M/Y) in the previous equation. 
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significant factor productivity differences across the two sectors. The study concludes 
that these results suggest that defence spending neither helps nor harms the economic 
growth in developing countries.  
 
Feder model has widely been used in the literature of defence and economic growth 
nexus, and usually quoted as Feder-Ram type. Mintz and Stevenson (1995) for 
example, construct a three-sectors Feder-Ram model, that consist of civilian sector, 
military sector and non-military public sector, to investigate the effect of defence 
spending on economic growth for a sample of 103 c ountries over different periods 
between 1950-1985. They used the time series data to estimate the model for each 
county in the sample. The results indicate that the non-military public spending has a 
significant positive effect on economic growth for most countries in the sample, 
whereas defence expenditure appears to have no significant effect on economic 
growth for most countries. Thus, the study suggests that the governments should not 
be encouraged in expanding military programs for economic purpose. 
 
Murdoch et al (1997) also considers a three-sector Feder-Ram model for number of 
Asian and Latin American countries (8 Asian countries and 16 Latin American 
countries) over the period 1955-1988.  The reported results are based on the estimates 
of time series data for each country in the sample, as well as on the estimates from 
pooled panel data for each cohort (Asian countries and Latin American countries). 
Time series estimates were inconclusive about the impact of defence spending on 
economic growth, whilst those drawn from the pooled panel data indicate that defence 
expenditure and other government’s outlays are both growth promoting in both 
subsamples; Asian countries and Latin American countries. However, the results 
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imply that defence spending and other forms of government expenditure are more 
productive in Asian countries than in Latin American countries. 
 
Although the Feder-Ram model type has widely been used in the defence literature it 
has been criticised on several grounds even from Ram (1995) him self. Recently 
Alexander and Hansen (2004) report several shortcomings of the models include 
some theoretical misspecifications and econometrics weaknesses such as, simultaneity 
bias, a high possibility of multicollinearity between the last two terms in the estimated 
equation (see the previous footnote), the model is static and without lagged dependent 
variable…etc, see also Dunne et al (2005) for future details.  
 
Other group of studies employs simultaneous equation models (SEM) which 
incorporate both the demand and supply sides, to assess the interrelationships that 
characterize the defence-development nexus. Deger and Sen (1983), and Deger 
(1986a) argue that since there are number of channels through which defence 
expenditure may influence economic growth positively and/or negatively: the spin-
offs effects, indirect effect on saving and investment, balance of payment problem( if 
large armaments are imported), the  SEM therefore may provide better insight about 
these interrelationships.85 The demand-supply model has been employed in the 
defence literature and is known, by and large, as “Deger type” model.  
                                                 
85 Different SEM frameworks have been proposed in the literature, Deger and Sen (1995), for instance 
suggest the 4-equations SEM to represent the interrelationships between  defence expenditure and other 
economic variables as follow: 
                                             G= a0 + a1s +a2 m +a3 B + a4 Z1 
                                              S= b0 +b1 m + b2 g +b3 B + b4 Z2 
                                              B= c0 + c1 m + c2 g + c3 Z3 
                                              M= d0 + d1 Z4  
where g is the growth rate of GDP, S is saving ratio, m is defence burden, B is the trade balance share 
in GDP, Zi  are a set of exogenous variables chosen through data specification, and (ai, bi, ci, di) are the 
sets of parameters. 
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Deger (1986b) constructs a simultaneous equation model that consists of three 
equations (growth equation, saving equation, and military burden), to investigate the 
interrelationships among defence burden, saving, and economic growth for a sample 
of 50 de veloping countries over the period 1965-1973. Based on three stage least 
squares (3SLS) estimates, the results report a positive significant effect from defence 
burden to economic growth, but a larger significant negative effect on saving from the 
defence burden appears to out-weighted the positive effect on gr owth. The overall 
effect of defence burden is negative. Klein (2004) analyses the effect of defence 
expenditure on economic growth for Peru over the period 1970-1997, using the Deger 
type model of three simultaneous equations. Results estimates of the 2SLS and 3SLS 
indicate a positive direct effect on growth from defence burden, yet the overall effects 
of defence burden seem to retard growth. The indirect adverse effects of defence 
burden on saving overweight the positive direct effect. 
 
Moreover, Hou (2009) models the defence-development relationship in India for the 
period 1970-2003, on the notion of Deger type model that consists of four 
simultaneous equations, growth equation, saving equation, balance of trade equation, 
and defence equation. Similar to the earlier findings, the reported estimate of GMM 
suggest a significant direct positive effect of defence outlay on e conomic growth, 
however, the negative indirect effects of defence spending on saving and on balance 
of trade dominate the positive direct effect. The study concludes as the empirical 
findings suggest that an increase in defence expenditure is likely to reduce the long 
run economic growth rate in India.  
The Deger type model, however, has been criticized for lack of well established 
theoretical ground as well as the ad hoc empirical specifications. Hartely (2006) 
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argues that one of the shortcomings of Deger model type is that military demand 
equation is limited and less satisfactory since it is not based on a demand for military 
expenditure function. 
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Table 3.2: Literature Survey (Supply-Side Model “Feder-Ram type”  and Deger model type) 
Auther(s) Sample Remarks Main Conclusion 
Feder-Ram type 
Biswas and  
Ram (1986) 
58 DC 
1960-1970 and 
 1970-1978 Cross-section estimations Defence expenditure has no significant effects on economic growth. 
Mintz and 
Stevenson (1995) 103 Countries Longitudinal time series estimations 
Defence expenditure appears to have no significant effects on economic 
growth for most countries. 
Murdoch et al 
(1997) 
24 DCs ( 8 Asian 
and 16 Latin 
American) over 
different periods 
between 1955-
1988 
Time-series estimation for each 
country as well as pooled panel 
estimation for each group: (Asia 
countries and Latin American 
countries). 
Time series results were inconclusive about the impact of defence expenditure 
on economic growth. Results of pooled panel data, on the other hand, suggest a 
positive effect from defence expenditure to economic growth in both sub-
samples. 
Deger model type 
Deger (1986a) 
50 DCs 
1965-1973 Cross-section estimations 
Defence spending has a significant positive effect on growth rate of output, but 
carries a larger negative effect on saving. The overall impact of defence 
expenditure is negative. 
Klein (2004) One country (Peru) 
Time series estimation ( 2SLS and 
3SLS techniques) 
Defence expenditure has direct positive effect on economic growth, but also 
has a negative significant effect on saving. The overall effect is negative. 
Defence expenditure retards economic growth. 
Hou  (2009) 
One country 
(India) Time series estimation ( GMM) 
Direct positive effect from defence outlay to economic growth and negative 
indirect effect on saving. The overall impact of defence expenditure is 
negative.   
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On the other hand, Dunne et al (2005) note that the models that widely considered in 
defence literature to investigate the defence-development relationship, such as Feder-
Ram type, have not been considered in the mainstream growth literature. They argue 
that the well-established growth models employed in mainstream growth literature, 
such as that of Barro or that of Solow may provide more promising avenue to assess 
the relationship between defence and economic growth. Number of studies in 
defence-growth relationship have considered Solow model to analyse such 
relationship.86 
 
Knight et al (1996) employed the Augmented Solow model that incorporates the 
defence variable along with other controlled variable to estimate the effect of defence 
burden on economic development for a sample of 79 countries over the period 1971-
1985. The results of the panel data estimates show a significant negative impact from 
defence burden to economic growth. Moreover, the estimated results of the model 
without the military expenditure have shown that the inclusion of military variable 
into the model caused a reduction in the absolute size of the coefficients of other 
explanatory variables (investment, human capital, and openness variables). The study 
concludes that the defence burden seems to harm the economic development through 
crowding out other form of spending and by raising the trade restrictions intensity.   
 
                                                 
86 The main assumption on which the impact of defence burden on economic growth is derived in the 
context of Solow model is through the effects of military burden (M/Y) on technological progress. This 
assumption has been criticised, however, where the defence spending may have ad hoc direct effect 
(externalities) on growth (Dunne et al, 2005). Thus, considering Augmented Solow model perhaps is 
more appropriate. 
The augmented Solow model with defence variable can be written as: 
         G = α0 + α1 lny0 + α2 lnk + α3  lnh + α4  ln(n+g+δ) + α5  lnm   
Where G is the growth rate of output per capita, y0 is  initial output per capita, k is investment, h is 
human capital, (n+g+δ) is the growth rate of effective labour and the depreciation rate, and m is 
military burden.  
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Yakovlev (2007) analyses the effects of defence expenditure, and net arms exports on 
economic growth using augmented Solow model for a sample of 28 countries over the 
period 1965-2000. The results of panel data estimates indicate that both defence 
burden and net arms exports appear to retard the economic growth in the study 
sample. Hou (2009) also consider the augmented Solow model for a sample of 36 
developing countries over the period 1975-2004. Her findings, based on cross-section 
and panel data techniques, show a negative direct effect from defence spending to 
economic growth. She further investigates the possibility of peace dividends after the 
Cold War by estimating the model for two sub periods: “Cold War” and “Post Cold 
War”.87  The results support the existence of peace dividends in the sample, the 
negative effect of defence expenditure on e conomic growth has diminished for the 
post Cold War period relative to that of Cold War period. The study concludes that 
the estimated results significantly indicate that defence expenditure retards economic 
growth in developing countries.    
 
In fact, there are countless numbers of empirical works on the defence- development 
relationship, where various theories, hypothesis, and techniques have been applied to 
investigate the form of the relationship between the two variables.88 For the purpose 
of this study, however, we will further survey some of the empirical works that have 
focused on the GCC countries and on Middle East region as whole with a summary 
table of the surveyed empirical studies is provided in Table 3.4.  
                                                 
87 The decline in military expenditure in the world after the end of Cold War 1990 is assumed to 
stimulate the economic development in developing countries. 
88 For comprehensive surveys regarding the models that have been considered in defence-development 
nexus as well as the empirical works that have been carried out in the field see, for example,  Deger and 
Sen (1995), Ram (1995), and Hou et al (2009)   
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Table 3.3:  Literature survey: (Solow Model) 
Auther(s) Sample Remarks Main Conclusion 
Knight et al 
(1996) 
79 Countries  
1971-1985 
Panel Data estimation (fixed effect  
technique) 
Defence expenditure has a significant negative effect on 
economic growth. 
Yakovev (2007) 
28 Countries  
1965-2000 
Panel Data estimation (fixed effect, 
random effect, and GMM 
techniques) 
Defence expenditure and net arms exports both have negative 
impact on economic growth. 
Hou  (2009) 
36 DCs, 
1975-2004  
Cross- section and Panel Data 
estimations (GMM technique) 
Defence spending has significant negative impact on economic 
growth. Findings also support the existence of peace dividends 
as results of the end of Cold War. 
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The high defence burden that characterized most countries in the Middle East region 
has drawn the attentions of some researchers, as mentioned earlier, to assess the 
impact of such heavy burden on the development process in the region.  Lebovic and 
Ishaq (1987) observed the striking tendency in most countries in the region to higher 
defence burden, the region defence expenditures between the 1970s and early 1980s 
account for one-third of that of developing countries and around one half of the world 
arms imports. They analyse the impact of defence burden on economic growth in the 
region by constructing a system of simultaneous equations (Deger type Model) which 
consists of three equations – growth equation, investment equation, and military 
burden equation – for a sample of 17 Middle Eastern countries over the period 1973-
1982. Similar to that of Frederiksen and Looney’s classification, the study groups the 
sample into two sub-groups “oil-exporting” countries and “non-oil-exporting” 
countries. The results of pooled panel suggest a significant negative impact from 
defence expenditure to economic growth and to investment in non-oil-exporting 
countries. The results, however, suggest the absence of statistically significant pattern 
for the whole sample.  On the other hand, the data limitation for most oil-exporting 
countries prevents the study from identified the form of the relationship between 
economic growth and military expenditure in those countries. 
 
Looney (1991) also examines the impact of the heavy defence burden on the industrial 
development in the Arab countries. The study tries to assess whether the military 
expenditure provides positive externalities to the industrial activities in the region, or 
it just simply depresses the industrial development by di verting the resources away 
from industrial activities. For a sample of 20 A rab countries over the period 1974-
1985, Looney estimates ad hoc equations where the manufacturing share of the total 
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output is regressed on military expenditure and other forms of government 
expenditures along with some controlled variables. The results show that the military 
expenditure has no significant impact on the industrial development, whilst the non-
defence government expenditure appears to retard the industrial expansion in the 
region. The study concludes that the reallocation of government expenditure from 
public consumption to capital formation perhaps is more effective policy to expand 
private sector development in the Arab countries rather than cut-off defence 
expenditure.89  
 
Another work by Looney (1999), has focused only on one oil-exporting country in the 
region, Saudi Arabia, which is known to be a highly defence spending developing 
country. Looney argues that the share of military expenditure in Saudi Arabia 
accounts, on average, for one-third of the government budget allocations. The study 
investigate whether this high share of defence expenditure has been at the expense 
(tradeoffs) of other budget categories, such as infrastructure, economic services, 
health and education, transport and communication…etc.  A cointegration analysis in 
the context of ECM is carried out between defence expenditure and each category of 
government budget over the periods 1979-1995. The general pattern that comes out of 
the findings is that change in defence expenditure has a significant large impact on the 
adjustment of other major budget categories. The impact of increasing defence 
expenditure tends to be positive in the short-run for both economic and human 
services; however, it comes at the expense of allocations to the economy in the long-
run. For human resources development and health services sectors no tradeoffs with 
                                                 
89 Looney (1994) duplicates his work again with slightly longer span of data 1974-1987, the results, 
however, were similar. 
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defence expenditure appears to occur. Defence and social sectors both seem to be 
more protected from budgetary cuts during period of austerity.  
 
Al-Yousif (2002) constructs Granger-causality test within a multivariate ECM 
framework to analyse the direction of causation between defence expenditure and 
economic growth for each country in a sample of six Arabic Gulf states ( Bahrain, 
Iran, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and UAE) over the period of 1975-1998. The 
results tend to be country specific and no generalization can be made across countries, 
whilst causality appears to run from defence to growth for one country, it is a bi-
directional or independent relation for another country.90  The study concludes that 
the defence expenditure decisions should be based on t he socio-economic 
circumstances for individual country, and calls for further empirical studies using time 
series data for individual countries.  
 
Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn (2003) chose three Middle Eastern countries (Egypt, Israel, 
and Syria) in particular, which have been the major participants in the Arab-Israeli 
war, to examine the relationship between military expenditures and economic growth 
over the period 1967-1998. They employ Granger-Causality test within a multivariate 
ECM framework where the government expenditure broken down into civilian and 
military expenditures. The reported results suggest that military expenditure has a 
negative impact on e conomic growth for all three countries, whilst the government 
civilian expenditure has a positive impact on the economic growth in Egypt and Israel 
but negatively affects the long-run economic growth in Syria. Their results future 
suggest that the defence expenditure appears to be independent from economic growth 
                                                 
90 Results of the study based on relatively low span of time series (23 observations); therefore, they 
should be viewed with caution.   
 110 
and other government outlays, which may suggest that the military expenditure in the 
Middle East is determined by ge opolitical atmosphere rather than by economic 
factors.  
 
Moreover, Yildirim et al (2005) investigate the relationship between defence 
expenditure and economic growth for a sample of 13 Middle Eastern countries over 
the period 1989-1999, by constructing a two-sector Feder-Ram model that consists of 
civilian sector and defence sector. Using cross-section and dynamic panel techniques, 
the reported results reflects a significant positive effect from defence expenditure to 
economic growth. The results also indicate that the military sector seems to be more 
productive than the civilian sector. Perhaps that is because of the high-technology 
involvement within the military sector compare to the civilian sector as the analysis 
suggests.    
 
Table 3.4 provides a summary of all empirical studies on the Middle East region that 
reviewed in this study.  
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Table 3.4: Literature Survey on Defence and Economic Development in the Middle East region 
Author Sample Model Remarks Main Conclusion 
Lebovic and  
Ishaq (1987)  
17 DCs (Middle East) 
1973-1982 
Deger type model ( Three 
equations: growth 
equation, investment 
equation, and defence 
equation) 
Sub-samples (oil-exporting 
countries, and non-oil-
exporting countries) pooled 
panel estimation (2SLS). 
Defence expenditure has a significant negative effect on 
both economic growth and investment in non-oil-exporting 
countries. However, no results were obtained for oil-
exporting countries, and no significant relationship is found 
between the two variables for the whole sample. 
Looney (1991, 
1994) 
20 DCs (Middle East) 
1974-1985 (Looney 
1991), and 1974-1987 
(Looney 1994) 
Ad hoc equation where 
the share of 
manufacturing of total 
output is regressed in 
defence burden and other 
controlled variables.  Cross-section estimations 
Military expenditure has no significant impact on the 
industrial development,. 
Looney (1999) 
one country (Saudi 
Arabia) 1979-1995 
Cointegration and ECM, 
a trade-offs analysis 
between defence share 
and each category of 
budgetary allocations Time series estimation  
The impact of increasing defence expenditure tends to be 
positive in the short-run for both economic and human 
services;  however it comes at the expense of allocations to 
the economy  in the long-run 
Al-Yousif (2002) 
6 DCs  
1975-1998 
Granger-causality test 
within ECM  Time series estimation  
No generalization can be made across countries; the results 
tend to be country specific. 
Abu-Bader and 
 Abu-Qarn (2003)  
3 countries  
1975-1998 (Egypt), 
1967-1998 (Israel), and 
1973-1998 (Syria) 
Granger-causality test 
within ECM  Time series estimation  
Military expenditure has a negative impact on economic 
growth for all three countries. 
Yildirim et al 
(2005) 
13 DCs (Middle East) 
1989-1999 
Two sectors Feder-Ram 
model: civilian sector and 
defence sector 
cross-section and dynamic 
panel estimation (fixed-effect 
and GMM) 
Defence spending has a significant positive effect on 
economic growth. 
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3.4 EMPIRICAL MOTHODOLOGY  
 
The predictions of economic theory with regard to the form of the relationship 
between defence spending and economic growth is somewhat ambiguous, whilst the 
defence spending may carry positive externalities to the economy ( direct effects), it 
may also crowd out other forms of outlays that perhaps are more growth promoting 
(indirect effects). Robert and Alexander (1990), and Alexander and Hansen (2004) 
suggest that is why most studies in the field have attempted to address the question 
empirically. Over the years, since Benoit (1973) work, the empirical works on t he 
defence-growth nexus have been carried out using variety of different approaches as 
we reviewed some in the previous section. However, Deger and Sen (1995) argue that 
although a large number of those works have used ad hoc specifications to model the 
relationship, those specifications and the variables proxies employed have usually 
implicitly followed the economic theoretical arguments that address the relationship 
between the two variables, as some were discussed in earlier section (e.g. supply side 
view, demand side view).  
 
The multiplicity of channels through which defence expenditure affects economic 
development, nonetheless, has complicated the modelling of the relationship between 
the two variables, and raised up some econometrics concerns such as exogeneity, 
simultaneity bias, and causality that associated with the estimates of a single equation 
used to capture the relationship between the variables (Deger, 1986a; Deger and Sen, 
1995).91  They propose the use of simultaneous equations model – Deger type model 
– as a viable way to model the interrelationships between defence spending and 
                                                 
91 Earlier section presents some econometrics problems that associated with some techniques used in 
the literature. However, Ram (1995), and Hartley (2006), provide some comprehensive critical 
discussions on the econometrics issues of the existing empirical works.  
 113 
economic development. Other scholars in the field, Ram (1995) and Hartley (2006) 
among others, also recommend the system of simultaneous equations model to be 
considered whenever data allows; a co mplex simultaneous equation model may 
capture the total effects of defence expenditure where it distinguishes between 
demand side effects (such as crowding out effects on i nvestment) and supply side 
effects (spin-offs from military expenditure), as well as it can  control for the problem 
of simultaneity bias among variables.                  
        
Due to data availability for most country in our sample the use of the system of 
simultaneous model is beyond the scope of this study. The limited number of 
countries in our sample also makes the use of cross-section and pooled panel 
techniques not encouraging. Ram (1995) suggests that findings from cross-section 
studies and that from single-country studies should be viewed as complimentary to 
each other rather than competing alternatives.92 Using time series data for four 
individual countries, the study constructs an econometrics specification based on the 
conventional production function model as an attempt to reflect the relationship 
between defence and economic development in the GCC countries.93     
 
The conventional production function in the form of Cobb – Douglas model is as 
follow: 
                                                 Q = A K α L β                           
Where Q is the total output, K is country’s capital stock, L is labour force, and A is 
technological progress.  The logarithm form of the equation is as follow: 
                                                 
92 Ram argues that cross-section data may reveal important inferences about the defence-development 
nexus, once reasonable evidences from individual-country studies have accumulated. 
93 This approach is widely common one in measuring the impact of public capital on economic growth 
as we shell see in the next chapter. 
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                                                lnQ = a + α lnK + β lnlL                      
Real GDP will represent the level of income Q, and the real gross capital formation is 
used as proxy for the capital stock K since data on the stock of capital are not 
available.94 Due to the lack of data on the labour force for long period in all countries 
in the sample the Population variable is used as proxy for Labour force as change in 
labour force show little volatility in short-run, and this proxy has been considered as 
an indicator of labour force, see for example Biswas and Ram (1986), Lebovic and 
Ishaq (1987). The model can be augmented with military variable as proxy for 
technological progress as well as to capture the causal relationship, if any, between 
economic development and real defence spending D. The econometric model of the 
previous equation can be written, after augmented with defence variable D, as follow: 
                                         
                      Ln GDP = α0 + α1 ln K + α2 ln L + α3 ln D + ε            (1) 
Where GDP is the level of real GDP, K, the proxy of capital stocks “the real gross 
capital formation”, L is population variable as proxy for labour force, D is the real 
defence expenditure of a country, and ε is the error term. All variables are measured 
in the real terms of 2000 prices. In order to develop the dynamics of the model as well 
as to avoid the simultaneity bias, the study employs the Vector Autoregressive (VAR) 
framework to estimate the previous equation, equation 1. 
 
The Vector Autoregression model VAR is a reliable framework that has widely been 
used in the economics literature. VAR provides a powerful and reliable approach to 
data description, forecasting, structural inference, and policy analysis (Sim, 1980). A 
                                                 
94 Investment figures are usually used to measure a country’s capital stocks in literature of the impact 
of capital on growth, see for example Balasubramanyam et al (1996), Greenaway et al (2007).  We 
follow Jorgenson (1973) and (1980) by constructing a series of capital stocks using capital formation 
data. However, we report here the results using the published data of capital formation since the 
resultant series yield identical statistical results to those of the actual one.   
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VAR approach treats each variable in the system as function of the lagged values of 
all endogenous variables in the system and thus simultaneity is not an issue and OLS 
yields consistent estimates. Although the individual coefficients in the VAR system 
are usually difficult to interpret, the VAR framework provides a systematic way to 
analyse the dynamic response of the system from random disturbance (Stock and 
Watson, 2001). From the VAR it self it is possible to extract some information about 
the reaction of all variables in the system to a sudden disturbance in the value of a 
given variable, and how long it would take such impact to work through the system.95 
Such information can be revealed through the examination of the so-called impulse 
response function IRF of the VAR system which could be more informative than the 
estimated coefficients of the VAR system. 
 
Impulse responses depict the responsiveness of the dependent variables in the VAR 
system to a one unit shock to each innovation; error, of the VAR system – assuming 
that this error returns to zero in the following periods and that all other errors in the 
system are constant (Stock and Watson, 2001)–. These are one-off disturbances, and 
give some information about the short-run impact of the variables on each other. 
 
Furthermore, the subsequent development on multivariate unit roots, see for example 
Johansen (1988, 1992, 1995), makes it possible, when all variables in the system are 
not level stationary I (0), to examine the existence of possible long-run relationships 
between the variables in the VAR system. However, the presence of long-run 
relationship would require the discovery of cointegration relationships between 
particular variables, and then the estimation of vector error correction model (ECM). 
                                                 
95 Although F-test suggests which variables have significant impact on t he future values of other 
variables in the system, it is not able to explain the sign of the relationship or the lengths of time these 
effects need to take place (Brooks, 2008). 
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Two or more variables are said to be cointegrated if they possess the same order of 
integration (same I(p)), and the linear combination of them εt is level stationary, 
integrated of order zero I(0). Engle and Granger (1987) argue that if two or more 
variables are cointegrated then, this may reveal inherited long run relationship 
between them. 
 
Thus, a VAR with p lags is as follow: 
       yt = Α1 y t-1 +…+ Α p y t-p + εt 
 
Where yt is a k-vectors of unit root non-stationary variables, As are vectors of βs 
coefficients, and εt is a vector of errors “innovations”. To employ the Johansen 
cointegration test the previous equation needs to be formulated into a vector error 
correction model (ECM) of the form: 
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Granger’s representation theorem suggests that if the coefficient matrix Π has reduced 
rank r < k, then the long-run matrix can be written as: 
βα ′=Π  : rk ×=α ,  kr ×=′β ,  
 
Where: r is the number of cointegration relationships between the variables (the rank 
of the matrix Π), β is the matrix of the coefficients in the cointegration relationships 
between the k variables, and α is the matrix of the speed of adjustment parameters in 
the VEC model. To determine the number of cointegration relationships in the VAR 
system, the trace statistic test and the Maximum eigenvalue statistics test of 
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Johansen’s approach are employed. 96 The existence of cointegration between the 
variables in the system may imply the presence of cointegration space, but that does 
not necessarily imply these relationships are identified/unique (have a meaningful 
economic insight). Normalization is a common practice to identify a long-rung 
cointegration relationship (CV) between the variables, by imposing restrictions on 
(βs) the coefficients of the variables in the cointegration vectors/equations, and/or on 
those of their loading vectors (αs), the speed of adjustment coefficients, in the VEC 
model. Restrictions imposed on these coefficients usually follow the economic theory 
implications about the possible relationships between the variables in the system. To 
identify the cointegration vectors in the system the theoretical implications from the 
underline theoretical argument of our model “production function” will be considered. 
However, it might not be possible to restrict a given CV to have the structure that the 
theory suggests.  
 
3.5 SOURCES OF DATA 
 
 
The data of the variables employed in the analysis are time series data for 4 individual 
GCC countries (Qatar and Kuwait are excluded due to the lack of historical data for 
Qatar and irregularity in Kuwait data).  The data for the variables, Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), Gross Capital Formation, and population, are all obtained from the 
International Monetary Fund publication “international Financial Statistic”(2009). 
The Data for military expenditure up to 1988 is obtained from different issues of the 
                                                 
96 Johansen’s maximum likelihood approach consists of two cointegration tests, the Trace statistic and 
the Maximum eigenvalue statistic: 
)1ln()(
1
∑
+=
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k
ri
itr TrLR λ , and  )1ln()1,( 1max +−−=+ rTrrLR λ  
These tests statistics are computed for r = 0, 1, . . ., k-1. Where r is the number of cointegration vectors 
under the null hypothesis, and λs are the estimated eigenvalues from Π matrix. 
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Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) “Year Book on World 
Armament and Disarmament”, whilst data from 1988 onw ard is obtained from 
database of the SIPRI website “www.sipri.org”.97  Yet the accuracy of military 
expenditure data is problematic, since the original source of the data viz. governments 
use different procedures and standards for data collection and have the motive to hide 
the actual figures from critics and foreign adversaries, (Lebovic and Ishaq, 1987; 
Dunne and Uye, 2009).   
 
The different sample periods are as follow: Bahrain (1975 – 2005), Oman (1975 – 
2007), Saudi Arabia (1963 – 2008), and United Arab Emirates (UAE) (1972 – 
2005).98 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
97 Most studies in the field employ the data from SIPRI, Al-Yousif (2002) argues that SIPRI data is 
preferable since it covers most countries in the world for a longer period of time compare to other 
sources of military data such as World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfer by US Arm Control 
and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the Government Financial Statistics of IMF …etc. The SIPRI data 
is also available in the current and constant prices of the local currencies and in the US dollar.     
98 Data of military expenditure for Bahrain and United Arab Emirates (UAE) are missing form 2006 
and onward. 
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3.6 EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 
 
3.6.1 UNIT ROOT TESTS 
 
We begin the empirical analysis, as in first chapter, with unit root tests in order to 
determine the order of integration of each variable considered. Two alternative unit 
root tests, the Augmented Ducky-Fuller (ADF) test and Philips-Perron (PP) test, are 
considered here to assess the degree of integration (stationarity) of each variable in 
the sample. The results of both tests for the level and the first difference forms of each 
variable for all countries are reported in Table 3.5. The tests statistics of both tests 
ADF and PP show that the null hypothesis of a unit root in the level form of all four 
variables (Gross Domestic Product GDP, Capital formation K, Defence expenditure 
D, and population L) cannot be rejected in all countries in our sample. 
 
In case of Bahrain and Oman, both tests suggest that all four variables are first 
difference stationary I(1) at 5% level of significant or better except population 
variable which is found to be first difference stationary at 10% level based on ADF 
but not on PP. However, a third unit root test -  Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin – 
KPSS test shows that the population variable L is first difference stationary at 5% 
level of significant in both countries.99  The results of the unit root tests for the other 
two countries, Saudi Arabia and UAE, shows that all four variables are first difference 
stationary I(1) at 5% level of significance or better. 
 
 
                                                 
99 The test statistics of KPSS test for L variable for both countries is as follow: t-stat [ ].and the 5% 
level ( ): Bahrain [0.080] (0.146), Oman [0.098] (0.146). 
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Table 3.5 : Unit Root Tests:     
          
H0: the variable has a unit root     
Country Variables  
Order of 
 
integration ADF  K P-P  L 
Bahrain GDP I (0) 2.133 0 2.079 2 
 K I (0) 0.754 3 0.668 1 
1975- 2006 (32) D I (0) 1.858 5 1.134 4 
 L I (0) -3.599 1 -1.915 0 
  ΔGDP I (1) -4.117*** 0 -4.162*** 3 
 ΔK I (1) -2.241** 2 -3.603** 0  
 ΔD I (1) -4.632*** 7 -3.616** 3 
 ΔL I (1) -1.882* 0 -1.550 3 
Oman GDP I (0) -0.699 0 -0.698418 6 
 K I (0) 0.832 0 0.667869 1 
1975 - 2007 (33) D I (0) -2.019 0 -2.024382 1 
 L I (0) -3.027 6 -0.724775 4 
  ΔGDP I (1) -4.689*** 0 -4.632*** 9 
 ΔK I (1) -4.415*** 0 -4.415*** 0 
 ΔD I (1) -5.843*** 0 -5.803*** 2 
 ΔL I (1) -1.735* 5 -1.548 4 
Saudi Arabia GDP I (0) -1.727 1 -1.585 1 
 K I (0) -1.495 2 -1.881 4 
1963 - 2008 (46) D I (0) -2.430 0 -2.434 1 
 L I (0) -2.594 4 -1.796 5 
  ΔGDP I (1) -3.899*** 1 -3.698*** 5 
 ΔK I (1) -2.408** 1 -3.129*** 4 
 ΔD I (1) -6.015*** 0 -6.056*** 3 
 ΔL I (2) -1.991** 2 -1.896* 3 
UAE GDP I (0) -2.366 0 -2.492 3 
 K I (0) -2.272 0 -2.483 3 
1972 - 2005 (34) D I (0) -1.364 5 1.134 4 
 L I (0) 1.164 3 -0.186 5 
  ΔGDP I (1) -4.373** 0 -4.300*** 1 
 ΔK I (1) -3.440** 0 -3.440** 0 
 ΔD I (1) -4.632*** 7 -3.616** 3 
 ΔL I (1) -5.175*** 3 -3.082** 4 
Note: k is the degree of augmentation in ADF tests determined automatically based on (SIC). L is the 
bandwidth determined automatically based on (Newly-West Bandwidth). 
Three asterisks *** indicates the significance at 1%, two asterisks ** indicate the significance at 5%, 
and one asterisk * indicates the significant at 10% level. 
 
 
The second step in our analysis is to estimate a stable VAR system for each country in 
the sample, and try to extract the impulse responses and variance decompositions for 
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each VAR.100 Cointegration test then is carried out to test for a possible stable long 
run relationship between the variables in each VAR system. The maximum likelihood 
method of Johansen (1988) is considered here to detect the presence of cointegration 
among the variables. If cointegration exists, we identify the cointegration vector (CV) 
and estimate the Vector Error Correction Model (ECM). The empirical analysis for 
each country in our sample is as follow: 
 
3.6.2 BAHRAIN 
 
3.6.2.1 VAR ESTIMATION, IMPULSE RESPONSES, AND VARIANCE 
DECOMPOSITIONS  
 
To determine the appropriate lag length for a VAR is, in practice, the first step to 
identify a s table VAR system. The test for lag length suggests the system is stable 
with one lag; the roots of the companion matrix are all less than one in absolute value. 
Moreover, the VAR produces residuals that have reasonable properties: they are 
normally distributed and there is neither auto-correlation nor heteroskedasticity, 
Appendixes A1. Thus, we carry on and test for cointegration, but first we would be 
interested in examine the dynamic of the VARs system using both the impulse 
responses and variance decompositions methods and see if they can be revealing.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
100 The graphs of the variables show that most variables have trend; and thus a trend was included in 
the VARs. 
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3.6.2.2 IMPULSE RESPONSES 
 
We provide here the impulse responses of GDP to the shocks in the other three 
variables – capital K, Defence D, Labour L - in the VAR system. Both the impulse 
response functions of Cholesky decomposition and those of Generalized Responses of 
Pesaran and Shin (1998) are depicted here with two standard error bands above and 
below the function as in Figure 3.2.  
 
The Cholesky responses of GDP from one-off innovations to defence D are similar in 
time-profile and magnitude to those produced by generalized responses: and are not 
too dissimilar with those with respect to innovations to capital K as in Figure 3.2. 
Thus, as the correlation matrix of the residuals from VAR suggests, the ordering of 
the variables in VAR does matter but only slightly. 101 The plotted responses in figure 
3.2 show that after the one-off innovations to defence D, income Y increases 
constantly for three years before it starts slowly receding over the periods. This 
finding for Bahrain is in line with Benoit’s argument of positive effect of defence 
spending on economic development in developing countries. Defence spending may 
carry some benefits to Bahraini economy; through the engagement of military 
programs in some public works – e.g. roads, airports, communication networks – as 
well as the process of modernization. Technological and skills transfer could be 
another channel through which Bahraini economy has benefited from defence 
expenditure. Bahrain, as other GCC countries, has a tied relationship with the some of 
                                                 
101 Cholesky decomposition assumes that the correlation between the residuals across the equations is 
zero. If, however, the condition does not hold the impulse responses will depend upon the order in 
which the variables have entered in the VAR system. The Generalized responses method of Pesaran 
and Shin (1998) provides an alternative way to proceed in such case by placing the targeted variable, 
upon which the impulses are being evaluated, at first. The rest of the variables are ordered according to 
the correlation among the variables. 
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the most powerful countries in the world, United States and United Kingdom, which 
have the most advance technologies and skills in many fields including defence. 
Bahrain had been under the British maritime protection since 1835 until 1971 
(Ulrichsen, 2009), and the year of 1998 marked the 50th anniversary of the American 
naval command presence in Bahrain (U.S Middle East Force), with the American 
Fifth Fleet headquartered there since 1995 (Katzman, 2008).102  
 
Shocks to capital (K) and Labour (L) variables seem to have adverse effects on GDP. 
GDP responses negatively to an increase in both variables and these negative impacts 
appear to persist over the periods as in figure 3.2. The negative impact of capital (K) 
on GDP could be attributed to the inefficiency in allocating investments in the 
economy as it is the case in many countries in the Middle East region (see for 
example, Makdisi et al, 2003;  Harb, 2009).  The negative impact of Labour (L) on 
GDP perhaps related to the proxy used for labour force, population, as being 
inadequate proxy for labour force. Growing population, with low human capital 
formation – in a small undiversified economy that has witnessed decline in oil exports 
for many years (Ulrichsen, 2009) – may have negative impact in the economy.         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
102 Citing Bahrain limited income, U.S military aids to Bahrain have been supported by the Congress 
and the successive Administrations (Katztman, 2008), which may have been beneficiary to Bahrain’s 
economy. For example, Bahrain receives about $200,000-$400,000 a year worth of IMET 
(International Military Education and Training) as military training assistance form United States, 
(Cordesman, 1998).   
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Figure 3.2: Impulse responses of real GDP for Bahrain 
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3.6.2.3 VARIANCE DECOMPOSITIONS  
 
Variance decompositions offer another method to analyse the dynamic of the VAR 
system which, to some extent, gives similar information to that drawn of the impulse 
responses functions (Brooks, 2008). They break down the variation of the dependent 
variables into the component shocks to the VAR system. In other word, each variable 
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is explained as linear function of its own current innovations and the lagged 
innovations of all variables in the system. Thus, variance decompositions may 
measure the relative importance of each random innovation in affecting the variables 
in the VAR system.103  
 
Table 3.6 reports the contributions of the variation in GDP attributable to the 
variations in the other three variables – Defence D, capital K, and Labour L - .  As it 
can be seen from Table 3.6, as time moves on after an innovation, the variation in 
GDP owes more and more to variations in the other three variables. The variance of 
GDP is influenced consistently throughout the periods by that of defence D, settling at 
around 14% after 5 pe riods. The contributions of the variations of capital K and 
labour L in the variation of GDP also increase after period 2, rising gradually over the 
periods to amount for 10% and 11% respectively after 10 periods have elapsed.  
 
Table 3.6: Variance Decompositions of GDP for Bahrain 
 Period S.E. GDP K D L 
 1  0.057  100.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 2  0.065  93.677  0.844  4.792  0.685 
 3  0.070  86.973  2.137  9.069  1.819 
 4  0.073  81.527  3.530  11.782  3.160 
 5  0.076  77.147  4.888  13.362  4.601 
 6  0.079  73.511  6.161  14.243  6.083 
 7  0.081  70.401  7.331  14.701  7.566 
 8  0.083  67.678  8.396  14.901  9.023 
 9  0.084  65.259  9.361  14.945  10.433 
 10  0.086  63.084  10.23  14.894  11.786 
Note: S.E is the forecast error of the variable at the giving forecast horizontal.    
 
                                                 
103 Eviews 6 user’s guide (2007). Like impulse responses the order of the variables in the VAR system 
is important for variance decompositions. 
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Such information along with those drawn from the impulse responses leads us on to 
attempts to identify possible long – run relationships between the variables in the 
VAR system.  
 
3.6.2.4 VECM AND COINTEGRATION RELATIONSHIP 
 
The existence of long-run relationship between the variables in the system would 
requires the presence of cointegration relationships between particular variables, and 
then the estimation of vector error correction model (ECM). The Johansen maximum 
likelihood method, which consists of two alternative likelihood ratio tests, the Trace 
statistic test and the Maximum Eigenvalue test, is carried out here to detect the 
presence of cointegration. In detecting the presence of cointegration, the choice here 
is between Model 3 and Model 4 of Johansen (1995). Model 3 excludes the trend 
from the cointegration vectors (CV) whilst Model 4 restricts the trend to lie in the 
cointegration space. The results statistics of both tests “Trace statistic” and 
“Maximum Eigenvalue test” for both Models “Model 3” and “Model 4” are based on 
the maximum likelihood estimates of VAR of order 1, and they are reported in 
Appendix A1.    
 
We note that under both models there are two cointegration vectors (2CVs), according 
to both likelihood ratio tests “the Trace statistic” and “Maximum Eigenvalue test”, 
and they are significant at 5% level as in Appendix A1. This means that we can use 
Johnsen’s Likelihood Ratio test 2χ  to test for the presence of trend (Model 4) versus 
the restricted model of no trend (Model 3) in the CVs. The test has degrees of 
freedom equal to the rank of the matrix (r), that is, the number of CVs. The test 
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statistic was calculated and the outcome was; 2χ (2) = 5.185, which is below the 5% 
critical value of 5.99.104 Thus, we accept the restriction implied by Model 3 that there 
is no trend in the CVs, the link between the variables in the long-run is independent of 
any time element.105  
 
The presence of cointegration relationships between the variables in the system may 
indicate the existence of cointegration space, however that dose not, necessarily, 
imply these relationships are identified/unique (have a meaningful economic insight). 
Normalization is a common practice to identify a long-rung cointegration relationship 
(CV) between the variables, by imposing restrictions on (βs) the coefficients of the 
variables in the cointegration vectors/equations, and/or on those of their loading 
vectors (αs), the speed of adjustment coefficients, in the VEM. Restrictions imposed 
on these coefficients usually follow the economic theory implications about the 
possible relationships between the variables in the system. However, it might not be 
possible to restrict a given CV to have the structure that the theory suggests.  
 
Based on our model, the production function, a long-run relationship between income 
Y and the other three variables, capital K, labour L, and defence D could be 
identified. Taking into account the variables in the model we were able to identify two 
cointegration relationships as t hey are reported in Table 3.7, and graphed in figure 
                                                 
104 The Likelihood ratio 2χ test = - N [ ]∑
=
−−−
r
i
inim
1
,, )1ln()1ln( λλ . Where N is the number of 
observations, r is the rank of the matrix, the subscripts: m and n refer to model 4 and model 3 
respectively, and λs are the eigenvalues for each cointegration rank, up to r.      
105 In simple terms, if the eigenvalues across the two competing models for a given rank of the matrix 
(number of CVs) are identical, then the two Log Likelihoods are identical and thus, restricting the trend 
to be 0 in each potential CV is “exactly” correct. 
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3.3.106 The LR test for binding restrictions with probability of (0.738), which is 
greater than (0.05), implies that the restrictions do hold and hence the βs coefficients 
are unique, all coefficients are statically significant (different from zero). The first 
cointegration vector is normalised on capital K (setting the coefficient of K in first CV 
to 1), and may implies a long-run relationships between K and both GDP and D. 
Converting it into equation indicates that in the long-run the level of GDP has positive 
impact on the level of K, whilst defence expenditure D negatively effects the level of 
capital formation K which may imply that the defence spending may crowd out other 
form of investments. 
 
The second cointegration vector is normalised on GDP and based upon the long-run 
relationship between GDP and the other three variables K, D, and L as predicted by 
the underline theoretical argument from the production function. When converting 
into equation it indicates that in long-run the levels of capital K, labour L, and defence 
D carry positive effects on t he level of GDP. Future manipulation on t he equation 
shows that the elasticity of GDP per capita (log (GDP/L)) with respect to both K and 
D is 0.270 and it is statistically significant for both. This result supports the underline 
argument of positive impact of defence expenditure on e conomic development in 
some developing countries. Defence expenditure may have favoured Bahrain’s 
economy, as mentioned earlier, via its contribution in the accumulation of capital 
stock, the process of modernizations, as well as technological progress through 
technological transfers. Coefficients that are not significant in the cointegration 
vectors CVS βs and those of the speed of adjustment αs can be set to zero in the 
                                                 
106 Although the graphs of CVs look as they are not stationary, both cointegration vectors  ar e 
stationary I(0) at 5% level of significance or better: First CV1 is level stationary I (0) according to 
KPSS unit root test with LM stat being (0.133) which is below the 5% critical value of (0.146). And the 
second CV is I (0) according to ADF unit root test with t-stat being (-4.068) and probability of (0.000).   
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process of identifying the cointegration vectors CVs, see Johansen (1995b) for further 
details. 
 
Table 3.7: Identified Cointegration Equations for Bahrain 
Cointegration Restrictions:   
      β (1,2)=1, β (2,1)=1, β (2,4)=-1   
      β (2,2)= β (2,3), β(1,4)=0   
      α(1,1)=0,  α(1,2)=0   
      α (3,1)=0    
Convergence achieved after 17 iterations.  
Restrictions identify all cointegrating vectors  
LR test for binding restrictions (rank = 2):   
Chi-square(4)  1.982740    
Probability  0.738934    
     
     Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1 CointEq2   
     
     GDP(-1) -3.397358  1.000000   
  (0.24782)    
 [-13.7089]    
     
K(-1)  1.000000 -0.270425   
   (0.02727)   
  [-9.91645]   
     
D(-1)  0.468119 -0.270425   
  (0.15572)  (0.02727)   
 [ 3.00607] [-9.91645]   
     
L(-1)  0.000000 -1.000000   
     
C  17.51715 -5.470722   
Note: the notations for the coefficients β and α are as follow: βi j is the coefficient of j
th variable in 
cointegration vector i. and αi j is the adjustment coefficient in the VEC equation i with respect to the 
error correction term from cointegration vector j.  
( ) =standard error: [ ] = t-stats 
 
 
 
To check whether these two identified cointegration vector can be informative, in 
essence that their predicted values for their dependent variables did no converge too 
far from their actual values. We employ the series of GDP and K given by first and 
second vectors to forecast their long-run values across the extended data set against 
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their actual values as they graphed in Figure 3.3.107 The graph shows that the long-run 
values of K appear to converge a bit far from their actual values, and thus the long-run 
relationship predicted by the first CV may not be very informative. On the other hand, 
the long-run values of GDP appear to wander around their actual values and seem to 
have similar trend of those of the actual values. Such results may imply that the long-
run relationship anticipated by t he second CV2 may hold, and thus the defence 
expenditure may have positive long-run relationship, along with K and L, with 
economic development, which may have some inferences for Bahrain’s policy 
makers. 
 
The results from the dynamic specification of VEC show that there are no current or 
lagged values of the first differences of the 4 variables, since the VAR contains only 1 
lag. We note that the retained adjustment coefficients (theα s) are all statistically 
significantly different from zero as in Table 3.8. Furthermore, we can conclude GDP 
is the “weakly exogenous” variable in the system: that is, it is not influenced by the 
disequilibrium in the 2 long-run relationships. In a weak sense, it “causes” them: that 
is as far as we can say, since by definition in any cointegration equation there can be 
no cause and effect. The variables have to “see saw” together: so that a “su dden” 
movement in any one automatically prompts adjustments in all the others. However, it 
is changes to real aggregate output that kick starts changes in the capital stock, 
military expenditure and population: essentially, since our variables are measured in 
logs, an increase/decrease in the growth of real output generates movements in the 
rates of growth of the other variables. 
 
                                                 
107 The long-run values are calculated by subtracting the cointegration vector from the actual values of 
the concern variable lagged once since the CV is the residuals from the cointegration equations 
between the variables lagged once. Thus, for example, the long-run value of GDP= GDP-1  - CV2 
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Table 3.8: VEC Estimation for Bahrain 
Error Correction: GDP K D L 
CointEq1  0.0000 -0.0660  0.0000  0.0073 
  (0.0000)  (0.0252)  (0.0000)  (0.0004) 
 [ NA] [-2.614] [ NA] [ 17.422] 
     
CointEq2  0.0000  0.5179  0.8720  0.0238 
  (0.0000)  (0.1825)  (0.2124)  (0.0031) 
 [ NA] [ 2.8371] [ 4.1056] [ 7.6820] 
     
C  0.0536  0.0445  0.0873  0.0328 
  (0.0130)  (0.0283)  (0.0319)  (0.0004) 
 [ 4.12020] [ 1.57100] [ 2.73674] [ 66.4300] 
Note: ( ) =standard error: [ ] = t-stats 
 
Figure 3.3: Cointegration Relationships, and Actual Values of the Variables and 
Values Predicted by Their Cointegration Vectors   
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3.6.3 OMAN 
 
3.6.3.1 VAR ESTIMATION, IMPULSE RESPONSES, AND VARIANCE 
DECOMPOSITIONS  
 
The appropriate lag length for VAR is tested, and the results suggest that the system is 
stable with one lag; the roots of the companion matrix are all less than one in absolute 
value. Moreover, the VAR produces residuals that have reasonable properties: where 
they are normally distributed, there is neither auto-correlation nor heteroskedasticity 
as in Appendix A2. Thus, again we carry on and examine the dynamic of the VARs 
system using both the impulse responses and variance decompositions methods. 
 
3.6.3.2 IMPULSE RESPONSES 
 
We observe that the correlation matrix of residuals in the VAR implies that the order 
of the variable into VAR may need to be considered. Moreover, the impulse responses 
provided by Cholesky are different from those produced by Generalized responses as 
in Figure 3.2, which suggests the order of the variables into VAR does matter. We 
provide here the impulse responses of GDP to the shocks in the other three variables – 
capital K, Defence D, Labour L - in the VAR system. Thus we analyse the 
Generalized response.   
 
The plotted Generalized responses of GDP from a shock to defence D shows that at 
the start GDP shifts upward in the first period then decrease gradually throughout 
until it becomes normal and dies out after 10 periods as in Figure 3.4. This finding 
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may suggests that defence expenditure has positive effect on economic development 
in Oman. Defence spending may have been supportive to Omani economy through 
the contributions of military programmes in some public works that could serve the 
civilian sectors, in addition to the role of military programmes in the process of 
modernization, where Oman, as most GCC states, has relatively low human capital 
formations. Yildirim et al (2005) argue that military arm forces in the Middle East 
region play an important socio-economic role by absorbing excess labour that might 
otherwise be unemployed. Technological and skills transfer also may have been 
another avenue through which Omani economy has gained from defence expenditure, 
where Oman as other GCC countries, has a t ied military relationship with United 
States and United Kingdom. Oman has long had military relationship with US and 
UK. Oman received first military assistance from U.S.A and UK against the Dhofar 
rebels in 1964 which was defeated by 1975 (Katzman, 2005). Moreover, Oman signs 
a military agreement with US in 1981 that has regularly been renewed, and allows 
access of the US military to building cantonments, shelters, air bases, and ports. In 
return Oman received around $320 million fund to build and develop these facilities, 
it also provides Oman with $199.1 million worth of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 
between 1980 and 1990, and about $853,000 in International Military Education and 
Training fund (IMET) (Cordesman, 1998).108  
 
Shocks to capital K and Labour L variables seem to have similar impact on GDP, 
GDP shift upward after a shock to both variable K and L, and slowly decreases as 
time moves until it normalized and dies out after 9 periods. This finding suggests that 
                                                 
108 Oman also works closely with UK; there are some British solders run training programmes for 
Omani army, in a ddition to some British officers seconded to Omani Navy and to Omani air force 
(Cordesman, 1998).   
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both capital K and labour exert positive impacts on t he level of output in Omani 
economy as the underline theoretical argument from the production function suggests.  
 
Figure 3.4: Impulse responses of real GDP for Oman 
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3.6.3.3 VARIANCE DECOMPOSITIONS  
 
Table 3.9 reports variance decompositions of GDP. The table shows that through all 
the periods, most of the variation in GDP is attributable to its own variations (over 
98% after 10 periods have elapsed). The variation of the other three variables in the 
system - Defence D, capital K, and Labour L – have marginal contributions in the 
variation of GDP through out the periods.109 Implication of variance decompositions 
analysis may suggests that the GDP variable is the key variable in the system, changes 
in the GDP seems to carry an influential impact over the variables in the system.  
 
Table 3.9: Variance Decompositions of GDP for Oman  
 Period S.E. GDP K D L 
 1  0.110971  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.144319  99.61392  0.123600  0.259543  0.002937 
 3  0.163381  99.33169  0.201777  0.452964  0.013568 
 4  0.175008  99.15435  0.244039  0.568196  0.033411 
 5  0.182174  99.03595  0.267136  0.634280  0.062631 
 6  0.186535  98.94769  0.279985  0.671606  0.100716 
 7  0.189109  98.87415  0.287084  0.692084  0.146683 
 8  0.190558  98.80733  0.290840  0.702641  0.199187 
 9  0.191319  98.74329  0.292638  0.707445  0.256626 
 10  0.191683  98.68032  0.293324  0.709082  0.317277 
Note: S.E is the forecast error of the variable at the giving forecast horizontal.    
 
Thus, again we carry on our analysis and try to identify possible long – run 
relationships between the variables in the VAR system.  
 
 
                                                 
109 We examined the variance decomposition of the other variables in the system, where we notice that 
the contribution of the variation of GDP in those of D and K is over 60% and 19% in the first period 
and continue to rise over the periods up to 88% and 70% respectively after 10 periods have passed.  
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3.6.3.4 ECM AND COINTEGRATION RELATIONSHIP 
 
The cointegration test of Johnsen maximum likelihood method is conducted here to 
detect the presence of long-run cointegration relationships between the variables in 
the system. The results statistics of both tests “Trace statistic” and “Maximum 
Eigenvalue test” for the two alternative Models of Johansen “Model 3” and “Model 
4” are based on the maximum likelihood estimates of VAR of order 1, and they are 
reported in Appendix A2.    
We note that under both models there are two cointegration vectors (2CVs), according 
to both likelihood ratio tests, and they are significant at 5% level as in Appendix A2. 
Johnsen’s Likelihood Ratio test 2χ  for the presence of trend (Model 4) versus the 
restricted model of no t rend (Model 3) in the CVs, suggests that a trend should be 
included in the cointegration vectors CV, where LR test statistic : 2χ (2) = 11.724 
which is greater than the 5% level of 5.99. Thus, we accept the restriction implied by 
Model 4 that trend should be included in the CVs; the link between the variables in 
the long-run is not independent of time element.  
 
Based on our model, the production function, we were able to identify two 
cointegartion relationships as they are reported in Table 3.10 and graphed in Figure 
3.5.110 The LR test for binding restrictions with probability of (0.635), which is 
greater than (0.05), implies that the restrictions do hold and hence the βs coefficients 
are unique, all coefficients are statically significant (different from zero). Same as 
before the first cointegration vector is normalised on c apital K and may implies a 
                                                 
110 Both cointegration vectors  are stationary I(0) at 5% level of significance with intercept and trend 
according to KPSS unit root test with LM stat for the first CV1 is (0.113), and (0.115) for the second 
CV2 which for both below the 5% critical value of (0.146). 
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long-run relationships between K and both GDP and D. similar to Bahrain, by 
converting the vector into equation indicates that in the long-run the level of GDP has 
a positive impact on the level of K, whilst the level of D carries a negative impact on 
K, which may indicate a high opportunity cost of defence expenditure on K.  
 
The second cointegartion vector is normalised on GDP and based upon the long-run 
relationship between GDP and the other three variables K, D, and L as predicted by 
the underline theoretical argument. When converting into equation it indicates that in 
long-run the levels of capital K, labour L, and defence D carry positive effects on the 
level of GDP. Future manipulation on the equation shows that the elasticity of GDP 
per capita (log (GDP/L)) with respect to both K and D is 1. This result supports the 
underline argument of positive impact of defence expenditure on economic 
development in some developing countries. Same as for Bahrain, the defence 
expenditure may have favoured Oman’s economy through its contribution in the 
capital stock accumulation, the process of modernizations, as w ell as skills and 
technological progress through technological transfer. 
 
Again, we calculate the long-run relationships to check whether these two identified 
cointegration vector can be informative. We employ the series of GDP and K given 
by first and second vectors to forecast their long-run values across the extended data 
set against their actual values as they graphed in Figure 3.5. The graph of the two 
cointegration vectors show that the long-run values of K and that of GDP appear to 
converge far from their actual values, and thus the long-run relationships predicted by 
the CVs have little to say about the long-run relationships between the variables in the 
system.   
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Table 3.10: Identified Cointegration Equations for Oman 
Cointegration Restrictions:    
      β (1,2)=1, β (2,1)=1, β (2,4)=-1   
      β (2,2)=-1, β (2,3)=-1, β (1,4)=0    
      α(1,1)=0, α (1,2)=0   
Convergence achieved after 717 iterations.  
Restrictions identify all cointegrating vectors  
LR test for binding restrictions (rank = 2):   
Chi-square(4)  2.552147    
Probability  0.635323    
     
     Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1 CointEq2   
     
     GDP(-1) -0.386117  1.000000   
  (0.11416)    
 [-3.38217]    
     
K(-1)  1.000000 -1.000000   
     
D(-1)  0.868592 -1.000000   
  (0.10082)    
 [ 8.61519]    
     
L(-1)  0.000000 -1.000000   
     
Trend -0.299088  0.253779   
  (0.01119)  (0.00875)   
 [-26.7221] [ 29.0114]   
     
C  0.561946 -3.479372   
     
Note: the notations for the coefficients β and α are as follow: βi j is the coefficient of j
th variable in 
cointegration vector i. and αi j is the adjustment coefficient in the VEC equation i with respect to the 
error correction term from cointegration vector j.  
( ) =standard error: [ ] = t-stats 
 
The results from the dynamic specification of VEC in Table 3.11 show that there are 
no current or lagged values of the first differences of the 4 variables, since the VAR 
contains only 1 lag. The retained adjustment coefficients (theα s) are all statistically 
significantly different from zero. Furthermore, we notice that GDP is the “weakly 
exogenous” variable in the system: that is, it is not influenced by the disequilibrium in 
the 2 l ong-run relationships. Changes to real aggregate output GDP appear to kick 
starts changes in K, D and L. 
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Table 3.11: ECM Estimates for Oman 
Error Correction: GDP K D L 
     
CointEq1  0.000000  1.641848  0.786321  0.032600 
  (0.00000)  (0.41455)  (0.22399)  (0.00820) 
 [ NA] [ 3.96059] [ 3.51048] [ 3.97552] 
     
CointEq2  0.000000  2.037896  0.969831  0.033070 
  (0.00000)  (0.50742)  (0.27418)  (0.01004) 
 [ NA] [ 4.01616] [ 3.53723] [ 3.29470] 
     
C  0.074924  0.070486  0.038538  0.034046 
  (0.02021)  (0.02801)  (0.02141)  (0.00054) 
 [ 3.70653] [ 2.51670] [ 1.80004] [ 63.3869] 
     
     Note: ( ) =standard error: [ ] = t-stats 
 
 
Figur 3.5: Cointegration Relationships, and actual values of the variables against 
the values predicted by their cointegration vectors  
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3.6.4 SAUDI ARABIA 
 
3.6.4.1 VAR ESTIMATION, IMPULSE RESPONSES, AND VARIANCE 
DECOMPOSITON:  
 
Following the same steps, the appropriate lag length for VAR is tested, and the results 
suggest that the system is mathematically stable with 4 lags; the roots of the 
companion matrix are all less than one in absolute value. Moreover, the VAR 
produces residuals that have reasonable properties: although they are not normally 
distributed, there is neither auto-correlation nor heteroskedasticity (see diagnostic 
tests Appendix A3. Thus, again we carry on and examine the dynamic of the VARs 
system using both the impulse responses and variance decompositions methods. 
 
3.6.4.2 IMPULSE RESPONSES 
 
We observe that the correlation matrix of residuals in the VAR implies that the 
impulse responses from Cholesky decomposition and those from Generalised 
responses of Pesaran and Shin (1998) may have similar information. The impulse 
responses provided by Cholesky are similar in time-profile and magnitude to those 
produced by Generalized responses as in Figure 3.6, which suggests that the order of 
the variables into VAR may not be very important. We provide here the impulse 
responses of GDP to the shocks in the other three variables – capital K, Defence D, 
Labour L - in the VAR system.  
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The plotted responses in Figure 3.6 show that after the one-off innovations to defence 
D, GDP increases gradually for five years, but constantly falls throughout the rest of 
the periods. Thus, again this finding for Saudi may indicates that defence expenditures 
may carry positive externalities to the Saudi economy in the short-run. Saudi Arabia is 
among the highly defence spending developing countries in the world – defence  
expenditures amount on average over 30% of the government budget shares (Looney, 
1999). The externalities from such big outlays may have been supportive to the 
economy in some ways such as infrastructure projects launched by the military, the 
process of modernization where Saudi has relatively low rate of human capital 
formation with relatively large percent of nomadic people in the population.  
 
Moreover, as most GCC countries Saudi has long had close military ties with United 
States and United Kingdom, US military presence in Saudi goes back to 1943 where 
US first leased port and air base facilities in Dharan in the east coast. Saudi has 
Military Training Mission Agreement with the US which was renewed in 1992, Saudi 
also has purchased over $16 billion worth of US military construction services during 
the late 1970s and the 1980s in addition to supervised military constructions that 
worth billions of dollars more (Cordesman, 1998).111 Thus, Technological and skills 
transfers from major industrial countries perhaps have been another channel through 
which Saudi economy benefited from defence expenditure.  
 
The plotted response of GDP from one-off shock to capital K shows that, GDP 
immediately increases, doing so for three years, but falls consistently over the period 
                                                 
111 Saudi Arabia has always have major defence contracts with some major arms exports countries 
mainly US, UK, and some other NATO members, where some of these contracts can amount for over 
US $50 billion in some years, Saudi’s arms agreements from 1997 to 2004 reached over US $10 billion 
Hasbani (2006). For example, in 2010 Saudi Arabia and UAE signed arms agreement with US that 
amount for US$60 billion each ( New Your Times, 21-Oct 2010)      
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until it dies out. This may indicate that capital positively affect the level of output, as 
our model, production function, suggested. A shock to labour L seems to have little 
effect of GDP as it can be seen from Figure 3.6 after a tiny increase for two years, it 
falls slowly for another five years, before it starts recovering and dies out over the 
period.  
 
Figure 3.6: Impulse responses of real GDP for Saudi Arabia  
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3.6.4.3 VARIANCE DECOMPOSITIONS  
 
The variance decompositions of GDP are calculated and reported in Table 3.12. The 
table shows that after an innovation, the contributions of the variation of D and that of 
K in the variation of GDP increase gradually over the periods to amount for over 11% 
and over 24% respectively after 10 periods have elapsed. The variations in GDP 
appear to be influenced throughout the periods by the variations of the other variables 
on the system. However, the variation of L has little contribution to the variation of 
GDP relative to other variables; GDP is marginally affected by the variation in labour 
proxy L until 5 periods have passed.  
 
Table 3.12: Variance Decompositions of GDP for Saudi Arabia 
 Period S.E. GDP K D L 
 1  0.137599  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.234068  85.44531  12.87292  1.492371  0.189399 
 3  0.310749  75.19413  21.08893  3.604642  0.112300 
 4  0.348609  68.95912  24.67237  6.190671  0.177832 
 5  0.365384  64.49380  25.44667  9.603279  0.456249 
 6  0.371842  62.91826  25.04973  10.95602  1.075997 
 7  0.374825  62.54395  24.66002  11.32528  1.470745 
 8  0.376407  62.64991  24.46909  11.31127  1.569728 
 9  0.377876  62.67174  24.50246  11.26240  1.563397 
 10  0.379042  62.52126  24.65972  11.25689  1.562138 
      
Note: S.E is the forecast error of the variable at the giving forecast horizontal.    
 
Thus, such considerations along with those drawn from the impulse responses lead us 
on to try to identify possible long – run relationships between the variables in the 
VAR system.  
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3.6.4.4 VECM AND COITEGRATION RELATIONSHIP: 
 
The cointegration test of Johnsen maximum likelihood method is conducted here to 
detect the presence of long-run cointegration relationships between the variables in 
the system. The results statistics of both tests “Trace statistic” and “Maximum 
Eigenvalue test” for the two alternative Models of Johansen “Model 3” and “Model 
4” are based on the maximum likelihood estimates of VAR of order 4, and they are 
reported in Appendix A3.    
 
We noted that under both models there are two cointegration vectors (2CVs), 
according to both likelihood ratio tests, and they are significant at 5% level as in 
Appendix A3. Johnsen’s Likelihood Ratio test 2χ  for the presence of trend (Model 4) 
versus the restricted model of no t rend (Model 3) in the CVs, suggests that a trend 
should be included in the cointegration vectors CV, where LR test statistic : 2χ (2) = 
16.926 ,which greater that the 5% level of 5.99.  
 
The two cointegration relationships were identified as they are reported in Table 3.13 
and graphed in Figure 3.7.112 The LR test for binding restrictions with probability of 
(0.157), which is greater than (0.05), implies that the restrictions do hold and hence 
the βs coefficients may be unique, all coefficients are statically significant (different 
from zero). Same as for other countries in our sample, the first cointegration vector is 
normalised on capital K and may implies a long-run relationships between K and the 
other three variables in the system, GDP, D, and L. converting it into equation 
                                                 
112 The finding of unit root test suggests that:  F irst CV1 is level stationary I(0), with intercept and 
trend, according to KPSS unit root test with LM stat being (0.119) which is below the 5% critical value 
of (0.146). And the second CV is I (0) at 5% level, with intercept and no trend, according to ADF unit 
root test with t-stat being (-3.3294) and probability of (0.019).   
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indicates that in the long-run the level of GDP and that of labour have a positive 
impact on t he level of K, whilst the level D carries a negative impact on K. The 
negative impact of defence expenditure on capital may indicate that the defence 
expenditures crowd out other form of investments, and therefore have a relatively 
high opportunity cost.  
 
The second cointegration vector is normalised on GDP and based upon the long-run 
relationship between GDP and the other three variables K, D, and L as predicted by 
the underline theoretical argument. Converting it in to equation it indicates that in 
long-run the levels of capital K, labour L carry positive effects on the level of GDP. 
Defence D, however, appears to negatively affect the level of output, with a relatively 
big elasticity of 2.56, which may just confirm the high opportunity cost of defence 
expenditures predicted by CV1 that defence spending may crowd out other form of 
outlays that could be more growth promoting, considering the relatively high budget 
allocation to defence in Saudi Arabia - Saudi Arabia has the highest military 
expenditure per capita and per soldier in the world (Looney, 1999) -. Furthermore, 
Saudi, as well as most GCC members, with such high military expenditures has not 
been even close in terms of military industries or technological transfers to some other 
developing countries with relatively high military expenditures such as Iran, Pakistan, 
Turkey and North Korea (Hasbani, 2006). 
 
 
 
 
 
 146 
Table 3.13: Identified Cointegration Equations for Saudi Arabia 
Cointegration Restrictions:    
      β(1,2)=1, β (2,1)=1   
      β (2,4)=-1    
      α(2,1)=0, α (2,2)=0   
      α (4,2)=0    
Convergence achieved after 645 iterations.  
Restrictions identify all cointegrating vectors  
LR test for binding restrictions (rank = 2):   
Chi-square(2)  3.699169    
Probability  0.157303    
     
     Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1 CointEq2   
     
     GDP(-1) -1.936890  1.000000   
  (0.42008)    
 [-4.61075]    
     
K(-1)  1.000000 -3.491870   
   (0.45703)   
  [-7.64038]   
     
D(-1)  1.131525  2.568097   
  (0.37420)  (0.46591)   
 [ 3.02387] [ 5.51196]   
     
L(-1) -3.905289 -1.000000   
  (1.03709)    
 [-3.76562]    
     
Trend  0.108139  0.065710   
  (0.03029)  (0.02401)   
 [ 3.56994] [ 2.73656]   
     
C  14.58220 -15.90503   
     Note: the notations for the coefficients β and α are as follow: βi j is the coefficient of jth variable in 
cointegration vector i. and αi j is the adjustment coefficient in the VEC equation i with respect to the 
error correction term from cointegration vector j. ( ) =standard error: [ ] = t-stats 
 
 
The long-run relationships predicted by the cointegration vectors are calculated to 
check how informative these two identified cointegration vector can be. Again, we 
employ the series of GDP and K given by f irst and second vectors to forecast their 
long-run values across the extended data set against their actual values as they 
graphed in Figure 3.7. Although, the graph of the two cointegration vectors show that 
the long-run values of K and that of GDP appear to converge a bit far from their 
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actual values sometimes, they however seem to wander around their actual values 
most of the time and appear to have similar trend of those of the actual values. Thus 
the long-run relationships predicted by the CVS may indicate some information about 
the expected long-run relationships between the variables in the system.   
 
The results from the dynamic specification of ECM, Table 3.14, show that in the shot-
run defence expenditure have a negative impact on t he level of GDP, the lagged 
dynamic of defence expenditure on GDP equation are all negative and significant 
(different from zero). Defence expenditure, therefore, appears to have opportunity 
cost in the short-run too, as it may have been crowding out other forms of 
expenditures in the short-run. We also notice that the retained adjustment coefficients 
(theα s) are all statistically significantly different from zero. Moreover, results 
suggest that the capital variable K is the “weakly exogenous” variable in the system: 
that is, it is not influenced by the disequilibrium in the 2 long-run relationships.  The 
changes to level of K appear to kick starts changes in the GDP, D and L 
 
Table 3.14: ECM Estimation for Saudi Arabia 
Error Correction: GDP K D L 
     
     CointEq1  0.507165  0.000000 -0.243620  0.000862 
  (0.11227)  (0.00000)  (0.10356)  (0.00037) 
 [ 4.51746] [ NA] [-2.35244] [ 2.32719] 
     
CointEq2  0.200354  0.000000 -0.455226  0.000000 
  (0.07468)  (0.00000)  (0.07203)  (0.00000) 
 [ 2.68293] [ NA] [-6.31975] [ NA] 
     
GDP(-1)  0.637893  0.446462  0.035995  0.001279 
  (0.19394)  (0.15294)  (0.14157)  (0.00064) 
 [ 3.28906] [ 2.91917] [ 0.25425] [ 2.00689] 
     
GDP(-2)  0.043432 -0.045000  0.011347  0.000918 
  (0.20656)  (0.16289)  (0.15078)  (0.00068) 
 [ 0.21026] [-0.27626] [ 0.07525] [ 1.35234] 
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GDP(-3) -0.069982  0.077413  0.101496  0.000180 
  (0.20791)  (0.16395)  (0.15177)  (0.00068) 
 [-0.33660] [ 0.47216] [ 0.66876] [ 0.26357] 
     
K(-1)  1.363763  0.386282 -0.114771 -0.000129 
  (0.38473)  (0.30339)  (0.28084)  (0.00126) 
 [ 3.54476] [ 1.27322] [-0.40867] [-0.10219] 
     
K(-2)  0.657021  0.172847 -0.371141  0.001853 
  (0.34359)  (0.27095)  (0.25081)  (0.00113) 
 [ 1.91222] [ 0.63793] [-1.47977] [ 1.64073] 
     
K(-3)  0.224528  0.422010 -0.324481  0.001450 
  (0.28849)  (0.22750)  (0.21059)  (0.00095) 
 [ 0.77829] [ 1.85499] [-1.54083] [ 1.52892] 
     
D(-1) -0.930238 -0.165240  0.181437 -0.001359 
  (0.33795)  (0.26650)  (0.24669)  (0.00111) 
 [-2.75257] [-0.62003] [ 0.73547] [-1.22321] 
     
D(-2) -0.638436 -0.101507  0.054495 -0.001006 
  (0.26316)  (0.20753)  (0.19210)  (0.00087) 
 [-2.42602] [-0.48913] [ 0.28368] [-1.16345] 
     
D(-3) -0.449291 -0.131975 -0.135872  1.11E-05 
  (0.18176)  (0.14333)  (0.13268)  (0.00060) 
 [-2.47194] [-0.92077] [-1.02409] [ 0.01859] 
     
L(-1) -10.27330 -16.03432 -121.2395  2.392859 
  (44.5165)  (35.1051)  (32.4956)  (0.14633) 
 [-0.23078] [-0.45675] [-3.73096] [ 16.3527] 
     
L(-2)  55.08102  51.96604  227.6609 -1.982420 
  (84.6728)  (66.7719)  (61.8084)  (0.27832) 
 [ 0.65052] [ 0.77826] [ 3.68333] [-7.12269] 
     
L(-3) -61.40367 -36.95753 -100.0054  0.549076 
  (45.2905)  (35.7155)  (33.0606)  (0.14887) 
 [-1.35577] [-1.03478] [-3.02491] [ 3.68823] 
     
C  0.686469  0.038020 -0.128183  0.001276 
  (0.19650)  (0.15496)  (0.14344)  (0.00065) 
 [ 3.49340] [ 0.24535] [-0.89362] [ 1.97568] 
     
 Note: ( ) =standard error: [ ] = t-stats 
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Figur 3.7: Cointegration Relationships, and Actual Values of the Variables 
Against the Values Predicted by Their Cointegration Vectors  
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3.6.5 UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (UAE) 
 
3.6.5.1 VAR ESTIMATION, IMPULSE RESPONSES, AND VARIANCE 
DECOMPOSTIONS  
 
To determine the lag structure, the appropriate lag length for VAR is tested, and the 
results suggest that the system is mathematically stable with 2 lags; the roots of the 
companion matrix are all less than one in absolute value. Moreover, the VAR 
produces residuals that have reasonable properties: there is neither auto-correlation 
nor heteroskedasticity although they are not normally distributed, (see Appendix A4). 
Thus, again we carry on and examine the dynamic of the VARs system using both the 
impulse responses and variance decompositions methods. 
 
3.6.5.2 IMPULSE RESPONSES 
 
The correlation matrix of residuals in the VAR implies that the order of the variables 
may need to be considered. A relatively high correlation between GDP and L at (0.65) 
gives indication that the use of Cholesky decomposition may not give unique impulse 
responses. However, we notice that the Cholesky responses of GDP from one-off 
shock to D are similar in time-profile and magnitude to those produced by 
Generalised responses: and are not too dissimilar for those with respect to K as in 
Figure 3.8, which may suggest that the order of the variables into VAR does matter 
but only slightly. Thus, again we provide here both Cholesky responses and 
Generalised responses of GDP from one shock to each of the other three variables in 
the system – capital K, Defence D, and Labour L –.  
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The plotted responses in Figure 3.8 shows that GDP increases gradually for three 
years after one-off innovations to defence D, but falls constantly for five years before 
it start recovering and dies out throughout that period. Thus, although this finding 
may indicates that defence expenditures carry positive externalities to the UAE 
economy, it however shows that D negatively affects the economy as the time moves. 
Such finding perhaps is possible where UAE has a relatively heavy defence burden, as 
some other GCC members, that may generate externalities to the economy in short-
run, but the returns on such heavy spending is probably very low in the long-run as 
the defence facilities may have little to offer to the economy.  
 
The plotted response of GDP from one-off shock to capital K shows that, K has little 
impact on GDP, after a tiny fall at the start GDP increases for 1 period and becomes 
normal and so for most of the period. A shock to labour L carries negative impact on 
GDP, GDP falls at the start after an innovation to L, but gradually increases for 7 
periods and then falls and dies out.  
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Figure 3.8: Impulse Responses of Real GDP for UAE 
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3.6.5.3 VARIANCE DECOMPOSITIONS  
 
The variance decompositions of GDP are calculated and reported in Table 3.15. The 
table shows that after an innovation, the contribution of the variation of D in the 
variation of GDP increases substantially and consistently influences that of GDP 
throughout the period, settling at over 35% after 5 pe riods. On the other hand, the 
contributions of the variations of the other variables, K and L, are very small 
throughout the periods, GDP are marginally affected by t he variation of L until 5 
periods have elapsed and settled at 1.7% after 6 periods, whilst the contribution of the 
variation of K has been marginal throughout the periods.   
 
Table 3.15: Variance Decompositions of GDP for UAE 
 Period S.E. GDP K D L 
 1  0.101304  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.131145  84.28022  0.830880  14.78355  0.105353 
 3  0.149593  69.01895  0.698417  30.20090  0.081728 
 4  0.158477  63.68382  0.622366  35.41519  0.278628 
 5  0.160744  62.90199  0.607181  35.75670  0.734131 
 6  0.161146  62.58990  0.659097  35.57993  1.171074 
 7  0.162339  62.49487  0.715627  35.36264  1.426865 
 8  0.164132  62.50198  0.733494  35.25646  1.508061 
 9  0.165506  62.38930  0.730145  35.37856  1.501988 
 10  0.166121  62.25777  0.725535  35.52360  1.493097 
 Note: S.E is the forecast error of the variable at the giving forecast horizontal.    
 
3.6.5.4 VECM AND COINTEGRATION RELATIONSHIP: 
 
The cointegration test of Johnsen maximum likelihood method is conducted here 
again to detect the presence of long-run cointegration relationships between the 
variables in the system. The results statistics of both tests “Trace statistic” and 
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“Maximum Eigenvalue test” for the two alternative Models of Johansen “Model 3” 
and “Model 4” are based on the maximum likelihood estimates of VAR of order 2, 
and they are reported in Appendix A4.    
 
There are three cointegration vectors (3CVs), according to both likelihood ratio tests, 
and they are significant at 5% level. Johnsen’s Likelihood Ratio test 2χ  for the 
presence of trend (Model 4) versus the restricted model of no trend (Model 3) in the 
CVs, suggests that a trend should be included in the cointegration vectors CVs, where 
LR test statistic : 2χ (3) = 26.255, which greater than the 5% level of 7.815.  
 
We identified the three cointegration relationships as they are reported in Table 3.16 
and graphed in Figure 3.9.113 The LR test for binding restrictions with probability of 
(0.733), which is greater than (0.05), implies that the restrictions do hold and hence 
the βs coefficients can be unique. Same as for other countries in our sample, the first 
cointegration vector is normalised on c apital K and may implies a long-run 
relationships between K and the other variables in the system. Converting it into 
equation indicates that in the long-run the level of GDP has positive impact on t he 
level of capital K.  
 
The second CV is normalised on GDP as to represent the relationship suggested by 
the underline argument of the production function. Converting it into equation it 
indicates that in long – run the levels of capital K, labour L carry positive effects on 
the level of GDP, whilst the level of defence D has a n egative impact on level of 
                                                 
113 The finding of unit root test suggests that the three CVs are all level stationary I (0) according to 
ADF unit root test with t-stat [ ] and prob ( ) as follow: CV1 [-3.111] (0.036) intercept and no trend, 
CV2 [-3.909] (0.024) intercept and trend, and CV3 [-3.608] (0.011) intercept and no trend. 
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GDP. Again future manipulation on the equation shows that the elasticity of GDP per 
capita (log (GDP/L)) with respect to D is (-0.464), which is much smaller that that of 
Saudi. However, as for Saudi, this result may suggests that defence expenditures have 
high opportunity cost as the military equipments and facilities may have little 
contributions to the development of other sectors in the economy considering the 
small size and little diversity in the UAE economy. It may also crowd out other form 
of outlays that could enhance growth, UAE, as the rest of GCC countries, has a 
relatively high budget allocation to defence. The third CV is normalised on D  and 
may indicate the demand for defence. Converting it into equation, it shows that in the 
long – run the level of GDP and that of Labour L have a positive impact on the 
demand for defence. 
 
 
The long-run relationships predicted by the cointegration vectors are calculated to 
check how informative these identified cointegration vectors. Again, we employ the 
series of GDP, K, and D given by f irst, second, and third vectors to forecast their 
long-run values across the extended data set against their actual values as they 
graphed in Figure 3.9. The graph of the three cointegration vectors show that the long-
run values of K, GDP and that of D appear to wander around their actual values most 
of the time and appear to have similar trend with those of the actual values. Thus, the 
long-run relationships predicted by the CVs may carry some information about the 
expected long – run relationships between the variables in the system.   
 
The results from the dynamic specification of ECM, as in Table 3.17, show that in the 
shot-run defence expenditure have no effect on the level of GDP, the lagged dynamic 
of defence expenditure on GDP equation is  insignificant (not different from zero). On 
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the other hand, the long-run retained adjustment coefficients (the α s) are all 
statistically significantly different from zero except the coefficient of CV3 in the 
defence equation.  
 
Table 3.16: Identified Cointegration Equations for UAE 
Cointegration Restrictions:    
      β(1,2)=1,  β (2,1)=1, β (2,4)=-1   
      β (2,2)=-1, β (1,4)=0, β (3,1)=-1    
      β (3,2)=0, β (1,1)=-1, β (3,3)=1   
      β (1,3)=0, α (1,2)=0, α (2,2)=0    
Convergence achieved after 450 iterations.  
Restrictions identify all cointegrating vectors  
LR test for binding restrictions (rank = 3):   
Chi-square(3)  1.280804    
Probability  0.733696    
     
Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1 CointEq2 CointEq3  
     
     GDP(-1) -1.000000  1.000000 -1.000000  
     
K(-1)  1.000000 -1.000000  0.000000  
     
D(-1)  0.000000  0.464882  1.000000  
   (0.02361)   
  [ 19.6866]   
     
L(-1)  0.000000 -1.000000 -6.323272  
    (0.51836)  
   [-12.1986]  
     
Trend -0.007282  0.045383  0.346170  
  (0.00441)  (0.00345)  (0.02882)  
 [-1.65088] [ 13.1682] [ 12.0103]  
     
C  6.084483 -8.283307  4.750096  
Note: the notations for the coefficients β and α are as follow: βi j is the coefficient of j
th variable in 
cointegration vector i. and αi j is the adjustment coefficient in the VEC equation i with respect to the 
error correction term from cointegration vector j.  ( ) =standard error: [ ] = t-stats 
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Table 3.17: ECM Estimation for UAE 
Error Correction: GDP K D L 
     
CointEq1  0.385351 -0.574963 -0.820652 -0.030231 
  (0.16671)  (0.07895)  (0.31670)  (0.00327) 
 [ 2.31145] [-7.28249] [-2.59125] [-9.24842] 
     
CointEq2  0.000000  0.000000 -0.879791 -0.030270 
  (0.00000)  (0.00000)  (0.32483)  (0.00270) 
 [ NA] [ NA] [-2.70850] [-11.1953] 
     
CointEq3  0.393841  0.388477 -0.275666  0.005426 
  (0.12050)  (0.05706)  (0.19028)  (0.00211) 
 [ 3.26845] [ 6.80766] [-1.44875] [ 2.56933] 
     
DGDP(-1))  0.431947 -0.037348  0.353533 -0.004584 
  (0.22418)  (0.10634)  (0.35320)  (0.00392) 
 [ 1.92675] [-0.35120] [ 1.00095] [-1.16807] 
     
DK(-1) -0.049938 -0.224198 -0.105079  0.003767 
  (0.15219)  (0.07219)  (0.23977)  (0.00266) 
 [-0.32813] [-3.10560] [-0.43825] [ 1.41414] 
     
DD(-1)  0.035876 -0.205475  0.435550 -0.002388 
  (0.14591)  (0.06921)  (0.22988)  (0.00255) 
 [ 0.24588] [-2.96872] [ 1.89471] [-0.93516] 
     
DL(-1) -3.987944  3.120128  1.969453  0.830417 
  (1.48006)  (0.70208)  (2.33180)  (0.02591) 
 [-2.69445] [ 4.44412] [ 0.84460] [ 32.0546] 
     
C  0.307832 -0.158910 -0.105601  0.008795 
  (0.09743)  (0.04621)  (0.15349)  (0.00171) 
 [ 3.15966] [-3.43851] [-0.68799] [ 5.15772] 
     
 Note: ( ) =standard error: [ ] = t-stats 
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Figure 3.9: Cointegration Relationships, and Actual Values of the Variables 
Against the Values Predicted by Their Cointegration Vectors  
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3.7 CONCLUSION 
 
The members of the GCC perhaps have the fame worldwide of being highly defence 
spending countries. They are in fact among the highly defence spending countries in 
the developing world. They are located in one of the most turbulent region in the 
World “Middle East” and, hence, the issue of security has proven to be crucial for the 
rulers of these rich countries; massive amount of money have been allocated to 
defence and security throughout the time. In this chapter we investigate the role that 
such heavy expenditures may have on t he development process for four GCC 
countries. We construct our empirical work in the context of time series analysis and 
VAR/ECM frameworks over the period of the last four decades. 
 
The emerging results come in contrast, to some extend, with the argument that was 
suggested by Frederiksen and Looney (1983) that defence expenditure may carry 
positive effect in the economic development for resource-rich countries, whilst 
negative impact of defence spending is expected for resource-poor developing 
countries.114 Defence expenditure appears to carry a long-run positive and significant 
effect on the economic development for the relatively resource-poor members of the 
GCC “Bahrain” and “Oman”. It is rather Benoit’s argument of positive effects of 
defence expenditure on the economic growth in developing countries what seems to 
fit the case of the members of GCC with relatively small level of defence spending 
“Bahrain” and Oman. 
 
                                                 
114 As mentioned, the argument is that resource-rich countries can afford to increase military 
expenditure without cutting the share of other sectors in the economy (e.g. education and health), 
whilst resource-poor countries may not.  
 160 
On the other hand, the heavy defence spending in the resource-rich members of GCC 
“Saudi Arabia” and “UAE” appears to significantly retard the economic development 
in both countries. It seems that the heavy defence expenditure in richer countries in 
the GCC may have come at the expense of other sectors in the economy (e.g. 
infrastructure, health and education), and, hence, have a higher opportunity cost. This 
might be true since large amounts of defence expenditure are spent on i mported 
armaments which may have little to offer to other sectors in the economy. 
Furthermore, despite this heavy expenditure in defence, the level of technological 
transfer is negligible; neither Saudi Arabia nor any member of GCC have a heavy 
military industry complex compare to other heavy defence spending developing 
countries such as India, Iran, and Turkey. 
 
The security of the region perhaps is beyond the security of these countries alone, oil 
is a st rategic good and any disturbance in its supply can hit the security of most 
countries in the world, especial those with high level of oil consumption such as U.S, 
which may explain the permanent presence of American force in the region. GCC 
countries may need to rationalize their defence expenditures to suit the size and the 
ability of their economies. Come together to establish some ambitious heavy defence 
industries that can be capable of transferring some technology and skills, perhaps can 
bring more strength to both the economy and the security of the region. Such heavy 
projects perhaps can be joint projects with some neighbouring allies such as Egypt 
and Pakistan.  
Furthermore, the chaotic situation that MENA region has been through from early this 
century; with American invasion of Iraq in 2003, and lately the uprising revolutions in 
the surrounding countries since December 2010, a s well as the political tension 
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between Iran and most GCC countries, suggests that moving under one security 
umbrella might be the best viable way for GCC countries to ensure the security of 
their future.  
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CHAPTER 4  
PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN SAUDI 
ARABIA 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter investigates the role of public infrastructures in the economic 
development for one member of GCC region, Saudi Arabia.115 With its immense land 
area, as big as west Europe – around 2.2 million square kilometres - , accompanied 
with small scattered population – around 6 m illions in 1960s - , Saudi Arabia 
represents a country that is widely fragmented geographically and economically. Such 
characters have created the necessity for a heavy investment in infrastructures, 
especially transportations and communications (Looney, 1990). Although the country 
has barely had any form of public infrastructure prior to 1960s, the massive external 
windfall of oil exports since early 1970s has allowed Saudi to evolve from traditional 
agricultural pastoral economy to a relatively advanced-service one within few decades 
(Costa and Noble, 1986). A series of ongoing five-years economic plans have been 
initiated since 1970 to elevate the economy from a small fragmented agricultural one 
to more modern one that is capable of producing consumer and industrial goods and 
services.116   
 
                                                 
115 Due to the lack of data form some economic variables for other GCC coutries the work is carried 
out for Saudi Arabia only. 
116 According to Saudi Arabia Embassy in the USA in a report on Infrastructure and economic in  the 
kingdom (2010), Industrial products amount for over 90 percent of the Saudi’s non-oil exports; Saudi’s 
products such as petrochemicals, construction materials, metal goods, plastics and electrical appliance 
are exported to some 90 countries. 
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Hundreds of billions of Saudi currency “riyal” have been devoted to public 
infrastructures since the start of the first economic plan; by the completion of the third 
economic plan in1985, for example, over 300bn Saudi riyals had been spent on 
infrastructure development in the country (Looney, 1990).117 Investment were made 
in many forms of infrastructures such as sea ports, Air ports, paved roads, electricity 
distribution networks that connect cities, towns, and villages around the country, 
telecommunications services, and piped water supply.118 Connor (2010) argues that 
infrastructure development in Saudi Arabia is the key factor of transforming Saudi’s 
economy from low-developing one to a fast growing developing economy. Loony and 
Frederiksen (1985) have also suggested that Saudi Arabia represents an ideal case 
study to assess the effect of infrastructure development on the development process in 
the country as Saudi Arabia appears to undertake a strategy of infrastructure led 
development through massive public investments.  F or example, infrastructure 
development received over 150bn r iyals in the last two five-year economic plans 
2000-2004, and 2005-2009 (SAMA annual report, 2010). 
 
The World Devolvement Report of the World Bank (1994) views infrastructure as an 
umbrella term for various activities that is usually referred to by many development 
economists as “social overhead capital” and includes different forms of services such 
as public utilities (e.g. telecommunications, electricity networks, water and gas 
supply, sanitation and sewerage system) and public works (e.g. paved roads, major 
dams and canals for irrigation, sea ports, airports, railways).119 Infrastructure has 
                                                 
117 Saudi Arabia has an average exchange rate with US dollar of 3.5 Saudi riyals per dollar during the 
1970s and early 1980s, and a fixed exchange rate of 3.75 was adopted since 1987.  
118 Further details on the infrastructure development in the country are presented in the next section. 
119 The report further suggests that due to the production characteristics of natural monopolies for most 
infrastructure services as well as the wide public interest involved, infrastructures are owned and 
operated by government in nearly all developing countries. 
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widely been thought of as an essential base for productive economic activities. 
Hirschman (1958, as cited in different sources such as Sutcliffe 1964; Looney and 
Frederiksen, 1981; among others), through his unbalance growth view, perhaps is one 
of the first economists emphasizes the role of public infrastructure on economic 
development. A big push to infrastructure through investments in public 
infrastructures will carry positive externalities to the other sectors in the economy and 
allow business activities to flourish. Services generated by infrastructure can 
contribute to economic growth through both supply and demand channels by lowering 
the cost of production, contributing to the diversification of the economy, and 
increasing the productivity of other production factors – labour and capital – by (e.g. 
improving health, reducing time and effort, and reducing wasteful consumptions of 
water, fuels and land) (Kessides, 1993).  
 
Infrastructure’s role comes, for example, in reducing the cost of establishing 
businesses (electricity, telecommunications, and water, for example, are used in 
nearly all sectors)120, increasing economic activities in a country by connecting cities,  
villages, and regions within the country and with rest of the world (e.g. poverty 
alleviation in rural areas, cost reduction in transports, increase in the exchanges of 
goods and services, and allowing for economic of scale)121, and contributing to 
environmental sustainability (e.g. clean water and sanitation, safe disposal of wastes, 
and better monitor of traffic in urban areas), as well as the contribution of 
                                                 
120 With minimum package of power, telecommunications, and transports; Chain alleviates its rural 
enterprises to the level that they employ around 18 percent of the labour force – over 100 millions – 
and contributes with over one third of the country’s total output (The World Development Report, 
1994).     
121The new economic geography studies suggest that the transport infrastructure is a central 
determinant of the location and the scale of economic activity as well as the pattern of trade where 
transport infrastructure can carry a great impact on the size of the market and hence allow producers to 
cluster in one central region (Haan et al, 2008).   
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infrastructure in providing amenities that enhance the quality of life and hence 
economic  performance (Kessides, 1993; The World Devolvement Report, 1994; and 
O’Fallon 2003, among others). 
 
Gramlich (1994) argues that economists sometimes cannot help it f rom deceiving  
themselves, although public capital is considered by most economists as an important 
factor in the production of total output, it was hardly even mentioned as a p otential 
source of the productivity slowdown in the US economy during the 1970s and 1980s, 
where public infrastructure investment has sharply declined since 1973, until the work 
of Aschauer (1989) revealed the expected role of public infrastructure investment in 
the productivity slowdown. Aschauer examines the impact of public capital in the 
productivity of private economy of U.S.A, and finds strong positive impact of public 
capital, especially infrastructure, on the productivity movement of the private sector. 
He suggests that the fall in public investment during the 1970s and 1980s perhaps is 
the potential cause of the productivity slowdown in the economy. The finding of 
Aschaure and that of the following works in the field have drawn a considerable 
attention among economists and policy makers worldwide to the role of public 
infrastructure in economic growth.  
 
Sturm et al (1998), Romp and Haan (2007), and Torrisi (2010) survey vest amount of 
works in the field and identified different theoretical approaches that have been 
widely considered to measure the impact of public infrastructure investment on t he 
economic growth such as the one considered by Aschaure “the production function 
approach”, cost-function approach, Vector Autoegressions VAR model, endogenous 
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growth model, and simultaneity equations models SEM.122 With few exceptions, most 
of the surveyed works suggest a positive and significant impact of public capital on 
the economic growth at the local and the international levels. However, the magnitude 
of the effect differs across the studies and for most of those considered Aschuare’s 
approach the elasticity appears to be smaller than that found by Aschuare, (Romp and 
Haan, 2007). 123   
 
After four decades of economic planning with a relatively heavy infrastructure 
investment, Saudi Arabia may represent, as Loony and Frederiksen (1985) suggest, an 
interesting case study to examine the impact of public infrastructure on economic 
development. In this chapter we will try to examine such impact in Saudi Arabia 
using the widely common approach of Aschuare “the production function approach” 
in the context of VAR model and cointegration analysis, similar to that of the 
previous chapter. The chapter is organized as follow: the following section discusses 
the infrastructure development in Saudi Arabia, section 3 reviews the literature, 
section 4 presents the empirical methodology and data sources, section 5 reports the 
empirical findings and section 6 concludes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
122 Gramlich (1994) and the World Development Report (1994) may provide earlier surveys of the 
literature. 
123 Fernald (1999), Haan et al (2008), among others, suggest that one feature of the public investment in 
some area, highway for example, is the fact of a very low marginal rate of return on additional 
investment is expected once the basic part of the networks are established. 
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4.2 INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT IN SAUDI ARABIA 
 
Some features and conditions that characterise Saudi Arabia’s economy are combined 
together to create the need for a catalyst role for the government in the process of 
economic development (Edens and Snavely, 1970; El Mallakh, 1982; Looney, 1990). 
Saudi Arabia has vast dry land area covers over 2.2 million square kilometres of what 
is called Arabian Peninsula, stretches from the west coast of Persian Gulf to the east 
coast of the red sea – over 1300 km –, and from south borders with Yemen and Oman 
to north borders with Iraq and Jordan – over 1700 km –.124  A country with immense 
uninhabitable desert land with no perennial rivers or lakes and sporadic and infrequent 
rainfall; only 0.2 percent of total land was used for cultivation by early 1970s and at 
least 25 pe rcent of total population were still nomadic. The urban population was 
small and scattered in numbers of towns in different regions around the country and 
hardly connected with each other, which may reflect the small market size of the 
country.125 Furthermore, economic activities in those towns were mostly engaged in 
bazaar or “suq-type” commercial activity (Edens and Snavely, 1970).   
 
Although oil revenue, since its exportation in late 1930s, has always been the major 
source for the government to practice the dominant role in all economic activities, it 
was not until the late 1960s and early 1970s, where oil revenue increases 
dramatically, the government had the financial capability to take its role to influence 
                                                 
124 Saudi Arabia is the largest country in Arab World and is among the largest 25 countries in the world 
(Aldagheiri, 2010).  
125 The population of the two major cities in the country Riyadh and Jeddah was less than 20,000 
inhabitants each prior to Wold War II, and up to the mid of 1950s Saudi Arabia had no paved roads 
(Costa and Noble, 1986). 
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the rate and the quality of economic development.126 In 1970 t he government 
introduced a series of ongoing five-year economic plans with a g enerous welfare 
system and heavy public investment programmes in different sectors as the principal 
aim is to alleviate the socio-economic level of the country and to lead the process of 
economic development.  F igure 4-1 shows that public capital investment increases 
dramatically with impressive figures since early 1970s, though it declines sharply 
since late 1980s and through the 1990s due to the drop in oil prices during these 
periods as well as the cost of second gulf war, it picks up again with the start of the 
seventh economic plan early this century as the oil prices tends to rise since, and the 
demand for infrastructure services tends to increase as the county’s population keeps 
growing. On the other hand, current government expenditure appears to grow with 
time – which may indicate the dominant role of government as the main employer for 
Saudi nationals (Fasano and Wang, 2001) –.127    
 
With such heavy capital expenditures Saudi Arabia has been able to acquire a ready 
made economic infrastructure that took Western Europe and United States over 100 
years to build (Al-Hegelan and Palmer, 1985). In the first two economic plans, for 
instance, approximately $250bn w as spent in various elements; with an impressive 
figure of investment per capita of almost $35,000 (Costa and Noble, 1986). Public 
investments were made in many sectors, but the development of public infrastructure, 
especially transports and communications, has received a great attention.  
 
 
                                                 
126 Saudi’s oil revenues rise from $56mn in 1950 to over $300mn in 1960 and over $1bn by 1970, the 
revenue generated  from oil price shocks during the 1970s alone went well beyond an impressive figure 
of $200bn( SAMA annual report, different issues).  
127 Looney (1997) argues that the wages bill accounts for almost 50 percent of the state budget in Saudi 
Arabia.  
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Figure4-1: Current and Capital Government Expenditures (Million Saudi Riyal) 
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 Source: SAMA Annual Report (2010). 
 
In such vast country like Saudi Arabia transportation infrastructure in particular is 
important to enhance the regional productivity and increase the exchange of goods 
and services within the county and with rest of the world. Thus, transports 
infrastructure has received unprecedented form of development especially in the first 
three economic plans. For example, 22 airports were either constructed or improved 
including three international airports in Riyadh (central region), Jeddah (western 
region), and Dammam (eastern region), Four major sea ports were built including the 
huge one in Dammam, and over 29,000km of paved roads that linked all regions, 
cities, and middle-sized urban towns were built  and connected with over 54,000 km 
of earthen-surface agricultural road that served over 7000 villages, (Costa and Noble, 
1986; SAMA annual report, 2010).128 Railways network in Saudi Arabia, on the other 
hand, has been neglected with only upgrading the existing railway between Riyadh 
                                                 
128 This huge infrastructure development went along with heavy investments in other sectors such as 
education, health, and defence as well as the constructions of two major industrial cities that 
accommodate industries with comparative advantage such as oil refinery and petrochemicals industries; 
one is in Jubail on the eastern coast and another one is in Yanbu on western coast.  
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and the east region and the construction of a dry port at Riyadh in 1981, railway 
infrastructure is the least developed transport system in the kingdom. Such shortage 
has been noticed and compensated with relatively heavy investment projects of about 
3200 km of railways that connect different regions; some of which is under 
construction and others will be constructed in the coming years, (Aldagheiri 2010, and 
SAMA annual report 2010). Now there are nine major sea ports and 12 other small 
and medium modern one in the country, 3 international airports and 21 other local and 
regional airports, and over 54,000km of paved road connected with about 132,000 km 
of agricultural roads.  
 
Telecommunications infrastructure also have been favoured during the first economic 
plans, with Intelsat network opened in the first economic plan the country was opened 
to the international communications with the extension of telephone networks to all 
cites and towns around the country, as well as to some villages; by 1985, for example, 
there was over 900,000 telephone lines. However, the telecommunications services 
went under huge pressure since late 1980s and through the 1990s; for example, about 
250,000 applicants were in waiting for new lines in 1992 and the number kept rising 
Benna (1995).129 As of now, Saudi Arabia has very well established 
telecommunication services; there are over 4 million telephone lines and seven 
standard earth stations link up with the Intelsat Satellite system. Mobile 
communication services also have witnessed a great development in the last decade in 
terms of penetration, quality, and prices especially after the market was opened for 
competition; the number of mobile phones increases from around 5 million mobiles in 
                                                 
129 Benna further suggests that most of infrastructure and industrial development in the country are 
concentrated in central east-west axis of the country from east port of Dammam through Riyadh in the 
central region to the west port of Jeddah on the red sea; for example, around 75 percent of the working 
telephone line in 1994 had been in the east, Riyadh (central region), and Jeddah (western regions).  
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2002 to over 44 million lines in 2009, internet services have been growing too with 
rapid rate; internet subscribers went up from around 1 million in 2001 to 10 million 
subscribers in 2009 (SAMA annual report, 2010).  
 
Fresh water shortage is well noticeable phenomenon in Saudi Arabia where most of 
the country is desert land including Al-Rub al Khali  which accounts alone for one 
third of the country’s land area. The government has acted in many ways to secure the 
shortage of fresh water since the start of first economic plan. During the 1970s the 
government put on a major effort to allocate and map aquifers around the country, and 
many dams were built around the country with thousands of miles of irrigation canals 
that distribute the surface floods water to the fertile land (Beaumont, 1977).130 To 
remedy the shortage of water and to meet with the increasing demand for water by 
urban and industrial uses, Saudi Arabia engages in the largest desalination programme 
in the world history (McHale, 1980). Number of desalination plants was constructed 
on the east and on the west coasts of the country with water pipe supply extended to 
many cities and towns around the country. Saudi Arabia is the biggest producer of 
desalinated water in the world; there are now 29 desalination plants in the country 
producing about 3 millions cubic meters a day (SAMA annual report, 2010). On the 
other hand, the development of the sewage system in the country has been rather 
slow. Although the construction of sewage networks in the major cities was 
completed in the second and the third economic plans (Beaumont, 1977; and Costa 
and Noble, 1986), the expansion of the existing networks and the construction of 
sewage network system in other small urban cities as w ell as t he management of 
sewage effluents waste have been slow.     
                                                 
130 By 2009 Saudi Arabia has 302 dams with a total storage capacity of 907.8 million cubic meters, 
(SAMA annual report, 2010). 
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Saudi Arabia has also invested heavily on electricity generation and distributions 
networks; electricity power reaches almost all parts of the country by the mid 1980s 
with generating capacity of over 13,900 Mega Watt (MW) in 1985 a nd over 1.7 
million subscribers. However, there has been a dramatic increase in the demand for 
electricity services from the industrial sector and from the growing urban population 
since late 1980s accompanied with slow growth rate of electricity capacity since 
1990. The electricity service went under a big pressure to meet the increasing 
demand, The Ministry of Water and Electricity’s calls for $117bn investment to 
increase the generation capacity from 17,000 MW in 1995 to about 67,000 MW by 
2020 (Moussa, 2010). 131  Massive investments have been carried out and some still 
going on t o increase electricity generation capacity and to expand the distributions 
networks. Saudi Arabia now generates over 38,000 MW a year with 8,750 miles of 
transmission lines, 52,000 miles of distribution lines and over 53,000 miles of service 
connections (SAMA annual report, 2010).132 Furthermore, an ambitious project has 
already begun with the other GCC countries to link all the national power grids of the 
GCC region. 
 
Figure 4-1 reports the volume of infrastructures investment in Saudi Arabia in the last 
8 economic plans (1970 – 2009). Infrastructure investment increases dramatically in 
the first three economic plans (1970-1984) which may reflect the low level of 
infrastructure in the country prior to the 1970s. As the infrastructure investment 
peaked in the mid 1980s, it starts receding during the late 1980s and through the 
1990s as the oil prices fell down and most of infrastructures were established. 
However, as the previous discussion suggests, Figure 4.2 shows that the infrastructure 
                                                 
131 Saud Arabia has one of the highest per capita electricity consumption in the world around 5000 
kwh/month, (Moussa, 2010). 
132 See also the report by Saudi embassy in U.S.A (2010). 
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investment has been increasing since the start of this century as t he government 
engages in different infrastructure projects to meet with the increase demand for 
infrastructure services. For example, the current economic plan (2010-2014) 
approximates $385 bn covering various sectors such as transports, energy and utility, 
health and education, industrial and tourism development (Connor, 2010). 
 
Figure 4-2:  Infrastructure Investment in Saudi Arabia (Billion Saudi Riyal) 
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Source: Al-Shammari (2009) and SAMA annual report different issues. 
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4.3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The role of public capital in economic development has always been recognised as an 
important factor for the development process. The large amount of public capital 
expenditure that most European and developing countries had witnessed in the 1960s 
and 1970s was as results of widespread conventional wisdom that was based upon 
both, the argument formulated by Hirschmann that social overhead capital, as he 
describes infrastructure,133 is the base for productive economic activities, and on the 
extensive government intervention that was generally needed after World War II 
(Diamond, 1990). A great attention, however, has been paid to the role of public 
capital in the economic performance after the finding of (Aschauer, 1989). Aschauer 
investigates the impact of public capital accumulation on the productivity movements 
of the United States’ private economy. He argues and presents some empirical 
evidence that suggests the shortfall in infrastructure investments during the 1970s and 
1980s in the Unite States could be crucial in explaining the slowdown in productivity 
growth in the country.  
 
Aschauer presents public capital as a f ree input, public good, pr ovided by t he 
government to all private firms. Using production function approach in the form of  
Cobb-Douglas that includes public capitals as explanatory variable, along with private 
capital and labour over the period 1949- 1985, the results reflect a s trong positive 
impact of public capital on productivity of the private sector. The estimated elasticity 
of total public capital was 0.39 and significant, whilst the elasticity of core 
                                                 
133 The first time the term “infrastructure” come to the current use was in the 1950s when the U.S. 
military applied it to their underlying structures (Cain, 1997).  
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infrastructure alone was 0.24 and highly significant compare to other forms of public 
capital.134  
 
Aschauer’s finding, as he suggests, offers tentative answers for two important 
questions in the macroeconomic literature. First, policy makers can be in a b etter 
position to judge the degree to which public expenditure policies stimulate 
production, raise interest rates, and induce excess demand pressures, if the degree to 
which public expenditures can be productive is estimated.135 Second, economists and 
policy makers may need to consider the long-run effect of public expenditure on the 
productivity movements.  
 
There have been substantial waves of empirical works in the role of public capital 
“infrastructure” on economic performance at the local and at the international levels 
since Aschauer’s findings. Gramlich (1994), Sturm et al (1998), among others, 
suggest that Aschauer’s findings and that of the following works may have in fact 
provide some explanations for the slowdown in the productivity during the 1970s-
1980s in the US and most of OCED countries as the infrastructure expenditure has 
declined during the same periods,136 and thereby represents a potential factor of the 
slowdown in productivity growth. Furthermore, Sturm et al (1998) suggest that the 
findings of Aschaure and that of the following works in the role of public investment 
in the growth of output have been well-received policy implications by policy makers; 
                                                 
134 Aschauer argues that although there are several proposed explanations for the cause of the 
productivity growth slowdown of private economy in US, such as decline in the R & D outlay, the oil 
price shocks in the 1970s, the composition of the work force, the findings of his work, however, 
emphases the importance of considering the role of public investment in explaining productivity 
slowdown.  
135 For example, a higher marginal productivity of public expenditure may imply that a short-term 
surge of public spending may bring multiple expansions of output.   
136 Sturm et al (1998), Romp and Haan  (2007), among others, argue that many European countries cut 
back public investment during the 1970s and 1980s, in order to raise the social security transfers as 
well as to finance the increase in the payments of the debt interest.    
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infrastructure investment formed a major factor of President Bill Clinton’s economic 
plans.137 
 
In line with Hartley’s (2006) argument of the absence of a formal economic model of 
the impact of defence expenditure on e conomic development, Holtz- Eakin and 
Lovely (1996) have suggested the same thing for productivity effects of 
infrastructure.138 Gramlich (1994), Sturm et al (1998), Romp and Haan (2007), and 
Torrisi (2010) survey vast amount of works in the field and distinguish four 
approaches that have been widely considered to measure the impact of public capital 
on economic performance. The first one and the most popular one is the one 
considered by Aschauer and is commonly labelled as the production function 
approach, where the public capital variable enters the production function as a 
common structural input to all firms’ production process.  The second approach, albeit 
similar, is so-called the cost-function approach in which the cost function of private 
firms is augmented with public capital stocks, as well-established public 
infrastructures may lower the cost of operations and increase profitability of private 
firms.139  
 
The third approach introduces A Vector Autoegressions VAR model as an alternative 
approach to mitigate some econometric problems of the first approach such as 
causality and simultaneity bias – as we have considered it in the previous chapter - . 
                                                 
137 Canning (1998), however, suggests that due to the large involvement of government in 
infrastructure provisions, the patterns of infrastructure stocks perhaps can be better understood through 
the political economy arguments rather than through the economic efficiency.    
138 A very little attention has been paid to the theoretical issue of the casual relationship between public 
capital and economic growth (Haan et al  2008).  
139 Sturm et al (1998) called this approach “the behaviour approach” since the profit function of the 
private firms can be estimated too with public capital in consideration, as firms may consider public 
capital as they optimize.  
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The fourth approach is dominated by cross-section studies and employs growth model 
based on t he endogenous growth view. Finally, there have been some attempts of 
employing more structural models, simultaneity equations models, to measure the role 
of public capital in economic growth, as we reviewed some here. The review of the 
empirical literature here will try to group the reviewed studies according to the above 
classifications, as a summary table for each classification is provided.  
 
Following Aschauer’s approach, Munnell (1990) investigates the impact of public 
capital on private output at the state and the regional level in the United States over 
the period 1970 – 1986. Using the production function approach, the results suggest 
that public capital has positive and statistically significant impact on private sector 
output for all regions (Northeast, North Central, South, and West) as well as for the 
whole sample. Moreover, even when public capital was disaggregated into Highway 
and streets, water and sewer system, and other structures and equipments, the 
estimated coefficients of each component was significant and in line with 
expectations.  H e concludes that infrastructure has a lot to offer to the private 
economy and as t he results seem to indicate, the states that invested more in 
infrastructure tend to have greater output. 
 
Canning and Bennathan (2000) also measure the effect of public capital on economic 
growth for 62 countries over the period of 1960 – 1990, using the production function 
approach and two proxies of infrastructure stock – electricity generating capacity and 
paved road - . The results suggest a positive and significant impact of both 
infrastructure proxies on economic output. However, when the sample was split into 
two sub-samples (low-income and high-income) as to control for the possibility that 
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the elasticity may vary across countries, the coefficient of infrastructure proxies in 
low-income countries are very small and insignificant, but they remain large and 
statistically significant for high-income countries. The study suggests that this could 
imply that infrastructure in poorer countries may not have greater effectiveness than 
other types of public capital, whilst in rich countries it may have a greater impact 
compare to other forms of public capital.140 
 
The production function approach, nonetheless, has been criticised on different 
grounds as of the econometric problems that associated with the estimation of a single 
equation such simultaneity bias and the direction of causation, as well as the 
misspecification of the relationship between the two variables.   To overcome some of 
the drawbacks of the production function approach, some studies use the cost function 
of private firms and suggest that the impact of public capital could be analysed in 
terms of cost saving.141  
 
Berndt and Hansson (1992) investigate the impact of public infrastructure on the cost 
of private sector in Sweden over the period 1960-1988, using cost function approach 
in the form of generalized Leontief cost function. The results suggest that increase in 
                                                 
140  Double counting problem is encounter here with the interpretation of the coefficients of 
infrastructure stock proxies since they are already included in total capital stock variable. Canning and 
Bennathan suggest that the coefficients of infrastructure proxies can be thought of as the effect of 
increasing the stock of the particular infrastructure proxy, whilst holding capital stock constant, that is; 
it is the effect of diverting the resource from other forms of capital to allocate it to the concern 
infrastructure proxy. 
141 A cost function of private sector can be specified by assuming that firms aim to produce a given 
level of output at minimum private cost. Since Input prices ( pi ) are exogenously determined to the 
private firms the firms can choose the quantity of the input factors ( qi ). This can be modelled as: 
                          it
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When firms optimize they will consider the environment where they operate, environmental variables 
such as the level of technological knowledge (A) as well as the level of public infrastructure capital 
(G). Thus the infrastructure capital enters the cost function as free input. The dual function that satisfies 
the optimization problem above is usually approximated by second – order Taylor approximation such 
as the translog or generalized Leontief function (Berndt and Hansson, 1992; Sturm et al, 1998; and 
Torrisi,  2010).    
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pubic infrastructure significantly reduce the costs of private sector. They also suggest 
that further work is needed to assess the social and private benefits of not only the 
public infrastructure but also those of other public expenditure such as those of health, 
education, and social services. Bosc´a et al (2000) use the cost function approach in 
the generalized Leontief cost function form to analyze the impact of public 
infrastructure on cost of private sector of 17 Spanish regions over the period 1980 – 
1993. The results of the study indicate that the stock of public infrastructure has a 
significant contribution in reducing the cost and stimulating the productivity of 
private sector in almost every region in the country. They also indicate that the 
government may need to continue its investment efforts as there seems to be shortage 
of public investment, and the results suggest that public capital is growth promoting in 
the long – run.   
 
Cohen and Paul (2004) also measure the effects of public infrastructure on the cost of 
the private sector using cost function approach in the form of generalized Leontief 
cost function on manufacturing data for 48 US states over the period 1982 – 1996. 
Using a constructed proxy for public highways as the proxy for public infrastructure, 
the results reflect significant impact of public highways in reducing the cost of 
manufacturing sector. The results also indicate that the infrastructure in neighbouring 
state raises the value of own-state infrastructure investment and directly affect the 
manufacturing firm’s cost. The interstate effect of public infrastructure, however, 
varies across the regions especially between the east and the west; the largest was in 
the west while the smallest effect was in the east and south, whereas the Pacific states 
benefit the least.  
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Table 4.1 literature survey (some studies used Production Function and Cost Function Approaches to Measure  the Impart of  Infrastructure on 
Economic Development) 
Author Sample Remarks Public capital variable Main Conclusion 
Production Function Approach 
Aschauer (1989) 
U.S.A  
1949-1985 Time – series estimates 
Public capital stock and core 
infrastructure  
Public capital and core infrastructure have significant positive 
effects on the productivity of the private economic.  
Munnell (1990) 
4 U.S regions 
1970-1986 
Time series and Pooled panel  
estimates Public capital stock  
Positive and significant impact of public capital on 
private sector output for all regions as well as for the whole 
sample. 
Canning and 
Bennathan (2000) 
62 countries 
1960-1990  Cross – section estimates 
Electricity generating capacity and 
paved road 
Positive impact of both public variables on economic growth for 
the whole sample, but insignificant impact for low income 
countries while positive and significant for high income 
countries. 
Cost Function Approach 
Berndt and 
Hansson (1992) 
Sweden , 
1960-1988 Time – series estimates Infrastructure capital 
Public infrastructure significantly reduces the cost of private 
economy.   
Bosc´a et al 
(2000) 
17 Spanish regions 
1980-1993 Pooled penal  estimates Stock of public Infrastructure  
the stock of public infrastructure has a significant contribution in 
reducing the cost and stimulating the productivity of private 
sector in almost every region in the country 
Cohen and Paul 
(2004) 
48 US states, 
1982-1996 Pooled panel estimates Public highways stock 
Public highway reduces the cost of manufacturing sector across 
the states. 
 
 
 
 181 
Sturm et al (1998) and Romp and Haan (2007) suggest, however, that the flexible 
form of the cost function usually produce estimates that suffer from multicollinearity 
problem since the function consists of many cross-products of the inputs. Moreover, 
they notice that the properties of the time series are not considered in most studies that 
used production function approach, and hardly mentioned in those employ cost 
function approach. They, however, conclude that most of the surveyed studies suggest 
that pubic capital raises the productivity and reduce the cost of private economy.  
 
Various studies in the field have employed Vector Autoegressions VAR models to 
mitigate some of the econometrics problems that are associated with first two 
approaches. VAR model as we saw in previous chapter does not have prior 
assumptions about the causality between the variables under investigation; in VAR 
models all variables are endogenous and jointly determined. Thus, the direction of 
causation between public capital and economic growth can be investigated.  B atina 
(1998), for example, uses VAR approach to estimate the production function of 
private sector in the US where public capital variable is included as to assess t he 
impact of public capital on pr ivate output over the period of 1948-1993. The study 
employs several alternative proxies for private capital and labour to assess the 
sensitivity of the results to the alternative proxies.  T he results indicate that public 
capital appears to have a st rong positive long lasting impact on the private sector 
output, and vice versa. The study finds strong evidence for multiple cointegration 
vectors, ranging from two to four vectors in many cases depending in which 
combination proxies are used. The main results, however, are fairly robust to the 
combination of proxies employed. Impulse response analysis also reveals that an 
innovation to public capital can have positive long lasting effect on pr ivate output, 
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labour, and capital. And an innovation to output, labour, and private capital can also 
affect the public capital. However, when public capital was disaggregated into 
different types – highways and streets, and water and sewer system – the impact of 
public capital was much smaller than that of the data in aggregate form.  
 
Kamps (2004b) also investigate the impact of public capital in economic growth for 
22 OECD countries over the period 1960-2001 using VAR approach and similar 
variables to those considered in production function approach.142 The results of 
cointegration and VECM suggest that there is at least one cointegration relationship in 
each country and a significant long – run relationship between pubic capital and 
output. Moreover, the impulse responses analysis shows that, for the majority of 
countries, an innovation to public capital have a significant positive effect on output, 
and vice versa. It further suggests that the public capital and private capital for most 
countries are long – run complements, whilst the response of employment to a shock 
in public capital is statically insignificant. On the other hand, Ghali (1998) 
investigates the impact of public capital on e conomic growth in Tunisia over the 
period from 1963 to 1993 using VAR approach. The results suggest that the public 
capital carries a l ong-run negative effect on t he output and on pr ivate capital. 
Furthermore, the causality appears to run from income to public capital and not vice 
versa. Ghali relates that to the inadequacy of infrastructure stocks allocation and 
highly subsidized inefficient state owned enterprises that often prevent the possibility 
for private investment.      
                                                 
142  Kamps (2004b) and Romp and Haan (2007) provide extensive surveys on the studies that have used 
VAR approach to analyse the impact of public capital in economic performance, they note, however, 
that most of the studies are usually consisted of four variables – output, employment, private capital, 
and public capital -.  
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Other group of studies, on the other hand, have employed cross – section and panel 
data to measure the impact of public capital on economic performance. Most of these 
studies employ growth model that primarily based upon the endogenous growth 
theory, In which the growth process is not exogenously determined, as it is the case in 
the view of exogenous growth theory, but is rather an endogenous process that 
influenced by economic agents’ behaviour. So in endogenous growth model capital 
formation plays the key role in explaining the different performances, where other 
types of capital namely human capital and knowledge capital are considered along 
with fiscal capital.143   For example, Easterly and Rebelo (1993) investigate the 
impact of some public policy variables such as taxation, and public investment on the 
economic growth rate using cross-section data for 100 countries over the period 1970 
– 1988. Using the share of investment in transport and telecommunication as proxy 
for infrastructure, the results suggest that economic growth is positively and robustly 
correlated with infrastructure variable. They study argues that the relatively large and 
significant coefficient of transport and telecommunication variable indicates that 
infrastructure investment may in fact raises economic growth not only by r aising 
private investment but also by increasing the social return to private investment. 
 
Devarajan et al (1996), on the other hand, investigate the effects of pubic expenditures 
on economic growth for 43 de veloping countries over the period 1970 – 1990. In 
contrast to the expectations, the standard candidates for productive expenditures such 
as telecommunication and transport, health, and education appear to have insignificant 
                                                 
143 The general forms of the estimated  models in various studies that investigate the impact of public 
capital on economic growth can be expressed as follow: 
                                      Δ(Y/L)t = α + β (Y/L)0 + γ (I
G /Y)t + Z 
Where, Δ(Y/L)t  is the  average growth rate of GDP per capita, (Y/L)0 is the initial level of GDP per 
capital, (IG /Y)t is the average rate of public investment, and Z is a set of conditional variables such as 
private investment, human capital proxy…etc, see Sturm et al (1998), and Torrisi (2010) for further 
details. 
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impact on t he economic growth, whilst the current expenditures are positively 
correlated with economic growth. Devarajan et al suggest that such results perhaps 
can be possible and not very surprising where productive expenditures can be 
unproductive if there are excessive amounts of them or they have been misallocated as 
it can be the case in many developing countries. The study concludes that the 
widespread belief that an increase in public capital in developing countries promotes 
economic growth may have been exaggerated; some components of current 
expenditure such as o peration and maintenance may carry significant effect on 
economic growth than public capital can do.  
 
Milbourne et al (2003) also employ the endogenous growth model that consists of 
public capital to assess the impact of public investment on economic growth for 74 
countries over the period 1960-1985. The cross-section estimates suggest that public 
investment carries a si gnificant and positive effect on economic growth with quite 
reasonable coefficient that is comparable with private capital coefficient. However, 
these results hold only for OLS estimates, but not for estimates produced by 
instrumental variable IV technique, where the impact of public capital was 
statistically insignificant.144 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
144 The cross- section studies are mostly based on the regression of single equation growth model, 
where the previous econometric problems such as simultaneity bias, causation, and multicollinearity 
may exist in the estimation. A more structural model perhaps can provide a viable way when data 
allowed.  
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Table 4.2 Literature Survey (Some Studies Used VAR and Cross-Section Approaches to Measure  the Impart of  Infrastructure on Economic 
Development) 
Author Sample remarks Public capital variable Main Conclusion 
VAR Approach 
Batina (1998) 
U.S.A  
1948-1993 Time – series estimates Public capital stock  
public capital carries a strong positive long lasting impact on the 
private sector output, and vice versa 
Kamps (2004b) 
22 OECD 
countries, 
1960-2001 Time-series estimates Public capital stock  
Positive and significant impact of public capital on 
private sector output for most countries in the sample. 
Ghali (1998) 
Tunisia, 
1963-1993  Time-series estimates Public investment 
Public investment has a significant negative impact on economic 
growth. 
Cross-Section Studies 
Easterly and 
Rebelo (1993) 
100 countries, 
1970-1988 Cross – section estimates 
The share of investment in transport 
and telecommunication 
Economic growth is positively and robustly correlated with 
infrastructure variable 
Devarajan et al 
(1996) 
43 Developing 
countries, 
1970-1990 Pooled Penal estimates 
Public capital components 
(telecommunication and transport, 
health, education…etc)  
Public capital expenditures have negative and significant impact 
on economic growth, whilst current public expenditures have 
positive effects on the economic growth.  
Milbourne et al 
(2003) 
74 countries, 
1960-1985 Cross – section estimates public investment 
Public investment has positive and significant impact on 
economic growth according to OLS estimates but insignificant 
impact according to IV estimates. 
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Other group of studies employs more structural models, a system of simultaneous 
equations, to measure the effect of pubic capital on the economic performance. A 
system of simultaneous equations model will overcome some econometrics’ problems 
that are associated with the estimation of a single equation, such as simultaneity bias 
and multicollinarity as i t can be the case in some of the other approaches discussed 
above.  Duffy-Deno and Eberts (1989) for instance, measure the impact of public 
capital on the regional economic growth, measured by GDP per capita, for 28 United 
States metropolitan areas over the period 1980-1984 using system that consists of two 
equations, income equation and public investment equation. The 2SLS estimated 
results suggest a positive and statistically significant effect of public infrastructure on 
personal income and vice versa. Duffy-Deno and Eberts suggest two channels for 
public infrastructure effects: one through the actual constructions of public 
investment, and the other one is through the contribution of public infrastructure as 
unpaid input in the production process and as consumption good for households. They 
conclude that public infrastructure has long – run consequences for promoting a 
region’s productivity and its competitive advantage. Therefore, well maintained 
public infrastructure should be an important component of any policy aims to enhance 
regional development. 
 
Roller and Waverman (2001) employ a system of simultaneous equations to 
investigate the impact of telecommunication infrastructure on economic growth for 21 
OECD countries over the period 1970 – 1990. The system consists of four equations: 
production function equation, demand for telecommunication equation, supply of 
telecommunication equation, and the production function of telecommunication 
equation. Using the penetration rate (number of mainline per capita) and controlling 
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for country-specific by fixed effect technique, the GMM estimates of the system 
suggest a si gnificant and positive effect of telecommunication on e conomic growth 
and vice versa. Furthermore, the results suggest that countries with higher level of 
telecommunication infrastructure may well experience a larger impact on output 
compare to those with relatively lower level telecommunication infrastructure.  
 
Moreover, Sridhar and Sridhar (2007) analyse the causal relationship between 
telecommunication infrastructure and economic performance for a sample of 63 
developing countries over the period 1990 – 2001 using a system of four equations 
similar to that of Roller and Waverman (2001).145 According to Sridhar and Sridhar 
the World Bank reports that the investment in telecommunications infrastructure by 
private sector in developing countries between 1993 and 2003 was about 230$bn. And 
therefore it is important to study the relationship between telecommunication 
infrastructure development and the economic performance in those countries as to 
determine if the developing countries have benefited from this recent development in 
this emerging area. The study use main landline penetration and mobile phone 
penetration as proxies for telecommunication infrastructure and allowing for country 
fixed-effect, the 3SLS estimates indicate that total telecommunication infrastructure 
carries a positive and significant effect on the economic growth. They also estimate 
the system for both the main landline penetration variable and the mobile phone; the 
results suggest that the impact of mobile phone variable on growth is greater than that 
of the main landline telephone. They related that to the fact that the cost of 
                                                 
145 Roller and Waverman (2001) argue that the direction of causation between economic growth and 
telecommunication is clearly two-way, increase in telecommunication stimulates economic growth by 
fostering the exchange of good and services, lowering the cost of information...etc, and in return 
increase in economic activities raises the demand for telecommunication services. Thus, unless telecom 
infrastructure investment is modelled, the measured effect of telecom infrastructure on economic 
growth will be bias.    
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infrastructure for landline telephones is greater than that of mobile phones, and 
therefore developing countries have bypassed investment in fixed landlines to 
wireless and cellular mobile system as a way to catch up with developed countries 
since penetration rates of telephones are very low in many developing countries. They 
conclude that the policy makers in developing countries need to promote investment 
in telecommunication by improving regulations and by c reating more competitive 
climate to attract more foreign direct investment into telecommunication industry.  
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Table 4.3 literature survey (Some Studies Used SEM to Measure  the Impart of  Infrastructure on Economic Development) 
Author Sample Remarks Public capital variable Main Conclusion 
Duffy-Deno and 
Eberts 
28 U.S 
metropolitan areas, 
1980-1984 
Two equations, income 
equation and public 
investment equation, pooled 
panel, 2SLS estimates’. Local infrastructure investment. 
Positive and significant effect of public infrastructure on 
personal income, and vice versa. 
Roller and 
Waverman 
(2001) 
21 OECD 
countries, 
1970-1990 
Four equations: production 
function equation, demand 
for telecommunication 
equation, supply of 
infrastructure equation, and 
the production function of 
telecommunication equation, 
pooled panel, GMM 
estimates’.  Main landline penetration 
A significant and positive effect of telecommunication variable 
on economic growth and vice versa. 
Sridhar and 
Sridhar (2007) 
63 Developing 
countries, 
1990-2001 
Four equations: production 
function equation, demand 
for telecommunication 
equation, supply of 
infrastructure equation, and 
the production function of 
telecommunication equation, 
pooled panel, 3SLS 
estimates’. 
Main landline penetration and 
mobile phone penetration 
Both variables have significant and positive effect on economic 
growth and vice versa. But the impact of mobile phone variable 
is greater than that of main landline. 
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4.4 EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
 
Diamond (1990) suggests that the wide range of infrastructure forms indicate that the 
relationship between infrastructure and economic growth is not only very complex but 
also is very real. As direct or indirect input into production, the quality and the 
quantity of infrastructure provisions affect the productivity and the cost of private 
economy. Vast amount of works on the role of infrastructure in economic growth, as 
we reviewed some in the previous section, have shown a positive and significant 
correlation at local, regional, and international levels between the two variables. 
However, the mechanism through which infrastructure affect growth is not fully 
established. A concern of whether infrastructure provisions cause economic growth or 
growth causes infrastructure investments, is not settled yet, as we reviewed different 
approaches that have been proposed in the literature to measure the casual relationship 
between the two variables. 
  
The World Bank report (1994) argues that there are evidences to suggest that 
infrastructure stocks composition do change significantly as i ncome rises and  t he 
economy matures from low-income stage into middle-income then into high-income 
stages, especially for certain infrastructure  - access to safe water, paved roads, 
telecommunication, and power - . Basic infrastructure such as su pply of safe water 
and transport is more important in low-income countries, but as economies grow and 
mature to middle-income stage more transport infrastructure is provided, the share of 
agriculture in the economy declines, and the demand for power and 
telecommunication increases. And as the economies move to high-income level the 
demand and the stocks of telecommunication and power become even greater.   
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Therefore, a more structure model as Sturm et al (1998) and Roller and Waverman 
(2001), among others, suggest perhaps is more appropriate one to measure the 
relationship between the economic growth and the infrastructure investment to control 
for simultaneity bias and to identify the casual relationship.  Yet, Saudi Arabia, as 
most of MENA countries, suffers the lack of the quality and the availability of some 
economic and social indicators to construct a model similar to that suggest by Roller 
and Waverman (2001) or even an wishful one. 
 
Gramlich (1994) argue that public capital is recognised by most economists as an 
important factor in the production of total output. Therefore, the production function 
approach in the context of VAR and cointegration analysis may provide a viable way 
to measure the relationship between the two variables. VAR, as we discussed in the 
second chapter, is a reliable framework that has widely been used in the economics 
literature; an advantage of VAR model is that each variable in the system is a function 
of the lagged values of all endogenous variables in the system and thus simultaneity 
bias is not an issue and OLS yields consistent estimates.  
 
Following the main stream that considers VAR approach (e.g. Kamps 2004b) the 
econometric model is as follow: 
 
                      Ln GDP = α0 + α3 ln KG + ln KP + α2 ln L + ε             
Where GDP is the level of real GDP, KG is public capital stock, KP is private capital 
stock, L is labour force, and ε is the error term. In order to develop the dynamics of 
the model as w ell as t o avoid the simultaneity bias the study employs the Vector 
Autoregressive (VAR) framework to estimate the previous equation. Similar to our 
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analysis in the previous chapter, the impulse responses and variance decompositions 
analyses as well as t hat of the cointegration and ECM are carried out here. All 
variables are measured in the real terms of 2000 prices, and they are all in the natural 
logarithm form. 
 
4.5 DATA AND DATA SOURCES  
 
Real GDP is used as proxy for total output, public capital expenditure is used as proxy 
for public capital stock KG, 146 and Credit to private sector is used as indicator for 
private capital stock KP. Labour force is considered as indicator for employment. 
 
Data for GDP, public capital expenditure, and credit to private sector are obtained 
from the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency SAMA annual report (2010). Data for 
labour force from 1980 to 2008 is obtained from the World Development Indicators 
(WDI) (2010). To estimate the data for labour force during the period from 1970 to 
1979 we used data for the number of government’s employees to derive the labour 
force data from 1970 t o 1979. We find that the percentages of government’s 
employees in the labour force range from 9 percent to 11 percent throughout the time 
from 1980 to 2008. Hence, we consider 10 percent as an average rate and drive the 
labour force during the 1970s using data for the number of government’s employees 
which is available from SAMA annual report from 1970.147  The data for all variables 
range from 1970 to 2008.  
                                                 
146 Disaggregated data on public capital expenditure, such as transports and telecommunications, health 
and social development…etc, are available only from 1981, which offers limited number of 
observations for the estimation. Thus, we consider total public capital expenditure which is available 
from 1970. 
147 Simply if X is the number of government’s employees, and Y is the labour force. Then if X is 10 
percent of Y then: Y= (1/0.10) X.   
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4.6 EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 
 
4.6.1 UNIT ROOT TESTS 
 
The two alternative unit root tests, the Augmented Ducky-Fuller (ADF) test and 
Philips-Perron (PP) test, have been carried out to assess the degree of integration for 
each variable considered. The results of both tests suggest that our variables (real 
GDP, real public capital expenditure KG, real credit to private sector KP, and labour 
force L) are all first difference stationary I (1); the null hypothesis of a unit root in the 
level form of all four variables cannot be rejected at 5% level, but it was significantly 
rejected at 1% level for all first difference form of the variables by both unit root test 
as in Table 4.4.    
 
Table 4.4: Unit Root Tests 
            
H0: The variable has a unit root     
Variables  
Order of 
 integration ADF  K P-P  L 
LGDP I (0) -2.501 1 -2.785 0 
LRKG I (0) -2.861 0 -2.698 2 
LRKP I (0) -2.607 1 -1.777 5 
LL I (0) -1.628 0 -1.574 3 
ΔLGDP I (1) -5.493** 0 -5.492** 2 
ΔLRKG I (1) -7.093** 1 -7.835** 5 
ΔLRKP I (1) -4.664** 0 -4.591** 8 
ΔLL I (1) -3.911** 0 -3.906** 3 
Note: k is the degree of augmentation in ADF tests determined automatically based on (SIC). L is the 
bandwidth determined automatically based on (Newly-West Bandwidth). 
Two asterisks ** indicate the significance at 1%. 
 
Following the same steps as i n the previous chapter we estimate VAR and extract 
VAR’s impulse responses and variance decompositions. Cointegration test of 
Johansen (1988) and the estimation of the Vector Error Correction Model (ECM) is 
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then conducted to detect the presence of long – run relationship among the variables. 
The empirical analysis is as follow: 
 
4.6.2 VAR ESTIMATION, IMPULSE RESPONSES, AND VARIANCE 
DCOMPOSITIONS  
 
The appropriate lag length for VAR is tested, and the results suggest that the system is 
stable with 3 lags; the roots of the companion matrix are all less than one in absolute 
value as in Table B.1 in Appendix B. Further properties of the VAR system can also 
be found there. All residual except those from the equation for credit to private sector 
are normally distributed, also there is no autocorrelation. Hence, the dynamic of the 
VARs system is examined using both the impulse responses and variance 
decompositions methods.  
 
4.6.2.1 IMPULSE RESPONSES 
 
In the correlation matrix of the residuals there are evidences of high correlation 
between some variables (e.g. 0.41 between GDP and L) which may imply that the use 
of Cholesky decomposition might not produce unique impulse responses. However, 
we notice that the impulse responses provided by Cholesky are not too dissimilar in 
time-profile and magnitude to those produced by Generalized responses as in figure 
4.3, which may suggests that the order of the variables into VAR does matter but only 
slightly. Both the impulse response functions of Cholesky decomposition and those of 
Generalized Responses of Pesaran and Shin (1998) are depicted here with two 
standard error bands above an below the function as in Figure 4.3. We provide here 
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two sets of impulse responses: the first six subplots to the left in figure 4.3 is the 
impulse responses of GDP, KP, and L to a one standard deviation shock to public 
capital KG, and the second 6 subplots to right in the figure is the impulse responses of 
KG to a shock in each one of the other three variables (GDP, KP, and L) in the VAR 
system.  
 
The plotted Generalized responses in Figure 4.3 show that GDP shifts upward after a 
one-off innovations to public capital KG, and then decreases gradually for 10 periods 
before the impact becomes negative and continues to be to the end of the period. The 
responses of the other two production factors (KP, and L) may represent whether an 
increase in the third production factor in our model “public capital” is substitutable or 
complementary to the other production factors (KP and L). Private capital KP shifts 
downward after a shock to the public capital KG, but constantly increases for 4 years 
and gradually deceases for 10 ye ars before the impact reverts to negative impact 
which continues to the end of the period. The responses of Labour L to a one standard 
deviation shock to public capital KG are similar to some extent to that of private 
capital; a downward shifts at the start with negative impact for 3 ye ars then a 
constantly increase until it become positive after 4 years and continue to increase for 
another 10 years before it start receding to the end of the period.  
 
The positive increase in the total output GDP at the start after a shock to public capital 
KG may indicates the role of public capital in stimulating economic activities, but the 
gradual decrease of the impact and the negative impact thereafter perhaps is a sign of 
low rate of return on public investment – the ratio of pubic capital to GDP in Saudi 
Arabia is relatively high ranging from 60 to 91 percent in the last four decades - , or 
 196 
may refer to the low level of efficiency at which these public projects have been 
constructed and operated.148 On the other hand, an increase in the level of public 
capital appears to be complementary to private capital KP, in the medium run, but it 
can be substitutable in the short run and to some extent in the long-run.149 
Interestingly, labour force and public capital seem to be complements in the long-run 
which may indicate the public capital enhances economic activities and, hence, the 
demand for labour. However, the negative impact that public capital has at the start on 
both private capital and labour force, and at the end of the period in case of KP, 
perhaps is as result of crowding out effect.  
 
The second 6 subplots to the left in Figure 4.3 depict the response of public capital to 
shocks to the other variables in the model. After one-off innovations to GDP public 
capital KG shifts upwards at the start then increases for one year before it starts 
decreasing in cyclical pattern until it becomes negative after 12 years and continues to 
be negative until the end of the period. On the other hand, public capital seems to 
response negatively to an increase in the private capital as it can be seen from the 
subplot in figure 3-3. An increase in labour force also appears to carry negative 
impact on the public capital for the first 15 years before it becomes a positive effect 
that continues to the end of the period. So, it appears, to some extent, as it is from the 
previous plots; public capital and labour force may be substitutable in the short-run 
but they might be complement in the long-run, whilst public capital and private 
                                                 
148 Kamps (2004b) relates the negative output response to a shock in public capital that he finds for 
Japan to the high rate of public capital to total output where the ratio may have been beyond the 
optimal level – the highest amongst OECD countries the ratio of public capital to GDP in Japan ranges 
between 95 and 117 percent from 1980 to 2000 (Kamps, 2004a) – so that additional public capital may 
have negative impact.  
149 Note that the responses of private capital may help in explaining the pattern of the output responses, 
as public capital may crowd out private capital. 
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capital may be complement in the short-run but they can be substitutable in the long-
run.    
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Figure 4.3: Impulse Responses  
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4.6.2.2 VARIANCE DECOMPOSITIONS  
 
Variance decompositions, as we mentioned in the previous chapter, provide another 
method to analyse the dynamic of the VAR system. They break down the variation of 
the dependent variables into the component shocks to the VAR system and measure 
the relative importance of each random innovation in affecting the variables in the 
VAR system.   
 
Table 4.5: Table of Variance Decompositions: One Standard Deviation 
Innovation to The variable in the Top Raw, impact on the variables in the left 
hand column. 
  GDP KG KP L 
After 1 period 
GDP 100 12.778 2.716 17.403 
KG 0 87.221 2.707 1.778 
KP 0 0 94.576 1.453 
L 0 0 0 79.363 
After 2 period 
GDP 86.131 24.914 24.384 10.899 
KG 1.968 73.86 5.422 2.794 
KP 11.42 0.416 65.911 11.813 
L 0.481 0.808 4.282 74.493 
After 5 period 
GDP 76.778 27.188 24.779 6.684 
KG 4.27 70.023 14.523 4.082 
KP 13.793 1.864 57.173 45.528 
L 5.158 0.923 3.522 43.705 
After 10 period 
GDP 72.471 27.376 36.426 23.398 
KG 4.681 67.349 15.9 9.873 
KP 16.779 3.121 44.203 44.762 
L 6.069 2.152 3.468 21.965 
After 20 period 
GDP 67.724 28.634 34.994 34.482 
KG 6.993 61.086 15.227 15.727 
KP 19.366 7.627 44.642 33.643 
L 5.9158 2.652 5.135 16.147 
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Table 4.5 reports the variance decompositions for all variables in the system. The 
second column in the table shows that after an innovation the contribution of public 
capital KG variation in the variations of GDP is slowly increases from around 2% 
after 2 pe riods  t o around 4% after 5 pe riods but marginally increases  t hereafter 
amounting for about 7%  after 20 periods have elapsed. Similarly, the contribution of 
the variation in labour force in the variations of GDP is slowly increases throughout 
the periods where it peaks at 6% after 10 periods and marginally declines thereafter. 
On the other hand, the variations in GDP appear to be influenced constantly 
throughout the periods by the variations of private capital settling at around 20% after 
20 periods. Column 2 shows that only the variation of GDP has significant 
contributions to the variations in public capital where it increases from about 12% 
after first period to 27% after 5 periods and settles at about 28% after 20 periods have 
elapsed. The contributions of the variations in the other two variables, private capital 
and labour force, to the variations in public capital are very small until 20 pe riods 
have passed. The last two columns show the variation in GDP has a substantial 
influence throughout in the variations of private capital and that of labour force 
amount for about 36% and 23% respectively after 10 periods. The variation of public 
capital KG gradually contributes in the variations of the private capital, settling at 
around 15% after 10 years. It also influences the variations of labour force (column 5) 
where it amounts for about 15% after 20 periods have elapsed.  
 
Such information along with those drawn from the impulse responses leads us on to 
try to identify possible long – run relationships between the variables in the VAR 
system.  
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4.6.2.3 VECM AND COINTEGRATION RELATIONSHIP: 
 
Possible long – run relationships between the variables in the system would require 
the presence of cointegration relationships between particular variables, and then the 
estimation of vector error correction model (ECM). Similar to our analysis in the 
previous chapter, we consider Johansen cointegration technique which consists of two 
alternative likelihood ratio tests, the Trace statistic test and the Maximum Eigenvalue 
test. In detecting the presence of cointegration, the choice here is between Model 3 
and Model 4 of Johansen (1995). The results statistics of both tests “Trace statistic” 
and “Maximum Eigenvalue test” for both Models “Model 3” and “Model 4” are based 
on the maximum likelihood estimates of VAR of order 3, and they are reported in 
Appendix B.   
  
We note that under both models there are two cointegration vectors (2CVs), according 
to both likelihood ratio tests, and they are significant at 5% level as in Appendix B. 
This means that we can use Johnsen’s Likelihood Ratio test 2χ  to test for the presence 
of trend (Model 4) versus the restricted model of no trend (Model 3) in the CVs. The 
test has degrees of freedom equal to the rank of the matrix (r), that is, the number of 
CVs. The test statistic was calculated and the outcome was; 2χ (2) = 12.091, which is 
grater that the 5% critical value of 5.99. Thus, we accept the restriction implied by 
Model 4 that a trend should be included in the CVs. 
 
Based on our  model, the production function, we were able to identify two 
cointegartion relationships as they are reported in Table 4.6 and graphed in Figure 
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4.4.150 The LR test for binding restrictions with probability of (0.448), which is greater 
than (0.05), implies that the restrictions do hold and hence the βs coefficients can be 
unique. The first coitegration vector is normalised on private capital and represent the 
long – run relationship between private investment and total output as suggested by 
economic theory. Income could be the main determinant of the demand for credit by 
private sector in Saudi Arabia, whilst the level of public capital and that of labour 
have no significant impact of the private investment.151  
 
The second cointegration vector is normalised on GDP and may be regarded as the 
long – run relationships between the level of output and the levels of public capital 
KG, private capital KP, and labour force L. Converting it into equation indicates that 
in the long-run the level of GDP is positively affected by the level of public capital, 
private capital, and the level of employment. Private capital carries a positive and 
highly significant impact on the level of output which may confirm the prediction of 
the economic theory and the general view that private investment is an important 
factor in the production of total output. An elasticity of 0.42 implies that a 1 percent 
increase in private capital would boost total output by 0.42 percent, where the 
estimated effect is highly significant.  The coefficient of labour is restricted to 1 to 
identify the cointegration vector and, hence, is significant, but the coefficient of public 
capital, though with positive sign, is very small and is not significant. Effectively, 
there is along – run relationship between output and two production factors (privat 
capital KP and employment L). 
                                                 
150 Both cointegration vectors  a re level stationary I(0) at 5% level of significance with intercept 
according to KPSS unit root test with LM stat for the first CV1 is (0.173), and (0.217) for the second 
CV2 which for both below the 5% critical value of (0.463). 
151 Looney (1990) argue that Saudi Arabia has open economy and, hence, the crowding out effect of 
public investment on private investment may be less effective since private investors have access to the 
international market. 
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Table 4.6: Identified Cointegration Equations 
Cointegration Restrictions:    
      B(1,3)=1,B(2,1)=1,B(1,1)=-1   
      B(2,4)=-1    
      B(1,2)=0,B(1,4)=0,   
      A(2,1)=0,A(2,2)=0,A(3,2)=0   
Convergence achieved after 78 iterations.  
Restrictions identify all cointegrating vectors  
LR test for binding restrictions (rank = 2):   
Chi-square(5)  4.738985    
Probability  0.448558    
     
     Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1 CointEq2   
     
     GDP(-1) -1.000000  1.000000   
     
KG(-1)  0.000000 -0.012323   
   (0.02530)   
  [-0.48712]   
     
KP(-1)  1.000000 -0.420679   
   (0.07936)   
  [-5.30109]   
     
L (-1)  0.000000 -1.000000   
     
@TREND(70) -0.069221  0.045374   
  (0.00493)  (0.01061)   
 [-14.0396] [ 4.27708]   
     
C  3.301356 -7.778266   
Note: the notations for the coefficients β and α are as follow: βi j is the coefficient of j
th variable in 
cointegration vector i. and αi j is the adjustment coefficient in the VEC equation i with respect to the 
error correction term from cointegration vector j.  ( ) =standard error: [ ] = t-stats 
 
Why public capital appears to have insignificant effect on the development of total 
output? Is it because of the relatively high level of capital expenditure in Saudi 
Arabia, and, hence, a low rate of return on additional investment “over-investment” as 
Kamps (2004b) finds for Japan, and Harb (2009) for some GCC countries)? Or, 
perhaps, is due to the misallocation phenomenon of public investment in the MENA 
(Ghali, 1998; and Makdisi et al, 2003; Agenor et al, 2005; among others), and/or to 
the disparity in the level of development among the regions in Saudi Arabia (Benna, 
1995)?    
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Joharji and Starr (2010), as they try to explain the low rate of return on publ ic 
investment that they found for Saudi Arabia, call for a reform of budgetary 
classifications system in order to obtain more detailed and classified data to pinpoint 
the components of public capital that drag down public capital productivity. They in 
fact find the current government expenditure is way more productive than public 
capital expenditure, and as Devarajan et al (1996) suggest, they argue that allocating 
public spending to maintenance and improvement of the existing infrastructure could 
be much more growth promoting than engaging in further investment. Agenor et al 
(2005), on the other hand, suggest that an improvement in the constructions and the 
operations of the public infrastructures would require redirecting the role of the public 
sector as a  catalyst, rather than a provider, of most of the infrastructure services, 
which will allow for the engagement of private sector in the infrastructure investment. 
Such engagement of private sector may provide commercial disciplines to the delivery 
of the services and thereby improving the quality and the quantity of the services as 
well as the level of efficiency.  
 
The misallocation of public investment, where public investment projects are badly 
conceived or managed that they operate at uneconomically high cost, is well noticed 
phenomenon in most countries in the MENA region and, to some extent, most of 
developing world as suggested by some researchers (Ghali, 1998; Magdisi et al, 2000; 
Agenor et al, 2005; among others). In a rentier state such as Saudi Arabia with 
relatively unlimited supply of capital the situation could be worst. As main recipient 
of the oil rent, the government has built a big bureaucracy to plan, execute, regulate, 
and to maintain the development process (Al-Hegelan and palmer, 1985). The 
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devastating impact that a rain storm had on t he second major city in Saudi Arabia 
“Jeddah” in November 2009, perhaps can be a reflection of the poor infrastructure 
development despite the massive public investment that have been devoted to public 
infrastructure development in the city. An impact of such magnitude that shocked 
both the government and the public; over 100 people lost their life’s and many roads 
and districts flooded with many houses and businesses are destroyed with billions of 
riyals worth of damage cost. The government has acted immediately by f orming a 
committee to investigate and to assess the reasons of such impact to happen with the 
permission to interrogate any government official regardless of his position.    
 
In other hand, Looney (1990) argues that there is a general agreement among 
economists that conflicting results and/or undesirable situations is expected if the 
public infrastructure investment, labour market planning, and educational planning are 
unconnected. Saudi Arabia has acquired a huge public investment that is way beyond 
the quantity and the quality of the human capital formation in the country, and has, to 
large extent, relied on expatriate labour to construct and to operate the public 
infrastructure projects (Al-Hegelan and palmer, 1985; among others). Moreover, the 
transfer of technologies and skills that are required for the constructions and the 
operations of these investment projects have been rather slow. Therefore, the 
argument of conflicting results or undesirable situations, as Looney suggests, perhaps 
can be evident in Saudi Arabia: despite the heavy public investment in different 
sectors the problem of a relatively high rate of unemployment among the Saudi 
nationals has been a major concern for Saudi government since early 1990s and up to 
now. 
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To check whether these two identified cointegration vector can be informative, in 
essence that their predicted values for their dependent variables did no converge too 
far from their actual values. We employ the series of KP and GDP given by first and 
second vectors to forecast their long-run values across the extended data set against 
their actual values as they graphed in Figure 4.4. The graph shows that the long-run 
values of KP and GDP appear to wander around their actual values and seem to have 
similar trend of those of the actual values, especially those of KP. Such results may 
imply that the long-run relationship anticipated by the second CV2 may hold, and thus 
the public capital expenditure may have insignificant impact of the level of output, 
whilst private capital and employment appear to have significant contributions to the 
level of GDP.  
 
The results from the dynamic specification of VEC in Table 4.7 s how that in the 
short-run public capital expenditure has positive but insignificant impact on the level 
of GDP, the lagged dynamic effect of public capital on GDP equation are all positive 
but insignificant ( not different from zero). On the other hand, both private capital KP 
and the level of employment carry short – run positive impacts on GDP; first dynamic 
lag in case of private capital KP and through the second dynamic lag  i n case of 
employment L. We also notice that the retained adjustment coefficients (theα s) are 
all statistically significantly different from zero. Moreover, results suggest that the 
public capital variable KG is the “weakly exogenous” variable in the system: that is, it 
is not influenced by the disequilibrium in the 2 long-run relationships.  The changes in 
public capital KG appear to kick starts changes in the GDP, KP and L: essentially, 
since our variables are measured in logs, an increase/decrease in the growth of KG 
generates movements in the rates of growth of the other variables. 
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Table 4.7: ECM Estimation 
Error Correction: DGDP DKG DKP DL 
CointEq1 -0.861449  0.000000 -0.375903  0.179515 
  (0.35379)  (0.00000)  (0.07596)  (0.04975) 
 [-2.43494] [ NA] [-4.94855] [ 3.60829] 
     
CointEq2 -0.906183  0.000000  0.000000  0.190596 
  (0.29728)  (0.00000)  (0.00000)  (0.04198) 
 [-3.04822] [ NA] [ NA] [ 4.53992] 
     
D(GDP(-1)) -0.253108  1.034496  0.307345  0.063487 
  (0.19203)  (1.02348)  (0.11001)  (0.02565) 
 [-1.31806] [ 1.01076] [ 2.79383] [ 2.47552] 
     
D(GDP(-2) -0.198070  0.728534 -0.420505 -0.028106 
  (0.17084)  (0.91055)  (0.09787)  (0.02282) 
 [-1.15938] [ 0.80010] [-4.29658] [-1.23184] 
     
D(KG(-1))  0.038925 -0.415213 -0.033980  0.000113 
  (0.03027)  (0.16132)  (0.01734)  (0.00404) 
 [ 1.28606] [-2.57391] [-1.95975] [ 0.02791] 
     
D(KG(-2))  0.030456 -0.683474  0.005578 -0.005022 
  (0.03332)  (0.17758)  (0.01909)  (0.00445) 
 [ 0.91411] [-3.84892] [ 0.29222] [-1.12864] 
     
D(KP(-1))  1.159809  0.051582  0.494476 -0.033011 
  (0.24051)  (1.28187)  (0.13778)  (0.03212) 
 [ 4.82229] [ 0.04024] [ 3.58887] [-1.02771] 
     
D(KP(-2))  0.310188 -0.133164 -0.523633 -0.072508 
  (0.23869)  (1.27218)  (0.13674)  (0.03188) 
 [ 1.29954] [-0.10467] [-3.82944] [-2.27457] 
     
D(L(-1))  0.638410  5.684262  2.042567  0.048436 
  (1.21265)  (6.46316)  (0.69469)  (0.16195) 
 [ 0.52646] [ 0.87949] [ 2.94027] [ 0.29908] 
     
D(L(-2))  2.792980  6.031524  0.081424 -0.082316 
  (1.03921)  (5.53877)  (0.59533)  (0.13879) 
 [ 2.68760] [ 1.08897] [ 0.13677] [-0.59310] 
     
C -0.269825 -0.603291  0.038857  0.061152 
  (0.10292)  (0.54853)  (0.05896)  (0.01374) 
 [-2.62176] [-1.09983] [ 0.65907] [ 4.44907] 
     
Note: ( ) =standard error: [ ] = t-stats 
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Figure 4.4: Cointegration Relationships, and Actual Values of the Variables 
Against the Values Predicted by Their Cointegration Vectors  
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4.7 CONCLUSION 
 
The role of public infrastructure in the development process has been thought of by 
many economists and policy makers as an important factor for economic growth. This 
chapter reviews large body of literature in the role of public capital investments’ and 
surveys different approaches that been considered to assess the casual relationship 
between the economic development and public capital.  Most of the surveyed studies, 
with few exceptions, suggest that pubic capital raises the productivity and reduces the 
cost of production. Among various approaches and estimating methods, the 
production function approach of Aschaeur (1989) in the context of VAR model and 
cointegration analysis is selected to examine the impact of public capital expenditures 
on the economic development in Saudi Arabia throughout the period from 1970 t o 
2008.  
 
The vast amount of windfalls from oil revenues since early 1970s has allowed Saudi 
Arabia to invest heavily in the development of public infrastructure, giving the fact 
the country had very little of public capital infrastructure prior to the 1970s. However, 
The main finding of the empirical results of the VAR/ECM estimations suggest that 
despite the relatively heavy public investment that Saudi Arabia has acquired in the 
last four decades, it appears such heavy public investment has insignificant – albeit 
positive – impact on the level of economic development in the country. Such results 
as Devarajn et al (1996) suggest perhaps can be possible and not very surprising 
where productive expenditures can be unproductive if there are excessive amounts of 
them or they have been misallocated as i t can be the case in many developing 
countries. Saudi Arabia, as mentioned earlier, has a relatively high rate of public 
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capital to GDP – 60 percent to 91 percent in the last for decades – with a big 
bureaucracy involved in planning and executing public project, low rate of return on 
public investment as well as the misallocation of public investment may have higher 
probability.   
 
Saudi Arabia may need a m ore careful and pragmatic economic planning that 
considers the characters of Saudi economy such as the level of human capital 
formation, the small market size of the country, and the nature of the economy 
“rentier economy”. for example, despite the fact that Saudi Arabia is a relatively very 
wide country and hence the railway transport and the constructions of dry ports in all 
regions should be on t he priority to increase the regional productivity within the 
country and to increase the exchanges of goods and services, however, the railway 
transports system is the least developed transport system in the country.  
 
Saudi Arabia has become increasingly concern over misallocations and 
mismanagement of public investment and the rapid deterioration of public facilities. 
Thus, allocating public spending to where there is need for, and to the maintenance 
and the improvement of the existing infrastructure could be much more growth 
promoting than engaging in further investment as it has been suggested by  Agenor et 
al (2005), and Joharji and Starr (2010), among others. Furthermore, encouraging the 
participation of private sector in the investment and the operation of public 
infrastructure can be crucial to alleviate the delivery and the quality of public 
infrastructure services.  
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CHAPTER 5  
CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
 
This chapter summarises the findings of the earlier chapters and provides the general 
conclusion of the thesis. The aims of this thesis have been to assess the role of the 
state in economic development for the member countries of the GCC. The fact that 
GCC countries are rentier economies and the state, as the recipient of natural resource 
wealth, plays the key role in all economic activity raises the importance of 
investigating the impact of government actions on t he development process of the 
economy. The directions in which the government allocates its expenditure dictate the 
distribution of income and the allocations of resources to foster growth and 
development. The analysis concentrates on three aspects of the role of the state that 
might have special importance to the development process in those countries.  
 
First, we examine an indirect role of the state in economic development by exploring 
the role of the financial development in affecting the development of other sectors in 
the economy. In such developing countries with a substantial concurrent flow of 
windfall from natural resource exportations, financial institutions can play a major 
role in the development of other sectors in the economy by channelling the wealth to 
the other promising sectors and, thereby, alleviate the developmental problems of 
other sectors. In addition, financial system can contribute significantly to total output 
since these countries have abundance of financial assets that may give them a 
comparative advantage in the financial and banking industries.  The government has 
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played an important role in trying to develop financial institutions and foster financial 
development. However, for small rich developing countries that sit on the world’s 
largest proven oil and natural gas reserves, security of the field and the trade of the oil 
is a major concern for these countries. GCC region is one, if not the first, of the highly 
defence spending regions in the developing world, and correspondingly has higher 
level of arms imports. Thus, the impact of such heavy defence expenditure in 
economic development is analysed as it may be regarded as a direct role of the state. 
Moreover, the oil wealth has allowed some of these countries to engage in relatively 
large programmes of investments in public infrastructure since early 1970s, as the aim 
is to alleviate the socio-economic level of the country and to lead the process of 
economic development. Infrastructure has widely been thought of as an essential base 
for productive economic activities. Thus, the final analytical chapter assesses the role 
that public capital investment may have had on the development of economic activity 
in Saudi Arabia over the period 1970-2008 as another direct role of the state in the 
development process.  
 
Chapter 2 reviews the development of financial sector in the GCC region in the last 
four decades. The chapter assesses the financial deepening in the region as well as the 
development of capital market and the monetary policy in these countries. Review of 
literature shows that there are two opposite hypothesis regarding the casual 
relationship between economic development and the state of financial development. 
Supply-leading hypothesis where more developed financial sector promotes the 
development process by e.g. mobilizing savings, facilitating the exchange of goods 
and services, and allowing investor to diversify risks. Demand –following hypothesis, 
on the other hand, suggests that the financial development grows in respond to the 
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economic growth and it may not be the one who can lead the development. It is rather 
the growth of the real side of the economy what promotes the development of 
financial sector.  
The aim of chapter 2 is to identify the casual relationship between the financial 
development and the economic growth in the GCC countries. Has the financial system 
promoted the economic development in the region, or it is merely a consequence of 
the development process as a whole.  This may have an important implication for the 
policy makers in the region where these countries may have a comparative advantage 
in financial industry as the region have abundant of financial capital. Four proxies of 
financial development are selected to represent the level of financial development 
(e.g. M3/GDP, credit to private sector as a share of GDP), and three alternative 
causality tests – Granger–causality tests, Sims–causality, and G-M-D causality tests –
are considered to assess the causal relationship and the direction of causation between 
financial development and economic growth in each country in the GCC in the last 
few decades. The results suggest that there is a long – run relationship between the 
level of economic development and the state of financial development in 4 countries 
in the sample (Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE). The results further suggest 
that for those countries that have been engaging for quite sometimes (e.g. Bahrain, 
UAE, and to lesser extent Kuwait) in improving the level of financial system; the 
financial system seems to facilitate the economic growth.  For Oman, some evidence 
suggest that the financial sector perhaps is growing in respond to the development of 
the real side of the economy, whilst the financial development and economic 
development appear to be mutually correlated  in case of Saudi Arabia. Qatar, in the 
other hand, has mixed results; different forms of causation are reported for each 
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indicator according to Granger – causality tests. However, the low frequency of the 
data may cast doubt over Qatar’s results. 
 
Chapter 3 investigates the role that security outlays may have on the development 
process in GCC countries. This chapter gives an overview of the region security and 
the historical events that have challenged the security and the stability of the region, 
and consequently have led to higher defence expenditure that characterises the GCC 
countries. The chapter also survey the theoretical models that have been considered in 
the literature to measure the effect of defence spending on economic development. 
Various model and technique have been applied in the literature  of  defence-growth 
nexus, five groups of different models are reviewed which include Benoit’s work, 
demand side models, supply side models, Deger type models ( system of equation 
model), and Solow models. Among those models, the classic production function 
approach in the form of Cobb-Douglas is considered to measure the effect of defence 
expenditure and economic growth. The empirical analysis is carried out in the context 
of time series and VAR model for 4 c ountries in the GCC region (Bahrain, Oman, 
Saudi Arabia, and UAE) over different periods in the last four decades.   
 
The emerging results suggest that there appears to be a long-run relationship between 
the level of defence expenditure and the level of economic development in all 
countries considered. However, the effect of defence expenditure on t he economic 
growth appears to convey Benoit’s argument of the positive impact of defence 
expenditure on economic growth for the members of the GCC with relatively small 
economy and low level of defence burden (Bahrain and Oman). On the other hand, 
Saudi Arabia and UAE with their high defence burdens, the effect is significantly 
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negative; higher defence expenditure in both countries appears to retard the economic 
growth in the long-run.  
 
Chapter 4 a nalyses the impact of public capital on t he development process in one 
member of the GCC, Saudi Arabia. The chapter reviews the public capital expenditure 
and the development of public infrastructure in Saudi Arabia in the last four decades 
1970-2008.  The theoretical models that have been applied in the literature to assess 
the casual relationship between the public capital and economic development are 
reviewed and grouped into five groups:  the production function approach, cost-
function approach, Vector Autoegressions VAR model, endogenous growth model, 
and simultaneity equations models SEM. The widely common approach of Aschaure 
“the production function approach” is employed in the context of time series analysis 
and VAR model.  
 
The finding suggests that public capital may enhance economic activity in the short-
run, but it has insignificant impact in the long-run.  Despite the low level of public 
capital that Saudi Arabia had up to the 1960s, the rate of return on the heavy public 
investment, which the government has been launching since early 1970s, may have 
been well below the expectations. This finding convey the findings of other works 
that have assesses the role of public capital in Saudi Arabia and some other countries 
in the MENA region (e.g. Ghali, 1998;  M agdisi et al, 2000; Agenor et al, 2005; 
Joharji and Starr,  2010).  Perhaps, the inefficient allocations of public investments as 
proposed by some researches as well as the high rate of public investment in Saudi 
Arabia may explain the low rate of return on public investment.    
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The main findings and contributions of this thesis as well as some policy implications 
of the thesis could be summarised as follow:  
      1. Financial sector can a growth promoting sector for some GCC countries. 
 
The results suggest the existence of long – run relationship between economic growth 
and financial development for all GCC countries except for Kuwait. For Bahrain and 
UAE, and to lesser extent Kuwait, the results also suggest that the financial system 
can be a leading sector in the process of economic development, where the supply – 
leading hypothesis appears to fit the relationship between economic growth and 
financial development in the last few decades. In Oman economic development 
appears to stimulate the financial development, whilst the bi-directional causality may 
fit the relationship between economic development and the level of financial 
development in case of Saudi Arabia. Qatar has mixed results. 
 
Financial sector can be a promising sector for all GCC countries, given the fact of 
limited domestic investment opportunities outside that of energy related sectors. The 
region can act as a financial centre for MENA region and to large extent other 
neighbouring developing regions such as East Africa, Indian subcontinent, and the 
new independent states in central Asia. Thus, GCC countries may need to consider the 
financial sector as promising sector that can contribute significantly to their economic 
development. The fact that the capital assets of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking 
Corporation (HSBS) is greater than that of the top 50 ba nks in the GCC region is 
totally disappointing. Merger between Banks in the region should be promoted; as the 
banker (2004) suggests the GCC Banks’ will be unable to survive the competition – 
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with such small fragmented banking sector – with well established international banks 
when markets do eventually open up.    
The central banks may need to take the lead in the process of promoting financial 
sector development by reviewing their regulation procedures that may hinder or slow 
the development of financial system; hard to acquire a commercial bank license is a 
common feature in the region which has lower the level of competition and led to high 
level of concentration in the banking industry. The lack of mortgage schemes in the 
financial system in some GCC countries has hindered the development of hosing and 
real estate sectors. Lack or  weak regulations that governor the insurance activities has 
also led to a small and fragile insurance industry; central bank of Saudi Arabia, for 
example, has just recently released the complete rules and regulations for insurance 
activities. Furthermore, there is a n eed in all GCC members to enhance prudential 
regulations and supervision, upgrade the standards of transparency and provision of 
financial information, and reduce government participation in financial institutions 
and allow for foreign participation. More and more attention needs to be devoted to 
alleviate the standards as well as the strength and the soundness of the financial 
institutions in the GCC so they can be able to take their position in the international 
market.  
 
The government, in principle, will have a major developmental role in actively 
promoting and prudentially regulating the financial sectors of the economy. Given 
that the central banks of these countries are not ‘independent’ as in the European or 
US sense, they still rely heavily on the directions provided by f inance ministries. 
Thus, the regulatory and promotional aspects of finance lie heavily in the hands of 
government. Further research on the institutional aspects of government involvement 
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in the governance and development of financial institutions, markets and structure 
would be fruitful. 
      2. Higher defence expenditure retards economic growth and development in 
some GCC countries. 
 
For GCC countries with high defence expenditure (Saudi Arabia, and UAE), the 
empirical results indicates that defence expenditure appears to negatively affect 
economic development in the long-run. On the other hand, the countries with lower 
and modest defence spending (Bahrain and Oman), defence expenditure seems to 
carry positive externalities to the economy.  However, the security of the region 
perhaps is beyond the security of these countries alone, oil is a strategic good and any 
disturbance in its supply can hit the security of most counties in the world, especial 
those with high level of oil consumption such as U.S, which may explain the 
permanent presence of American force in the region.   
 
History shows that these countries have always received substantial external help 
from foreign powers to halt the internal and the external threats; e.g. Oman against the 
rebellions in the 1960s, Kuwait against Iraq in the 1961 and 1990, and Saudi Arabia 
against the extremist rebels in 1979, as well as the permanent presence of British and 
then American troops in most of the GCC states up to now.  It seems to be impossible 
for the small GCC states to carry their security on their own; they are so small 
countries in terms of land area and population size. So moving to a union stage 
perhaps is the best way to ensure the security of all GCC members. GCC countries 
should understand that their security cannot be separable and is always to be together. 
The call from the king of Saudi Arabia in the GCC annual summit in December 2011 
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to move from cooperation stage to the union stage perhaps is a reflection of the 
necessity for these countries to merge into more formal political and economic system 
such as federation system or confederation one. In such political and economic system 
the GCC countries can perhaps build a strong regional power that is capable of 
carrying its security on its won. Moreover, the heavy defence expenditures of those 
countries can be better allocated in such political system and technological and skill 
transfers can be increased as these countries may engage in heavy defence industries.  
 
The role of the state is paramount in the analysis of defence and development, 
particularly since defence is the quintessential public good. This thesis looked at 
military expenditure and growth in a macroeconomic framework for the GCC. Further 
research would emphasise the micro aspects of the interconnections. Most important 
would be a potential study on defence industrial co-operation which could identify the 
areas where a co-operative defence structure would be the most beneficial. This would 
also reduce arms import which many analysts believe have the most direct growth 
retardation effects. 
 
3. The return on the higher public capital in Saudi Arabia may have been 
well below the expectations.  
 
The empirical results of the fourth chapter suggest that although public capital outlays 
may carry positive effect in the economy in the short – run, it has insignificant impact 
on the economic development in the long – run. Misallocation and inefficient use of 
the public investment may have been the cause of the low rate of return on publ ic 
capital as it is the case in most countries in the MENA region according to different 
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resources (e.g. Ghali, 1998; Magdisi et al, 2003). Thus, more allocation to the 
maintenance and the improvement of the existing public infrastructure could be much 
more growth promoting than engaging in further investment. Furthermore, 
encouraging the participation of private sector in the investment and the operation of 
public infrastructure can be crucial to alleviate the delivery and the quality of public 
infrastructure services.  
 
Economic development, labour market, and education system in all GCC countries 
seem to be unconnected; despite the heavy public investment in Saudi Arabia or in 
other GCC countries since the 1970s, the problem of high level of unemployment 
among the GCC nationals has been a real concern to the governments for over two 
decades.152 The very low percent of national labour in the private sector is a common 
feature in all GCC countries;  Saudi Arabia, for example, as it is trying to tackle the 
problem of growing unemployment among the national labour sets 5 percent as the 
minimum national labour that each private company has to employ. Furthermore, 
although the governments in the region have always been the biggest employer of the 
national labour, the governments’ employment capacity in these countries could not 
keep up with the growing populations since late 1980s.  
 
Policy makers in GCC countries, therefore, need to consider some economic features 
of their economies in the economic planning such as the dominant role of natural 
resource sector in the economy, small market size (low level of population), and the 
comparative advantage that they may have in some energy related industries as well 
as in banking and financial industries. In essence, the more emphasise perhaps should 
                                                 
152 Kuwaitization, Omanization, and Saudization are the alternative terms that reflect the high levels of 
unemployment among national labour in the region.  
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be put on the development of the sectors with comparative advantage (e.g. 
petrochemical industries, oil refinery, aluminium, airline transports, banking 
industries, insurance and reinsurance activities) should go ha nd in hand with 
development of the education system and educational institutions in the related fields, 
as well as increasing the foreign participations in such industries to alleviate the level 
of efficiency and to allow for technological and skills transfers. If data was available 
on human capital formation, further research would use a similar econometric model 
to analyse the impact of human capital (education, skills, technology) on economic 
growth. 
 
Finally, this thesis may have some weight but it is far from perfect and has its 
limitations.  The lack of data for most GCC countries as well as the short span of the 
time series for some economic and social indicators has limited the choices of 
empirical methodologies and dictated the empirical analysis. Some limitations of the 
work as well as some suggestions to guide further empirical and econometric research 
are reviewed below. 
  
In chapter two the low frequency of the data for most countries in our sample may 
cast doubt over the reliability of the results. So, considering more financial indicators 
and see w hether the main conclusion for each country does hold, would be useful.  
Furthermore,  i t would be perhaps more appropriate to include more countries with 
similar characters such as those of OPEC and apply panel techniques to get over the 
short span of the data problem and to assess if there is a general pattern for the causal 
relationship between economic development and the level of financial system 
development in rentier economies.  
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The main limitation in chapter three is data availability. If aggregate military 
expenditure could be broken down into its components, such as personnel and 
procurement, then we could investigate which aspect of defence is relatively more 
productive or harmful to economic growth. Moreover, it might be interesting to 
investigate whether the heavy defence expenditure (demand for arm) that 
characterises some GCC countries is as results of an arm race going on between Iran 
and GCC countries with their American ally over the control of the strategic region of 
the Persian Gulf, as the political tension between Iran and GCC member has been 
escalated since the beginning of this century. An empirical arms race model for the 
region would be an interesting future research project, given the usual problems of 
data.  
 
Chapter four has also its own limitations. The total public capital expenditure for 
Saudi Arabia, which includes different forms of capital expenditures (e.g. education, 
infrastructure, health), is used as proxy for the infrastructure investment; this may 
mask the actual impact of the infrastructure investment. In addition, the estimated 
power of the model can perhaps become better if a human capital proxy is included in 
the model along with existing variables (public and private capital, as well as the level 
of labour force), which would require the construction of human capital proxy based 
upon the economic and social data available about Saudi Arabia. Adding other 
countries to the sample, and estimating their own time series analysis would also be 
fruitful. Construction of more appropriate human capital proxy may give better 
estimated results by the model. However, GCC countries as most MENA countries do 
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not have data for long periods for human capital indicators such as education 
expenditure, enrolment ratio, and average year of schooling. 
 
The thesis generally has added to knowledge of the role of the state in economic 
development, with special focus on the GCC rentier states, by a pplying some 
appropriate data analysis technique to assess the impact of government intervention 
on economic development. It also provides some economic overview over one of the 
fast growing developing economies, the rentier states of the GCC. Traditional results 
that emerge from empirical studies are usually based upon the estimation of a single 
equation using basic econometrics techniques. We have utilised more advanced 
econometrics to estimate and analyze the impact of the government on development 
in major direct and indirect channels.  T he empirical results of this thesis are 
noteworthy and add contributions to the overall literature of the role of the state in 
economic development.     
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APPENDIX A1: Bahrain 
Bahrain: The VAR Estimates and the Diagnostic Tests  
  Table A1.1: Vector Autoregression Estimates (Bahrain) 
 GDP K D L 
     
GDP(-1)  0.489569  0.256584  0.755735 -0.006452 
  (0.18200)  (0.44573)  (0.55221)  (0.00887) 
 [ 2.69000] [ 0.57564] [ 1.36855] [-0.72759] 
     
k(-1)  0.009363  0.644726 -0.055928  0.001839 
  (0.05180)  (0.12686)  (0.15716)  (0.00252) 
 [ 0.18077] [ 5.08227] [-0.35586] [ 0.72852] 
     
D(-1)  0.109817  0.136512  0.580818 -0.002975 
  (0.05053)  (0.12375)  (0.15332)  (0.00246) 
 [ 2.17331] [ 1.10309] [ 3.78834] [-1.20845] 
     
L(-1) -2.440289 -4.731532  0.809407  0.959615 
  (0.63073)  (1.54474)  (1.91376)  (0.03073) 
 [-3.86899] [-3.06299] [ 0.42294] [ 31.2242] 
     
C -0.146192 -6.372923 -2.115660  0.039447 
  (0.78846)  (1.93106)  (2.39236)  (0.03842) 
 [-0.18541] [-3.30023] [-0.88434] [ 1.02676] 
     
TREND  0.095744  0.141276 -0.040433  0.000777 
  (0.02358)  (0.05775)  (0.07154)  (0.00115) 
 [ 4.06055] [ 2.44642] [-0.56516] [ 0.67660] 
     
      R-squared  0.981799  0.856389  0.905320  0.999917 
 Adj. R-squared  0.978008  0.826470  0.885595  0.999899 
 Sum sq. resids  0.079989  0.479794  0.736407  0.000190 
 S.E. equation  0.057731  0.141391  0.175167  0.002813 
 F-statistic  258.9270  28.62352  45.89713  57664.49 
 Log likelihood  46.33784  19.46580  13.03938  136.9840 
 Akaike AIC -2.689189 -0.897720 -0.469292 -8.732264 
 Schwarz SC -2.408950 -0.617480 -0.189053 -8.452025 
 Mean dependent  7.611689  6.138816  4.500700 -0.721377 
 S.D. dependent  0.389289  0.339417  0.517882  0.280498 
     
      Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  8.30E-12   
 Determinant resid covariance  3.40E-12   
 Log likelihood  225.8296   
 Akaike information criterion -13.45530   
 Schwarz criterion -12.33435   
     
Note: ( ) =standard error: [ ] = t-stats 
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 Diagnostic Tests: 
1) The roots of the companion matrix:  
                                  Table A1.2 
                                      
Root Modulus 
0.988543 0.988543 
0.763707 0.763707 
0.676189 0.676189 
0.24629 0.24629 
 
2) Residuals’ tests:  
                               Table A1.3 
Equation Normal distribution test 
  J-B statistic Kurtosis 
Y 7.126      (0.028) 4.326    (0.138) 
K 2.815      (0.244) 1.499    (0.093) 
D 0.346      (0.841) 2.507    (0.581) 
L 2.967      (0.226) 1.851    (0.199) 
Vector  13.256  (0.103) 
Vector tests 
  AR(4) Hetero 
LM (χ2 (16) )   17.52 (0.353)   
χ ( 100)   108.20 (0.270)  
 
 
 
3) Cointegration test: 
 
Table A1.4 
Johansen Maximum Likelihood cointegration test 
No. of CV 
Model 3   Model 4 
Max- Eigen 
 statistic 
Trace 
Statistic  
Max- Eigen 
 statistic 
Trace 
statistic 
None 85.795* 119.6362*  87.123* 138.588* 
at most 1 28.514* 33.840*   32.466* 51.465* 
* Significant at %5 level of significance. 
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APPENDIX A2: OMAN 
The VAR Estimates and the Diagnostic Tests  
 Table A2.1: Vector Autoregression Estimates 
 GDP K D L 
GDP(-1)  0.489569  0.256584  0.755735 -0.006452 
  (0.18200)  (0.44573)  (0.55221)  (0.00887) 
 [ 2.69000] [ 0.57564] [ 1.36855] [-0.72759] 
     
K(-1)  0.009363  0.644726 -0.055928  0.001839 
  (0.05180)  (0.12686)  (0.15716)  (0.00252) 
 [ 0.18077] [ 5.08227] [-0.35586] [ 0.72852] 
     
D(-1)  0.109817  0.136512  0.580818 -0.002975 
  (0.05053)  (0.12375)  (0.15332)  (0.00246) 
 [ 2.17331] [ 1.10309] [ 3.78834] [-1.20845] 
     
L(-1) -2.440289 -4.731532  0.809407  0.959615 
  (0.63073)  (1.54474)  (1.91376)  (0.03073) 
 [-3.86899] [-3.06299] [ 0.42294] [ 31.2242] 
     
C -0.146192 -6.372923 -2.115660  0.039447 
  (0.78846)  (1.93106)  (2.39236)  (0.03842) 
 [-0.18541] [-3.30023] [-0.88434] [ 1.02676] 
     
TREND  0.095744  0.141276 -0.040433  0.000777 
  (0.02358)  (0.05775)  (0.07154)  (0.00115) 
 [ 4.06055] [ 2.44642] [-0.56516] [ 0.67660] 
     
      R-squared  0.981799  0.856389  0.905320  0.999917 
 Adj. R-squared  0.978008  0.826470  0.885595  0.999899 
 Sum sq. resids  0.079989  0.479794  0.736407  0.000190 
 S.E. equation  0.057731  0.141391  0.175167  0.002813 
 F-statistic  258.9270  28.62352  45.89713  57664.49 
 Log likelihood  46.33784  19.46580  13.03938  136.9840 
 Akaike AIC -2.689189 -0.897720 -0.469292 -8.732264 
 Schwarz SC -2.408950 -0.617480 -0.189053 -8.452025 
 Mean dependent  7.611689  6.138816  4.500700 -0.721377 
 S.D. dependent  0.389289  0.339417  0.517882  0.280498 
     
      Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  8.30E-12   
 Determinant resid covariance  3.40E-12   
 Log likelihood  225.8296   
 Akaike information criterion -13.45530   
 Schwarz criterion -12.33435   
     
Note: ( ) =standard error: [ ] = t-stats 
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Diagnostic Tests:  
1) The roots of the companion matrix: 
                  Table A2.2 
                                      
Root Modulus 
 0.905703 - 0.030989i  0.906233 
 0.905703 + 0.030989i  0.906233 
 0.345108  0.345108 
 0.225238  0.225238 
 
 
2) Residuals’ tests:  
                     Table A2.3 
Equation Normal distribution test 
  J-B statistic Kurtosis 
Y 1.570     (0.456)  1.985   ( 0.241) 
K 1.894     (0.387) 1.818    (0.172) 
D 3.990     (0.136) 1.275    (0.046) 
L 2.970     (0.226) 1.519    ( 0.087) 
Vector  10.425 (0.236) 
Vector tests 
  AR(3) Hetero 
LM (χ2 (16) )  15.46  (0.492)    
χ ( 100)   123.124  (.058)  
 
 
3) Cointegration test: 
 
Table A2.4: Johansen Maximum Likelihood cointegration test 
No. of CV 
Model 3   Model 4 
Max- Eigen 
 statistic 
Trace 
statistic  
Max- Eigen 
 statistic 
Trace 
statistic 
None 96.46* 126.77*  106.82* 153.08* 
at most 1 23.079* 30.310*   24.425* 46.259* 
* Significant at %5 level of significance. 
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APPENDIX A3: SAUDI ARABIA 
The VAR Estimates and the Diagnostic Tests  
 Table A3.1: Vector Autoregression Estimates 
 GDP K D L 
GDP(-1)  0.824620  0.586559  0.095932  0.000577 
  (0.24164)  (0.18054)  (0.18303)  (0.00071) 
 [ 3.41267] [ 3.24889] [ 0.52413] [ 0.81786] 
     
GDP(-2) -0.584135 -0.357895  0.014634  0.000326 
  (0.29156)  (0.21784)  (0.22085)  (0.00085) 
 [-2.00347] [-1.64289] [ 0.06626] [ 0.38309] 
     
GDP(-3) -0.122399  0.122959  0.090762 -0.000682 
  (0.28812)  (0.21527)  (0.21824)  (0.00084) 
 [-0.42482] [ 0.57118] [ 0.41588] [-0.81123] 
     
GDP(-4)  0.054279  0.102809 -0.047015  0.000921 
  (0.25121)  (0.18770)  (0.19029)  (0.00073) 
 [ 0.21607] [ 0.54774] [-0.24707] [ 1.25577] 
     
K(-1)  0.868286  0.810676  1.074753 -0.000714 
  (0.32703)  (0.24435)  (0.24772)  (0.00095) 
 [ 2.65507] [ 3.31775] [ 4.33865] [-0.74789] 
     
K(-2) -0.566059 -0.265778 -0.278996  0.000864 
  (0.38085)  (0.28456)  (0.28848)  (0.00111) 
 [-1.48631] [-0.93401] [-0.96711] [ 0.77750] 
     
K(-3) -0.415622  0.179422  0.025040 -0.000893 
  (0.38456)  (0.28733)  (0.29129)  (0.00112) 
 [-1.08079] [ 0.62445] [ 0.08596] [-0.79505] 
     
K(-4) -0.330394 -0.380777  0.342019 -0.000598 
  (0.32919)  (0.24596)  (0.24935)  (0.00096) 
 [-1.00366] [-1.54813] [ 1.37163] [-0.62267] 
     
D(-1)  0.304080  0.117231 -0.186323  0.000344 
  (0.21986)  (0.16427)  (0.16654)  (0.00064) 
 [ 1.38306] [ 0.71364] [-1.11880] [ 0.53619] 
     
D(-2)  0.242372  0.078020 -0.120210  0.000722 
  (0.20856)  (0.15583)  (0.15798)  (0.00061) 
 [ 1.16212] [ 0.50068] [-0.76093] [ 1.18617] 
     
D(-3)  0.189403 -0.019582 -0.187121  0.001077 
  (0.18669)  (0.13949)  (0.14141)  (0.00055) 
 [ 1.01453] [-0.14039] [-1.32322] [ 1.97606] 
     
D(-4)  0.387453  0.143961  0.142538  0.000419 
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  (0.19239)  (0.14375)  (0.14573)  (0.00056) 
 [ 2.01387] [ 1.00147] [ 0.97808] [ 0.74520] 
     
L(-1)  26.35571 -26.68264 -124.9475  3.102338 
  (57.8412)  (43.2169)  (43.8131)  (0.16886) 
 [ 0.45566] [-0.61741] [-2.85183] [ 18.3726] 
     
L(-2) -36.74112  84.16112  358.8278 -3.686227 
  (160.519)  (119.934)  (121.589)  (0.46861) 
 [-0.22889] [ 0.70173] [ 2.95116] [-7.86636] 
     
L(-3) -16.67210 -91.99827 -333.5840  1.929087 
  (160.410)  (119.852)  (121.506)  (0.46829) 
 [-0.10393] [-0.76760] [-2.74541] [ 4.11945] 
     
L(-4)  25.27195  33.87344  100.8979 -0.354504 
  (57.2658)  (42.7869)  (43.3772)  (0.16718) 
 [ 0.44131] [ 0.79168] [ 2.32606] [-2.12053] 
     
C  3.198777 -2.800654  2.798175  0.007902 
  (2.11745)  (1.58209)  (1.60391)  (0.00618) 
 [ 1.51067] [-1.77023] [ 1.74459] [ 1.27834] 
     
TREND  0.078927  0.017362 -0.051631  0.000126 
  (0.02702)  (0.02019)  (0.02047)  (7.9E-05) 
 [ 2.92085] [ 0.85996] [-2.52249] [ 1.60356] 
     
      R-squared  0.984758  0.993003  0.993325  1.000000 
 Adj. R-squared  0.973962  0.988047  0.988597  0.999999 
 Sum sq. resids  0.454403  0.253672  0.260720  3.87E-06 
 S.E. equation  0.137599  0.102809  0.104227  0.000402 
 F-statistic  91.21393  200.3578  210.0858  3861529. 
 Log likelihood  35.45984  47.70158  47.12612  280.5888 
 Akaike AIC -0.831421 -1.414361 -1.386958 -12.50423 
 Schwarz SC -0.086706 -0.669645 -0.642243 -11.75951 
 Mean dependent  5.939178 -0.307614  3.788133  2.548352 
 S.D. dependent  0.852733  0.940354  0.976038  0.508287 
     
      Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  1.55E-13   
 Determinant resid covariance  1.65E-14   
 Log likelihood  428.0207   
 Akaike information criterion -16.95337   
 Schwarz criterion -13.97451   
     
Note: ( ) =standard error: [ ] = t-stats 
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Diagnostic Tests  
1- The roots of the companion matrix: 
                     Table A3.2 
Root Modulus 
 0.947695 - 0.136455i 0.957468 
 0.947695 + 0.136455i 0.957468 
 0.803646 - 0.473712i 0.932871 
 0.803646 + 0.473712i 0.932871 
 0.482181 - 0.687432i 0.839678 
 0.482181 + 0.687432i 0.839678 
 0.835091 0.835090 
 0.714863 - 0.419788i 0.829006 
 0.714863 + 0.419788i 0.829006 
-0.470159 - 0.677586i 0.824726 
-0.470159 + 0.677586i 0.824726 
-0.722562 0.722561 
 0.135002 - 0.612043i 0.626755 
 0.135002 + 0.612043i 0.626755 
-0.393837 - 0.261753i 0.472887 
-0.393837 + 0.261753i 0.472887 
 
2- Residuals’ tests:  
                               Table A3.3 
Equation Normal distribution test 
  J-B statistic Kurtosis 
Y 6.886     (0.032) 1.026      (0.009) 
K 6.222     (0.044) 1.135      (0.013) 
D 3.406     (0.182) 2.806      (0.798) 
L 4.768     (0.092) 1.358      (0.087) 
Vector  21.284 ( 0.006) 
Vector tests 
  AR(3) Hetero 
LM (χ2 (16) )  21.89  (0.147)   
χ ( 320)    338.60 ( 0.227) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 231 
3- Cointegration test: 
 
Table A3.4 
Johansen Maximum Likelihood cointegration test 
No. of CV 
Model 3   Model 4 
Max- Eigen 
 statistic 
Trace 
statistic  
Max- Eigen 
 statistic 
Trace 
statistic 
None 45.043* 76.949*  45.296*  101.448* 
at most 1 5.133* 5.133*    33.784* 56.151* 
* Significant at %5 level of significance. 
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APPENDIX A4: UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (UAE) 
The VAR Estimates and the Diagnostic Tests  
Table A4.1: Vector Autoregression Estimates 
 GDP K D L 
     
GDP(-1)  0.624531  0.148421  0.570555 -0.009749 
  (0.20320)  (0.09812)  (0.28025)  (0.00333) 
 [ 3.07349] [ 1.51266] [ 2.03588] [-2.92454] 
     
GDP(-2) -0.342576  0.072609  0.074462  0.001110 
  (0.25598)  (0.12361)  (0.35304)  (0.00420) 
 [-1.33828] [ 0.58742] [ 0.21091] [ 0.26430] 
     
K(-1)  0.273293  0.169159 -0.451639  0.006858 
  (0.28851)  (0.13931)  (0.39791)  (0.00473) 
 [ 0.94724] [ 1.21422] [-1.13502] [ 1.44886] 
     
K(-2)  0.071265  0.201452  0.013872 -0.003476 
  (0.18054)  (0.08718)  (0.24899)  (0.00296) 
 [ 0.39474] [ 2.31087] [ 0.05571] [-1.17363] 
     
D(-1)  0.344342  0.160489  0.469391 -0.008463 
  (0.14097)  (0.06807)  (0.19443)  (0.00231) 
 [ 2.44264] [ 2.35768] [ 2.41425] [-3.65950] 
     
D(-2)  0.013400  0.231207 -0.160539  0.000247 
  (0.16936)  (0.08178)  (0.23357)  (0.00278) 
 [ 0.07913] [ 2.82729] [-0.68732] [ 0.08890] 
     
L(-1) -3.844665  2.223160  20.33924  1.705871 
  (5.17913)  (2.50085)  (7.14296)  (0.08497) 
 [-0.74234] [ 0.88896] [ 2.84745] [ 20.0773] 
     
L(-2)  1.720324 -4.423261 -15.36336 -0.727599 
  (4.37440)  (2.11227)  (6.03310)  (0.07176) 
 [ 0.39327] [-2.09408] [-2.54651] [-10.1389] 
     
C  4.108670 -1.902264 -1.383009  0.119204 
  (1.85300)  (0.89476)  (2.55562)  (0.03040) 
 [ 2.21731] [-2.12601] [-0.54116] [ 3.92132] 
     
TREND  0.118905  0.125866 -0.239745  0.001526 
  (0.05893)  (0.02845)  (0.08127)  (0.00097) 
 [ 2.01785] [ 4.42350] [-2.94997] [ 1.57884] 
     
      R-squared  0.895084  0.975494  0.963771  0.999994 
 Adj. R-squared  0.850120  0.964991  0.948244  0.999991 
 Sum sq. resids  0.215512  0.050250  0.409935  5.80E-05 
 S.E. equation  0.101304  0.048917  0.139717  0.001662 
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 F-statistic  19.90672  92.88094  62.07104  390573.1 
 Log likelihood  33.02814  55.59637  23.06194  160.4429 
 Akaike AIC -1.485686 -2.941701 -0.842706 -9.705991 
 Schwarz SC -1.023110 -2.479125 -0.380129 -9.243415 
 Mean dependent  12.16523  6.223500  4.439029  0.574351 
 S.D. dependent  0.261671  0.261438  0.614138  0.568883 
     
      Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  5.76E-13   
 Determinant resid covariance  1.21E-13   
 Log likelihood  285.0356   
 Akaike information criterion -15.80875   
 Schwarz criterion -13.95844   
     
Note: ( ) =standard error: [ ] = t-stats 
 
Diagnostic Tests  
1- The roots of the companion matrix:  
                               Table A4.2 
Root Modulus 
0.789979 - 0.353192i 0.865339 
0.789979 + 0.353192i 0.865339 
0.839896 0.839896 
0.142289 - 0.561936i 0.579671 
0.142289 + 0.561936i 0.579671 
-0.473484 0.473484 
0.369001 - 0.120001i 0.388024 
0.369001 + 0.120001i 0.388024 
 
2-Residuals’ tests:  
                  Table A4.3 
Equation Normal distribution test 
  J-B statistic Kurtosis 
Y 5.033      (0.080) 1.027      (0.024) 
K 5.717      (0.057) 0.896      (0.016) 
D 2.333      (0.311) 1.735      (0.150) 
L 5.219      (0.073) 0.991      (0.022) 
Vector   18.304 ( 0.019) 
Vector tests 
  AR(3) Hetero 
LM (χ2 (16) )  11.577  (0.772)     
χ ( 180)   166.05   (0764)  
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3- Cointegration test: 
 
Table A4.4 
Johansen Maximum Likelihood cointegration test 
No. of CV 
Model 3   Model 4 
Max- Eigen 
 statistic 
Trace 
statistic  
Max- Eigen 
 statistic 
Trace 
statistic 
None 79.7580* 131.570*  86.275*  165.323* 
at most 1 35.2717* 51.812*  48.463* 79.047* 
at most 2 12.750* 16.540*   19.295* 30.583* 
* Significant at %5 level of significance. 
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APPENDIX B:  
The VAR Estimates and the Diagnostic Tests  
 
Table B1: Vector Autoregression Estimates 
 GDP KG KP L 
     
GDP(-1)  0.363277  2.130050  0.582292  0.035956 
  (0.23300)  (1.29100)  (0.14758)  (0.03436) 
 [ 1.55911] [ 1.64992] [ 3.94558] [ 1.04638] 
     
GDP(-2) -0.039564 -0.536198 -0.740408 -0.095907 
  (0.22318)  (1.23659)  (0.14136)  (0.03291) 
 [-0.17727] [-0.43361] [-5.23769] [-2.91385] 
     
GDP(-3)  0.169045 -0.409847  0.384574  0.022389 
  (0.16812)  (0.93151)  (0.10649)  (0.02479) 
 [ 1.00550] [-0.43998] [ 3.61151] [ 0.90300] 
     
KG(-1)  0.045141  0.387675 -0.018682 -0.000382 
  (0.03387)  (0.18766)  (0.02145)  (0.00500) 
 [ 1.33276] [ 2.06579] [-0.87085] [-0.07651] 
     
KG(-2)  0.007986 -0.325158  0.048306 -0.003269 
  (0.03700)  (0.20503)  (0.02344)  (0.00546) 
 [ 0.21581] [-1.58589] [ 2.06099] [-0.59902] 
     
KG(-3) -0.039299  0.443070  0.010693  0.007098 
  (0.03867)  (0.21426)  (0.02449)  (0.00570) 
 [-1.01627] [ 2.06792] [ 0.43658] [ 1.24460] 
     
KP(-1)  0.698069 -0.804140  1.041922  0.079516 
  (0.24578)  (1.36180)  (0.15567)  (0.03625) 
 [ 2.84022] [-0.59050] [ 6.69297] [ 2.19375] 
     
KP(-2) -0.454927 -0.637105 -0.890421 -0.004936 
  (0.31957)  (1.77067)  (0.20241)  (0.04713) 
 [-1.42354] [-0.35981] [-4.39899] [-0.10474] 
     
KP(-3) -0.235242  1.111756  0.480106  0.066758 
  (0.23605)  (1.30790)  (0.14951)  (0.03481) 
 [-0.99656] [ 0.85003] [ 3.21112] [ 1.91766] 
     
L(-1) -0.653707  4.418918  1.770406  0.706277 
  (1.55903)  (8.63817)  (0.98747)  (0.22992) 
 [-0.41930] [ 0.51156] [ 1.79286] [ 3.07184] 
     
L(-2)  1.459576 -0.038240 -2.102387 -0.178061 
  (1.61625)  (8.95521)  (1.02372)  (0.23836) 
 [ 0.90306] [-0.00427] [-2.05368] [-0.74703] 
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L(-3) -1.085151 -6.190887  0.306157  0.211822 
  (1.17280)  (6.49815)  (0.74284)  (0.17296) 
 [-0.92527] [-0.95272] [ 0.41214] [ 1.22469] 
     
C  6.016547 -6.151853  0.183580 -0.617107 
  (1.72271)  (9.54503)  (1.09114)  (0.25406) 
 [ 3.49250] [-0.64451] [ 0.16825] [-2.42901] 
     
T  0.035223  0.081119  0.032520 -0.003581 
  (0.01508)  (0.08355)  (0.00955)  (0.00222) 
 [ 2.33578] [ 0.97086] [ 3.40472] [-1.61009] 
     
      R-squared  0.946521  0.642871  0.996200  0.998919 
 Adj. R-squared  0.914919  0.431840  0.993954  0.998280 
 Sum sq. resids  0.441920  13.56675  0.177290  0.009611 
 S.E. equation  0.141730  0.785284  0.089770  0.020902 
 F-statistic  29.95179  3.046332  443.6294  1564.028 
 Log likelihood  28.12082 -33.51564  44.56098  97.02814 
 Akaike AIC -0.784490  2.639758 -1.697832 -4.612674 
 Schwarz SC -0.168677  3.255571 -1.082019 -3.996861 
 Mean dependent  13.17988  10.64835  11.35965  1.455782 
 S.D. dependent  0.485898  1.041816  1.154531  0.504052 
     
      Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  2.86E-08   
 Determinant resid covariance  3.98E-09   
 Log likelihood  143.8193   
 Akaike information criterion -4.878849   
 Schwarz criterion -2.415597   
     
Note: ( ) =standard error: [ ] = t-stats 
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2- The roots of the companion matrix:  
        Table B2 
Root Modulus 
 0.948459 - 0.194209i 0.968138 
 0.948459 + 0.194209i 0.968138 
 0.382743 - 0.784767i 0.873127 
 0.382743 + 0.784767i 0.873127 
-0.412004 - 0.593529i 0.722513 
-0.412004 + 0.593529i 0.722513 
-0.323246 - 0.584334i 0.667783 
-0.323246 + 0.584334i 0.667783 
0.646533 0.646533 
0.474982 0.474982 
 0.092867 - 0.412375i 0.422703 
 0.092867 + 0.412375i 0.422703 
 
 
 
2-Residuals’ tests:  
                  Table B3 
Equation Normal distribution test 
  J-B statistic Kurtosis 
GDP 4.304        (0.116) 4.016        (0.045) 
KG 4.167        (0.124) 2.156        (0.142) 
KP 6.514        (0.038) 6.494        (0.011) 
L 2.331        (0.311) 2.321        (0.917) 
Vector  17.318   (0.027) 
Vector tests 
  AR(4) Hetero 
LM (χ2 (16) )  14.231        (0.581)   
χ ( 260)   303.636          (0.0325) 
 
3- Cointegration test: 
 
Table B4 
Johansen Maximum Likelihood cointegration test 
  Model 3   Model 4 
NO of CVs 
Maximal 
eigenvalue 
 statistic 
Trace  
statistic  
Maximal 
Eigenvalue 
 statistic 
Trace  
statistic 
None 65.173* 96.922*   66.289* 121.624* 
at most 1 21.78* 31.749*   32.755* 55.334* 
* Significant at %5 level of significance. 
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